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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RANDY G. MOON 
Petitioner and Cross-
Respondent, 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, 
and the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES. 
Cross-Petitioner and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
AND RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
CaseNo.980134-CA 
Priority 14 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the Career Service Review Board of the State of 
Utah. Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-14(1997). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A formal evidentiary hearing was held under the Administrative Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. (1997) and the State Grievance and Appeal Procedures, Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et seq. (1996). Following the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner Randy 
G. Moon (Moon) appealed the decision to the Career Service Review Board (Board). The 
Board upheld the termination of Petitioner on the ground of a poaching incident, but rejected 
the Department of Natural Resources' (Department) claim that Moon had abused his 
position. Moon appeals the ultimate decision upholding his termination and the Department 
cross-appeals the Board's ruling that Moon did not abuse his position. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Has Moon properly challenged the Board's findings that he was an active, 
knowing participant in the poaching incident which justified his termination? 
Standard of review: For Moon to successfully argue that his version of the facts are 
controlling, he must marshal the evidence in favor of the Board's findings and establish that 
after all reasonable inferences supporting the findings are viewed, they are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 
1993); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311.315 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Does one prior case decided by the Board under different Board rules and 
before this Court decided the Board's role in reviewing agency decisions bind the Board? 
Standard of review: The Board's determination that a prior case is not binding in 
Moon's case is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness. Savage Industries. Inc., v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1991). 
3. Did the Board correctly affirm as reasonable and rational the Department's 
termination of Moon for the poaching incident alone? 
Standard of review: The Board, in applying the facts as established in the evidentiary 
hearing must determine whether the decision of the Department is reasonable and rational. 
2 
Kent v. Department of Employment Security, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1993); Taylor v. 
Department of Commerce. 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah App. 1998). 
ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
4. Did the Board incorrectly rule that Moon did not "abuse his position" when he 
got other employees to issue a permit change without following specific procedures required 
by rule? 
Standard of review: The determination of whether the Board correctly ruled is an 
issue of law, reviewed for correctness. See: Savage, supra. Morton, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable in this matter. The text of the 
provisions either appears in the argument or in Addendum to this Brief. 
STATUTES: Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1(2) (1995); Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4(3) 
(1996); Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(5)(e) (1996). 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: Utah Admin. Code R137-1 -20(1) (1994); Utah Admin. 
CodeR137-l-21(D)(3)(1997); Utah Admin. CodeR137-l-22(4)(1997); UtahAdmin. Code 
R477-1 l-l(3)(e) (1996); Utah Admin. Code R657-37-4(8)(a) and (b) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Moon had been deputy director of the Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) and at 
the time of his termination was serving in the director's office as DWR's Programs and Field 
Operations Administrator. Moon was terminated from employment because he actively 
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participated in a poaching incident with his son in Wyoming and abused his position in 
getting other employees to violate published division rules in obtaining a permit transfer 
from one Posted Hunting Unit (PHU) to another PHU. 
Moon appealed the director's decision to the Board, which assigned a hearing officer 
to hear the appeal. The hearing officer, after a four-day evidentiary hearing, issued a 
decision sustaining Moon's termination on both grounds set forth by the Department. 
Petitioner appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Board which, after reviewing 
the briefs, transcripts, and evidence and hearing oral argument overturned the hearing 
officer's conclusion that Moon had abused his position, but sustained the termination on the 
poaching incident alone. From that decision, included Addendum B, Moon appeals and the 
Department cross-appeals to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ANTELOPE POACHING INCIDENT 
Moon and his sons were hunting in the Crawford Mountain area as described in the 
Utah Hunting Proclamation for 1996 at page 51 (Exhibit G-5, R. 208). Moon and his sons 
Nathan and Ryan each saw an entering Wyoming sign when they drove east of Randolf on 
Highway US 30 (R.864, R. 976, R. 1028). The Utah-Wyoming state marker is on the fence 
line west of a power station where a painted stripe is on the roadway (A-19, R. 203; R. 1172). 
The north-south fence from the marker was the marked border (R. 441). During the summer 
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of 1996, Wyoming state employees had marked the roads with markers consisting of steel 
posts, boards and signs where Moon and his sons hunted (R. 438-9). 
Where Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220 crosses into Utah from Wyoming at the 
south, Utah/Wyoming markers were present and visible (R.292-3, R. 324, R. 492, R. 564). 
Between the border markers to the north and south, however, there were no additional 
markers on the fence line (R. 494, R. 564). Lincoln County Road 220 connects with US 
Highway 30 about .2 to .25 miles to the east of the Utah/Wyoming border (R. 293, R. 435, 
R. 490, R. 872). The road angled back into Utah (R. 293) about 1 mile from US 30 (R. 492). 
Moon and his son Nathan acknowledged that when they turned south off US 30 onto 
Lincoln County Road 220, they were in Wyoming (R. 937, R. 994). They drove south on 
Lincoln County Road 220 approximately 700 yards or four-tenths of a mile where Nathan 
got out of the car with his rifle (R. 875). While there, Moon and his sons saw a white 
Suburban on the west side of the fence herding antelope (R.449, A-2, point N, R. 159, R. 
473, R. 533-4, R. 873-5, R. 995). From where the Moons were on Lincoln County Road 220 
they were several hundred yards from the fence - border (R. 316; G-56 pictures, R. 227). 
Moon and his sons saw several antelope jump the fence heading easterly between the 
fence and the front of their vehicle (R. 469, R. 874, R. 995, R. 1019). As the antelope ran 
toward Lincoln County Road 220, they crossed between the Moon vehicle and a power 
substation east of the border. Moon told his son Nathan "Don't shoot at the power station.'1 
(R. 450, R. 534,R. 875, R. 952, R. 977). The antelope crossed Lincoln County Road 220 
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some distance in front of the Moon vehicle and headed easterly over a hill (Point E, Exhibit 
A-2, R. 159, R. 469) at which time Nathan shot one round (R. 449-50, R. 534, R. 875, R. 
977, R. 1020) and missed (R. 457, R.534, R.1001, R. 1020). 
Moon drove his vehicle up a spur road after the antelope which headed further 
northeasterly (R. 450, R. 876, R. 978, R. 1021). Nathan told Wyoming Officer Neil Hymas 
that the antelope were running away fast "further into Wyoming" (R. 471). As they were 
returning to Lincoln County Road 220, they encountered the white Suburban they had seen 
earlier. Moon had a conversation with the driver of the Suburban. Nathan testified that the 
driver of the Suburban advised them that he thought the fence line south of the substation 
was the state line (R. 472, R. 995-6). 
Glen and Jane Chen were also parked along the spur road observing another hunter 
shooting at an antelope in a bowl area east of Lincoln County Road 220 (R. 282, R. 313). 
As Moon and his sons met the Chen vehicle, Mr. Chen asked Moon "Aren't we in Wyoming 
here?" (R. 282, R. 314, R. 880, R. 1023). Moon responded : "Yes, the Utah border is back 
behind us at the fence line" (R. 282, R. 282, R. 315). Nathan confirmed that that is what his 
father told the Chens (R. 472). Moon added that he believed they were in Wyoming (R. 452, 
R. 1160) and said: "According to the guy in the white truck we are" (R. 880). Later, Moon 
told Officers Hymas and Woody that he believed Lincoln County Road 220 was the state line 
(R. 486, R. 887, R. 1160). 
Moon drove his vehicle down Lincoln County Road 220 where they saw a group of 
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antelope in a bowl east of the road approximately 350-400 yards (R. 436, R. 479). Moon 
asked his son what he wanted to do (R. 882) and let Nathan and his brother out to hunt the 
antelope (R. 1024). Nathan and Ryan climbed over a southern hill east of Lincoln County 
Road 220 stalking the antelope (R. 453), shooting four shots from varying distances (R. 289, 
R. 453, R. 459, R. 884). One antelope did not run and Nathan ultimately shot the antelope 
at point blank range (R. 289, R. 981). 
Moon stood outside his vehicle and watched the shooting (R. 292, R. 322, R. 337, R. 
453, R. 884). He tried to get his sons' attention (R. 292) by whistling or calling to them (R. 
292) and waiving his arms (R. 292, R. 323). The boys had left the carcass and were walking 
back until Moon got their attention. Thereafter, the boys walked back to the antelope and 
began dragging it toward the Moon vehicle (R. 292-3). Moon walked up the draw to see if 
he could determine whether the animal had been previously hit (R. 456, R. 503, R. 504, R. 
1024). Nathan and Ryan dragged the antelope to Moon to be by him and be in a "safety 
zone" with their father (R. 537). 
Moon told his son to f,Go ahead and clean it,f (R. 1025) and while Nathan did most 
of the field dressing (R. 963), Nathan said "My dad got me started gutting the antelope" (R. 
503) and assisted in field dressing the animal (R. 477), all of which took place on the east 
side of Lincoln County Road 220 (R. 478). 
Moon made no attempt to stop Nathan (R. 485) or keep Nathan from shooting at the 
antelope (R. 449-50, R. 952) except telling Nathan not to shoot in the direction of the power 
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station (R. 450, R. 534, R. 952, R. 977, R. 1019). Moon sought direction from his son on 
numerous occasions as to what Nathan wanted to do (R. 873, R. 882, R. 883, R. 977-8, R. 
981), then watched his sons stalk and shoot the antelope (R. 453, R. 952). 
After field dressing the animal, Moon helped load the animal on his vehicle (R. 458, 
R. 477, R. 486), tagged it with a Utah tag (R. 458-9, R. 1164), and transported it to his home 
in Bountiful, Utah (R. 486, R. 1164). The Moons made no attempt to determine whether 
they were in Utah (R. 937, R. 994, R. 1030, R. 1033). They consulted no maps (R. 1001) and 
did not drive down Lincoln County Road 220 any further to determine where they were (R. 
946) even though Moon knew boundaries were important (R. 943) and was concerned 
because of what the other drivers said (R. 953). 
Moon also knew where DWR Officer Gregory lived in Randolf (R. 510, R. 745) yet 
didn't try to contact him (R. 943), didn't contact anyone outside of his hunting group (R. 
943), and didn't report the kill (R. 445). Moon did not contact anyone between the time of 
the incident and when he was interviewed by Officer Hymas (R. 889-90). 
Moon took Officers Hymas and Gregory to his home where the antelope was hanging 
in his yard (R. 458, R. 539) with a Utah tag (R. 467, R. 539). The animal was seized as 
evidence (R. 467). Moon stated that it was his intent to process the animal prior to it being 
seized by Officer Hymas (R. 1173). 
ABUSE OF POSITION IN OBTAINING PHU TRANSFER 
A Posted Hunting Unit (PHU) is a private land block where an individual owner can 
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allow hunting to augment income (R. 353). Though wildlife belongs to the State of Utah (R. 
582) private landowners may request permission to permit the sale of hunting permits for 
their property (R. 411, R. 647). 
Applications for such permission (CORs), are submitted to DWR after which 
professional biologists review the request with the landowner, operator or others to determine 
what the harvest of particular animals will be for a particular area (R. 646). The State 
Wildlife Board gives final approval and sets the number of animals that may be harvested 
in a certain area (R. 647-8). Approved CORs contain the number of private hunters as well 
as public hunters that may hunt on a particular PHU during any season (A-12, R. 184-8; A-
13, R. 189-94). The handling of CORs was under Petitioner Moon's section at DWR (R. 
948). 
DWR enacted rules regarding PHUs, found in R657 (A-4, R. 162-67). The rules 
contain procedures to allow transfers from one PHU to another PHU. These included the 
requirement that all operators or owners submit requests in writing for DWR approval (R. 
616; A-4, R. 162-67). 
Moon had been a DWR deputy director under Tim Provan and Bob Valentine, former 
directors of the division (R. 343). His responsibilities included the day-to-day operations of 
the division (R. 343). In the summer and fall of 1996, he held the position of Programs and 
Field Operations Administrator (R. 383) with responsibilities over all fiscal, information and 
education areas of DWR (R. 342). He reported to the director, who was his supervisor (R. 
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730, R. 947). He was part of DWR's upper management team associated with the director's 
office (R. 729) and, along with other assistants, participated in making key decisions for the 
division (R. 728). 
In the summer of 1996, Ryan Moon, Moon's son, drew a bull mouse permit as a 
public hunter on the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU (R.1008; A-17, R.201). The East Fork 
Chalk Creek PHU operator was Cal Haskell (A-12, R. 184) and the South Fork Chalk Creek 
PHU operator was Terry Thatcher (A-13, R. 189). During the hunting season, Haskell and 
Thatcher did not see many moose in the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU area (R. 769, R. 841). 
Haskell told Moon that he was going to investigate whether he could transfer permits 
to the South Fork Chalk Creek PHU (R. 842). Moon likewise investigated whether a transfer 
was possible by going to Wes Shields, DWR Wildlife Inspection Chief (R. 580). Shields 
informed Moon that transfers were permitted by rule and told Moon where he could find the 
procedure (R. 600). Shields pointed out the sections of the rule as they talked (R. 597, R. 
620, R. 949). Moon was told that both operators had to agree and the request for transfer had 
to be signed off by the region (R. 846). Shields did not tell Moon that Moon could make the 
request (R. 600) and never told him that the Unit operators didn't have to make the request 
(R. 600). He said it could be done legally pursuant to the rule (R. 618). 
Haskell called Lou Cornicelli, the Regional Wildlife Manager for the Northern Region 
(R. 670) about transferring 3 private hunters from one PHU to another (R. 677). Cornicelli 
had never done a transfer before so he looked at the PHU Rule (A-4, R. 162-67) and called 
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the Salt Lake Office and talked with Mike Welch who was over the program (R. 678). 
Welch told Cornicelli that it could be done and that the call of whether it could be done was 
up to the region (R. 678). After consulting with the region biologist, Steve Kearl, Cornicelli 
felt the request to transfer three was appropriate (R. 677). Cornicelli called Haskell and 
informed him that the transfer could be done (R. 679) and told him that Haskell needed to 
draft a letter that the two operators needed to sign (R. 679). Cornicelli told Haskell what to 
write (R. 681). 
Haskell and Thatcher submitted a written request to transfer three private hunters on 
October 2, 1996 via fax machine from Haskell's business United Sportsman, to Lou 
Cornicelli (R. 754, R. 755, A-14, R. 195). Cornicelli faxed the letter back after he had signed 
it (R. 755). Haskell and Thatcher were familiar with the PHU rules and knew the rule 
required that the request for transfer be in writing (R.759, R. 782-3). 
Neither Haskell nor Thatcher ever submitted a request in writing for Ryan Moon to 
be transferred (R. 685, R. 756, R. 759, R. 787) and neither talked to Cornicelli about 
transferring Ryan (R. 758, R. 789). Nothing was ever faxed to Cornicelli regarding Ryan (R. 
761)_and no messages were left by either PHU operator (R. 758, R. 789). The PHU rule 
required that only owners or operators of PHU areas could request a transfer in writing (A-4, 
R. 162-167, R. 595, R. 688). Neither Haskell nor Thatcher, who were the operators of the 
PHUs, submitted anything (R. 685, R. 689). 
Haskell called Moon and told Moon that he had left Ryan's name off of the October 
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3rd request for transfer (R. 843). Haskell told Moon that he had not been able to get in touch 
with Comicelli (R. 758, R. 843). Moon offered to call Comicelli (R. 758, R. 759, R. 844). 
Moon called Comicelli from his office in Salt Lake DWR (R. 844) and left a message 
(R.685, R. 847). Comicelli returned Moon's call to Moon's office in Salt Lake and talked 
to him (R. 686, R. 847). 
Moon told Comicelli that Haskell had forgotten to put his son's name on the letter of 
October 3, (R. 686, R. 847; A-14, R. 195). Moon said he had spoken with Haskell (not 
Thatcher) and everything was all right (R. 686, R. 695). Because the rule required only 
owners or operators to make the request (R. 595, R. 648), Comicelli said Moon's request 
"seemed kind of strange" (R. 686). Moon was from the director's office and not an owner 
or operator of a PHU (R. 672, R. 713). 
Comicelli went to his supervisor because he had concerns over the request (R. 692-3). 
Comicelli and the Regional Director, Bob Hasenyager, discussed what to do (R. 687). 
Hasenyager and Comicelli recognized that the request was outside the parameters of the rule 
(R. 687). Hasenyager told Comicelli to approve the request because Moon was an extension 
of the director's office and they don't question what is requested when it comes from the 
director's office (R. 672, R. 713). Because Moon's request came from the director's office 
Comicelli approved it (R. 687, R. 712). 
Because of their concerns Hasenyager told Comicelli to "cover your butt and make 
a note" (R. 712-13). Comicelli did so by writing the handwritten statement on the bottom 
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of the October 3rd request, dated it 10/16/96 and signed it (R. 681; A-14, R. 195). Cornicelli 
faxed the letter with his handwritten notation to Moon at his DWR office in Salt Lake City 
(R. 849-50, G-60, R. 233). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Moon argues his case from the premise that he was an unknowing and passive 
participant. In so arguing he does not address the contrary factual findings of the Board and 
show they are not supported by substantial evidence. In order for Moon to so argue, he must 
marshal all supportive evidence to the Board's findings and then establish the fatal flaw. 
Moon never does so. Therefore, the factual findings of the Board stand. 
Point II: Moon relies on a prior Board decision as dispositive of this appeal. The case 
relied on was decided by the Board under a different standard of review and before this Court 
issued four cases defining the role the Board is to take in reviewing department actions. 
Applying the correct standard of review and the Board's current rule, Rl 37-1 -22(4), the case 
is of no precedential value and is not dispositive. 
Point HI: Moon asserts that he was treated differently than other employees who were 
not terminated. He fails to establish that such situations are "substantially similar" and 
provides no basis to overturn the Board's decision. 
Point IV: Moon claims that had the Board adequately reviewed his prior work history 
as a mitigating factor, he would not have been terminated. The Board appropriately found 
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that the aggravating factors of the antelope poaching incident alone were sufficient to sustain 
the termination. 
Point V: Because Moon was a high level statewide manager in DWR, his activities 
of poaching were sufficiently connected to his job and the mission of the Department to 
establish nexus. 
Point VI: Employees cannot use their position and influence to get other employees 
to violate procedures set by rule in order to secure a special privilege for a son or someone 
else. One who does so is "abusing his position." The Board erred in concluding there was 
no "abuse of position." 
Point VII: Even if the single antelope poaching incident is not sufficient to sustain the 
termination, the fact that Moon abused his position and engaged in the poaching incident are 
sufficient to sustain the termination when considered together. 
ARGUMENT - RESPONSE TO PETITIONER MOON 
POINT I 
MOON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE RECORD 
EVIDENCE, WHICH IS SUBSTANTIAL, SUPPORTING 
THE FINDING THAT HE WAS A KNOWING, ACTIVE 
PARTICIPANT IN THE ANTELOPE POACHING. 
Petitioner Moon's arguments are based on his assertion that he was a passive 
bystander who has no culpability. Both the hearing officer and the Board rejected this claim 
and issued lengthy decisions reciting why they found Moon was an active participant and 
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knew his actions were illegal. Without attacking any specific finding of the Board, Moon 
simply cites portions of the record he argues support his articulated position. 
At no place in his brief has Moon pointed out where the evidence is so lacking that 
the Board's findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. The 
Department's lengthy recitation of facts demonstrates that the hearing officer's decision, 
Addendum A, and the Board's decision, Addendum B, had ample evidence to conclude that 
Moon knew he was in Wyoming and was an active participant. Moon simply sets forth a few 
facts, then argues his "non-participation" in the event. 
Moon drove his son to every location, carried on conversations with the Chens and 
the driver of the Suburban, encouraged his son by prodding him as to what he wanted to do, 
directed him to locations, signaled for the antelope to be brought to the vehicle, checked the 
draw to determine his son's involvement, helped in cleaning the antelope, helped load the 
antelope on the vehicle, helped tag it with a Utah tag, transported it to his home in Bountiful, 
Utah, and hung the carcass in his yard in preparation for processing. These actions bespeak 
a knowing aiding and abetting. 
This Court in Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993) held that it 
will not address a challenge to findings of fact unless an appellant has properly marshaled 
the evidence. According to Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comnf n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 
(Utah 1993), the marshaling of evidence is a listing of the evidence supporting the finding 
that is challenged. Thereafter, the party so challenging the finding must show that, despite 
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the supporting evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. See: Stewart 
v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 1992); McPherson v. Belnap. 830 P.2d 
302, 305 (Utah App. 1992). 
This Court discussed what it expects for such a challenge in West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991): 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's 
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and folly assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
Id. at 1315 (emphasis added, italics in original). 
Moon simply takes the position that the Board was wrong and argues his version of 
the facts. This method has been rejected by this Court as an improper marshaling for 
purposes of argument. See: Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. v. Board of Review. 839 P.2d 
841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). Because Moon has failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the Board's finding that (1) Moon was in Wyoming, (2) knew he was in Wyoming and (3) 
was an active participant in the poaching incident, those findings should be accepted by this 
Court. See: Johnson v. Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992) where this 
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Court accepts the findings of the tribunal when a petitioner fails to adequately marshal the 
evidence. 
POINT II 
ONE PRIOR BOARD DECISION THAT PREDATES 
CURRENT RULES AND COURT DECISIONS DOES NOT 
CREATE BINDING PRECEDENT AND IS NOT 
CONTROLLING IN THIS CASE. THE BOARD 
P R O P E R L Y D E T E R M I N E D T H A T THE 
DEPARTMENT'S DECISION WAS REASONABLE AND 
RATIONAL. 
Moon argues that Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D. 
Dennis Weaver. 3 PRB 22 (1987), issued by the Board, binds the Board and this Court. He 
claims his circumstances were sufficiently similar to those of Dennis Weaver, who was 
reinstated by the Board, that he, too, should be reinstated. Department asserts, however, that 
Anderson was decided by the Board using different Board rules of review and prior to this 
Court issuing four significant decisions that define the role of the Board in reviewing an 
agency's disciplinary actions. The very Board that issued Anderson applied current rule and 
case law to differentiate Moon's situation from Anderson. 
In 1987 when Anderson was decided, Board Rule 19.8.2 set forth the Board's standard 
of review, with emphasis added: 
The Board's standards of review consist of determining whether 
the Hearing Officer's decision was supported by substantial 
evidence and whether that decision is warranted by the facts. 
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The Board placed itself in the role of a "superagency," allowing itself to determine 
whether a discipline was "warranted" regardless of an agency's determination. The Board 
changed its rule regarding standard of review to reflect decisions issued by this court. Rule 
Rl37-1-22(4) currently provides that the Board will look at three things: (a) whether the 
allegations are supported by substantial evidence, (b) whether an agency has applied relevant 
policies and statutes correctly, and: 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the 
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon 
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules and statutes determined according to the above 
provisions. 
Under the prior rule, this Court reversed the Board twice in cases where the Board 
relied on its ability to determine whether termination was warranted. See: Utah Department 
of Corrections v. Suchen 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App. 1990); Utah Department of Corrections 
v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Kent v. Department of Employment Security, 860 P.2d 984,987 (Utah App. 1993), 
this Court clearly defined the role of the Board as follows: "The CSRB must affirm the 
Department's decision if it is within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" (emphasis 
added). The Board changed its rule to Rl37-1-22(4), cited above, to reflect this role. 
The latest pronouncement of this Court affirms the role of the Board as follows: 
Therefore, we must determine if the CSRB appropriately 
reviewed Lunnen's disciplinary sanction by considering if 
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UDOT presented factual support for its allegations and if the 
sanction was so disproportionate that it amounted to an abuse of 
discretion. 
Lunnen v. Utah Dept. of Transportation. 886 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah App. 1994). See: Despain. 
824P.2dat443. 
The Board properly reviewed Moon's situation in light of these significant changes. 
While Department believes that Weaver's termination would have been sustained under 
current Board rule and court decisions, such a discussion is unnecessary. The Board's 
unreflited findings and conclusions relative to Moon's knowledge and participation stand as 
ample support for the ultimate conclusion that Anderson is not controlling. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)(e) the department head found "adequate cause or reason" and the 
Board sustained this conclusion as "reasonable and rational." 
The Board's discussion differentiating Weaver and Moon, while informative, is not 
necessary. Moon has cited no support for his argument that Anderson alone binds the Board 
and this Court. The changes brought about by recent court decisions nullify Moon's 
reasoning. The Court is urged to reject Moon's argument as being without basis in law. 
POINT III 
MOON'S CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT "SUBSTAN-
TIALLY SIMILAR" TO OTHER SITUATIONS CITED. 
MANAGEMENT'S DIFFERENTIATION IS ADEQUATE. 
Though the Board's findings regarding Moon's knowing and active participation in 
the poaching incident have never been adequately challenged by Moon he continues to argue 
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his case as if this Court should adopt his version. At page 16 of his Brief he states: "...the 
CSRB failed to follow Rl 37-1-21(D)(3) in this case, and denied Moon a consistent, 
proportionate penalty for his infraction when it terminated him for an unintentional wildlife 
violation" (emphasis added). 
Moon refers to the CSRB decision at R.154 as support for his argument that he was 
treated differently than others, under the claim his actions were "unintentional". The Board 
discusses the other situations and states why it believes Moon's termination was justified. 
Moon, however, makes little attempt to compare situations and discuss why the Board is 
legally in error. He simply argues that since the few others he cites weren't terminated, he 
shouldn't be terminated either. His lack of specificity and comparison falls short of 
submitting sufficient evidence and argument to establish that those situations are 
"substantially similar" and dispositive of his sanction. 
In Pickett v. Department of Commerce. 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1993), this Court 
addressed the issue of similar situations having an affect on future decisions. Pickett dealt 
with numerous examples of conduct so similarly situated that the court found it necessary 
to overturn the Department's sanction against Pickett's professional license. 
While Pickett is informative, its application must be viewed in light of the totality of 
all circumstances of a particular case. Broad discretion is granted to management to 
determine the sanction to impose on employees in the employment setting. There is no 
instruction sheet that dictates which sanction to impose for each of a myriad of situations. 
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The decision is left to a department head as he/she reviews all factors. For every situation, 
there is a "universe" of "acceptable" alternative disciplines that, if imposed, would not violate 
the "reasonable and rational" and "abuse of discretion" standards established by this Court. 
For any one situation the potential disciplines will be different from other situations. 
Any option chosen from that "universe" would be considered reasonable and rational. As 
long as the discipline falls within that universe, there is no abuse of discretion. In order for 
an act to be abusive under Moon's argument, the universe would have to be so narrowed by 
previous "substantially similar" actions that a universe of only one option exists. Department 
asserts such a universe could only be created by consistent and numerous applications of the 
same disciplinary penalty for the same offense under the same circumstances. One case, 
such as Anderson, even assuming it has some precedential value, does not create a universe 
of one. If it did, then one case would destroy discretion. 
Recently Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090,1095 (UtahApp. 1998) 
interpreted Pickett regarding past practices. Past practice is only created when "prior cases 
present facts substantially similar to the facts in Taylor's case" (emphasis added). 
Under Pickett, and Taylor, Moon fails to establish that the cases are "substantially 
similar" and/or that they create any type of pattern. The most he argues is that in other 
situations no one else was terminated. 
First, the hearing officer found numerous justifications as to why Moon was treated 
differently than others (R. 46). The Board adopted those findings. While Department 
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contends that there is "no" pattern of "substantially similar" situations from which to hold 
that deviation is inappropriate, Moon fails to show the differences in light of the evidence 
justifying the difference in sanction. This Court, in Taylor, cited SEMCO Industries v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) to hold that that reasonable and rational 
explanations as to differences is all that is needed to support an inconsistent action. 
Second, the Department did terminate Anderson, Weaver and Moon's son Ryan. 
Weaver was reinstated by the Board, not the department as alluded to by Moon. 
Third, Weaver and Anderson were employees of Parks and Recreation, a different 
division whose mission is totally different from that of DWR. 
Fourth, the termination of a high level manager with statewide authority in DWR is 
justified when compared to lower level nonsupervisory employees, such as those cited by 
Moon.. 
Moon had been a deputy director of DWR under two former directors, Tim Provan 
and Bob Valentine (R. 343). Moon's responsibilities included directing the day-to-day 
operations of the division (R. 343). He was in charge of all facets of DWR including liaison 
between sections and the director (R. 830). 
Moon accepted a reassignment in 1995 as Programs and Field Operations 
Administrator (R. 383) with statewide responsibilities over all fiscal, information and 
education areas of DWR (R. 342) and was functioning in this position at the time of the 
hunting incident. The DWR director was his supervisor (R. 730, R. 947). Moon was one of 
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only a few high level managers on the executive management team (R. 729) and along with 
other assistants to the director participated in making key decisions for the division (R. 728). 
Moon was considered part of the director's office (R. 721). 
Moon had formerly been over law enforcement (R. 357) and at the time of his 
termination was recognized as an authority figure (R. 362). Those in Assistant, Associate or 
Program Coordinator positions bore a larger responsibility because of the larger order of 
authority they possessed (R. 380). 
No employee situation cited by Moon involved a supervisor, especially a supervisor 
at such a high level. The Board makes particular note of this fact which Moon ignores. This 
alone differentiates him from all others and makes his situation "substantially different." 
Moon names several individuals who he asserts are similarly situated. These consist 
of several biologists, a heavy equipment operator and a park ranger. None of these 
individuals were supervisors and none had any relationship to setting department policy. As 
will be discussed below, no situation was "substantially similar" to Moon. 
K.S. was a biologist who shot twice at what he thought was one elk. He learned that 
he had in fact shot at two elk, hitting both. He turned himself in when he discovered what 
he had done (R. 348, R. 925). D.A. was a biologist who discovered on his own that he had 
hunted sage grouse in a closed area. He turned himself in (R. 394). W.B. was a biologist 
who assisted a sheepherder spot game from an airplane. He was suspended 21 days (R. 923). 
The department could locate no information on a second incident (G-65, R. 239). Only a 
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hearsay statement from Moon about such an incident was made, objected to by counsel for 
Department and noted as a continuing objection by the hearing officer (R.919). There is no 
corroborating testimony on this issue - it cannot be relied on for any comparison. W.H. was 
a heavy equipment operator whose offense was to shoot across a road. He took no game (G-
65, R. 238, R. 919-20). M.H. was a park ranger who killed a cougar. He was suspended, but 
resigned (G-65, R.239). R.H. was a biologist who shot a 4 pt. Bull in a spike only area. He 
was suspended (G-65, R. 239). 
Director Kimball articulated additional reasons why Moon was treated differently. 
Moon had adequate time to turn himself in or do something to correct what he had done (R. 
418). Instead of checking things out, he was getting ready to process the meat for family 
consumption (R. 1173). This is substantially different from every other situation. 
Moon has failed to show how any of these situations are "substantially similar." Top 
level administrators justifiably are treated differently than nonsupervisory, lower level 
employees. He simply asserts that discipline imposed in dissimilar situations should dictate 
what happens to him. There are no "substantially similar" situations to justify this Court 
overturning the Board's finding. It is not the Department's responsibility to defend 
something that Moon has not adequately set forth. The Department has met its legal 
responsibility of showing sufficient differences to sustain Moon's discipline. 
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POINT IV 
THE BOARD DID NOT ABUSE ITS AUTHORITY IN 
REJECTING MOON'S MITIGATION ARGUMENTS 
BECAUSE HIS ACTS WERE SO EGREGIOUS. 
Moon contends that his fifteen years of service with the State of Utah is sufficient to 
overcome a termination. This he argues is controlling "mitigation." The Board listened to 
Moon's arguments and simply rejected his claim. Moon further contends that an exhaustive 
analysis of his past record must be conducted before the Board can sustain a termination 
found by the Department and the hearing officer as appropriate. 
The Board concluded that Moon's active participation and his senior status at DWR 
were "so compelling" that they outweighed all of the mitigating factors he presented. The 
record speaks volumes as to the seriousness of the poaching incident. As pointed out earlier, 
Moon's knowing involvement and gross disregard for the laws and procedures of hunting 
were so significant that the board's rejection of his record as a mitigation factor was no error. 
Moon cites Rl 37-1-20(1) as support of his position that the Board erred. The rule 
simply says that "the past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of 
either mitigating or sustaining the penalty..." This rule does not purport to mandate that any 
positive work record is controlling when the totality of facts is considered. The degree that 
one's work record applies to any circumstance is dictated by each particular case. One's 
work record is only one of many factors that may be considered. Positions held, knowledge 
of rules and policy, supervisory roles, law enforcement status, seriousness of the incident, 
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etc., can all bear some role in determining the type of discipline to impose. It is not an abuse 
of discretion to determine that one's actions are so egregious that a positive work record will 
not prevent the discipline from being imposed. 
Director Kimball testified at great length why Moon's actions, in light of his past 
employment with the Department, were sufficient to terminate him. The hearing officer at 
length discussed these issues and the Board, in reviewing all of the circumstances, simply 
rejected Moon's argument. 
Contrary to what Moon argues, R477-1 l-l(3)(e) is not a listing of factors that must 
be considered for mitigating purposes. It is a listing of factors that may be considered by 
management in deciding the type and severity of discipline. The specific language of the rule 
is as follows: "When deciding the specific type and severity of the discipline to administer 
to any employee, the agency representative may consider the following factors'1 (emphasis 
added). Both "past work record" and "severity of the infraction" are listed as matters that 
may be considered. There is no requirement that each factor be considered in every case. 
While Moon attempts to do so at page 22 of his Brief, some factors simply are not relevant. 
Department maintains that any one factor could be so significant that it outweighs all others 
in determining whether the discipline imposed is appropriate. 
Lunnen does not stand for the proposition that every factor must be considered or that 
the agency must affirmatively establish that it considered each factor in its case proper before 
a decision is made. 886 P.2d at 73. To the contrary, when Moon presented his past work 
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record, it was considered. The aggravating circumstances of the event and his role in the 
poaching, however, so outweighed his past work record that the Board rejected it as a reason 
to modify the discipline. 
The Board's position is not without support. In Ruffin v. Department of 
Transportation. 428 N.E.2d 628 (111. App. 1981), the court held that the seriousness of an 
event can outweigh the good record of an employee: "While the plaintiffs past work record 
is good, it cannot be said to outweigh the serious misconduct which occurred in this case. 
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's determination that the Commission abused its 
discretion in discharging plaintiff." 
Indeed, the Board addressed many of the issues discussed by Moon who alleges that 
they were not considered. Even R477-1 l-l(3)(e) goes to whether management had a basis 
upon which to act. The Board agreed that it did and supported the findings of the hearing 
officer. Moon, again, simply states facts which he believes support his position instead of 
showing where the Board's findings were unsupported. 
The totality of the record justifies the ultimate conclusion of the Board that Moon's 
past employment record is offset by the seriousness of the poaching incident. Moon's 
argument should therefore be rejected. 
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POINT V 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT NEXUS TO MOON'S POSITION 
THAT THE BOARD WAS CORRECT IN SUSTAINING 
THE TERMINATION BASED ON THE POACHING 
INCIDENT ALONE. 
Moon errs in his assertion that for public employment an agency must establish that 
a person cannot perform his job in order for "nexus" to exist. This has never been the law 
and the Department asserts it is an inapplicable standard in this case. If one's actions "off 
duty" are related to one's job or go contrary to the mission of the agency for which he works, 
nexus is established. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1(2) (1995) sets forth the mission of DWR: 
(a) Subject to the broad policy making authority of the Wildlife 
Board, the Division of Wildlife Resources shall protect, 
propagate, manage, conserve, and distribute protected wildlife 
throughout the state. 
(b) The Division of Wildlife Resources is appointed as the 
trustee and custodian of protected wildlife and may initiate civil 
proceedings, in addition to criminal proceedings provided for in 
this title. 
DWR and its employees have a unique role in insuring that wildlife is "protected," 
"managed," "conserved," and "distributed." Nexus is established for executive managers of 
DWR, such as Moon, who violate that very trust. There can be no public confidence in an 
organization headed by those who themselves violate the very laws the organization is 
empowered and obligated to enforce. Certainly, the position, responsibility and authority of 
employees of DWR determine the culpability involved with disciplinary matters. The Board, 
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in its decision, focused on Moon's position with the department and his overall statewide 
responsibilities. That is reasonable and rat ional as defined by Kent, supra, in both finding 
nexus and sustaining the termination. 860 P.2d at 987-8. 
DWR has an obligation to the state and the public to take seriously such activities of 
its employees. Each employee cited by Moon in prior argument as having discipline of lesser 
severity than termination was likewise "off duty" when hunting. Employees of DWR who 
violate the very laws the division is charged to enforce may be disciplined. That is 
particularly clear with Moon as a top manager with statewide responsibility. 
DWR has established a code of conduct for its employees. Regardless of what Moon 
believes, this DWR policy clearly ties Moon's actions to the agency and its mission. Kent 
supports application of the doctrine of nexus. 860 P.2d at 988. DWR Policy II -10.5 states 
in part: 
Employees are members of the local community and are 
expected to conduct themselves as respectable citizens. They 
should never deviate from strict observance of city, county or 
State laws except as absolutely required in the performance of 
their official duties. 
Personnel shall not engage in hunting and fishing activities for 
which a license is required without having in possession the 
appropriate license. 
(G-67,R.241). 
Moon was in violation of this code of conduct and engaged in activities that were 
contrary to the very mission of his department. This is sufficient. The Utah Supreme Court 
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supports this view of nexus in Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 663 
P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The employee claimed that his "off duty" conduct had no connection 
with his employment. The court rejected his argument and set forth the following standard, 
applicable to the present case: 
It is only necessary that the misconduct have such "connection" 
to the employee's duties and to the employer's business that it 
is a subject of legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer. 
Id. at 443. 
Moon's actions are connected to the mission of DWR and he is clearly identifiable as 
a leader of the division. 
Wild v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 692 F.2d 1129 (7th 
Cir. 1982) is helpful in understanding the propriety of the Board's conclusion. Wild was an 
appraiser for HUD for many years. In addition, he was a "slum lord" of apartments he 
owned. HUD terminated him. The court discussed at length the fact that Wild's actions 
were inconsistent with and mocked the very mission of the agency. The court stated: 
We do not think it was the purpose of the Civil Service Reform 
Act to make it impossible as a practical matter to get rid of a 
civil servant whose off-duty conduct is in direct conflict with the 
mission of the agency that employs him. We think the focus of 
the protective provisions on which Wild relies is on off duty 
conduct that may offend a supervisor or even the public but that 
is irrelevant to the agency's mission. 
Id. at 1133-34. 
30 
Certainly, executives of DWR who poach and violate the very trust that is placed in 
them, meet that criteria. Moon's conduct offends the very essence of what the agency stands 
for. Public employment cannot be a protection to employees who engage in such egregious 
actions inconsistent and contrary to the mission of their own agency. 
The D.C. Circuit court generalized the reasons for nexus as a legal concept: 
The nature of the particular job as much as the conduct allegedly 
justifying the action has a bearing on whether the necessary 
relationship obtains. The question thus becomes whether the 
asserted grounds for the adverse action, if found supported by 
evidence, would directly relate either to the employee's ability 
to perform approved tasks or to the agency's ability to fulfill its 
assigned mission. 
Doe v. Hampton. 556 F.2d 265, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). 
Once there is a valid and rational connection between the employee's conduct and that 
employee's public job or the mission of the agency for which he/she works, an agency can 
act in disciplining employees. As in Clearfield, actual harm or affect on the agency need not 
be established. The reason for this distinction in Clearfield is because when agencies rid 
themselves of those employees who create such situations, the harm is not forthcoming and 
is only a potential. However, if an agency does nothing and allows the situation to remain 
unresolved, substantial harm could then cripple an agency or bring such disrespect to an 
agency that the focus of the mission is lost because of lack of public support and confidence. 
In Aiello v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 551 A.2d 664 (Penn. 1988), a mine 
inspector was found guilty of violating copyright infringement laws. The court found that 
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sufficient nexus existed because it called into question his integrity. As one who dealt with 
the public and was able to exercise discretion, it could affect his ability to perform his job. 
Director Kimball testified that Moon's actions were completely contrary to the 
Division's mission. DWR has a "stop poaching" program in order to increase awareness and 
enforcement in curtailing poaching (R. 356). Moon not only engaged in poaching 
(something the department was trying to curtail) but did not use the very program that had 
been set up for that purpose. Indeed it was the Chens, members of the public, who were the 
ones who called and reported an executive of the division as a poacher (R. 295, R. 325-6). 
DWR employees are expected to enforce the laws of wildlife (R. 360). Moon violated the 
laws the division was to enforce. The public has given DWR and its employees a trust that 
needs to be honored to administer and manage (R. 362). Moon dishonored that trust through 
his actions. Moon was in a high profile position (R. 363), had formerly been over law 
enforcement (R. 357) and had participated in at least one poaching enforcement operation 
in the Randolf area where his own poaching took place (R. 508-510). The public expects 
department employees to act in a responsible and ethical manner (R. 356). The press and the 
public scrutinize the division because opportunities to hunt are becoming more limited (R. 
355-6). The public is frequently claiming that DWR fixes drawings or Department 
employees get special consideration (R. 356). Yet Moon asserts nothing should happen to 
him because pleading guilty to violating the poaching laws doesn't have any impact on his 
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position. As director Kimball testified: "The public expects us to do better than that" (R. 
361). 
Kimball further wrote that Moon's actions were "an embarrassment to this office" and 
had "a potential of destroying the public's confidence in this division" (Exhibit A-3, R. 160). 
He testified that such was the case and the publicity created a situation where there was such 
a "furor" he waited to make his final decision. "I wanted the furor to die away so it more a 
comfortable environment to make that decision [what discipline to render]" (R. 362-3). 
Despain and Kent stand for the proposition that if one's actions off duty are related 
to one's job or one's ability to continue in the position, nexus is satisfied. The record is 
replete with sufficient testimony and evidence to support the Board's conclusion that nexus 
exists. That decision is reasonable and rational and supported by the record. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS PETITION 
POINT VI 
THE BOARD ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
HOLDING THAT A SUPERVISOR WHO USES HIS 
POSITION TO GET LESSER EMPLOYEES TO 
VIOLATE RULES FOR THE BENEFIT OF HIS FAMILY 
HAS NOT ABUSED HIS POSITION. 
The Board at page 3 of its Final Agency Action (R. 135) adopts in their entirety the 
factual findings of the hearing officer as they relate to what is titled "Abuse of Position 
Incident." The hearing officer sustained the agency in its assertion that Moon had 
misused/abused his position on behalf of his son in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) 
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(1996). She found that Moon had used his official position to secure a special privilege for 
his son. The Board (R. 140-1) specifically rejects that conclusion, with the following flawed 
reasoning: MRyan had a legal right to have his name on that list" (R. 140). The Board 
thereafter states: 
The hearing officer stated that "The Department presented 
substantial evidence that Grievant used his official position to 
secure special privileges for his son in violation of this rule and 
statute." However, there is no evidence or factual finding in the 
evidentiary decision which supports this erroneous conclusion." 
(Emphasis added) 
The Board's all encompassing statement that there is no evidence to support the 
hearing officer's conclusion is itself erroneous and an attempt to justify its own unfounded 
and improper conclusion. The Board totally misconstrues director Kimball's reasons for 
finding that Moon abused his position. It concludes that since two PHU permit holders were 
the only ones that could violate Rule R657-37-4(8)(a) and (b), Moon could not and did not 
violate the rule. Therefore he could not have abused his position for the benefit of his son 
(R. 142). 
The Board further errs by stating that the hearing officer erred by holding that Moon 
needed to place his request in writing because the rule didn't apply to him (R. 142). The 
hearing officer ruled no such thing and at no time did Department argue or the hearing officer 
hold that Randy Moon had any right to involve himself in the process or request a transfer. 
The Board disregards the very issue that director Kimball found constituted an abuse of 
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position. In all of this, the Board errs to such a substantial degree that its entire ruling in this 
regard is flawed and must be rejected. 
Unless one complies with laws, rules and procedure set forth to be followed to obtain 
a benefit provided by the state, there is no legal right to that benefit. For the Board to hold 
that Ryan had a legal right to have his name on the transfer list and, therefore, no one had to 
comply with the rules to get his name on the list belies reason. Taking the Board's reasoning 
to its logical conclusion, one could obtain a drivers license, notary certification, dba 
certification, professional license, obtain welfare benefits or even vote without complying 
with rules and laws by having a family member or friend get the license or certification under 
the claim that one had the legal right to it anyway. 
No one has a legal right to anything unless the laws and rules to get that item are 
complied with. It is nothing but astounding that the Board held as it did. Such a ruling 
mocks our system of law. It creates a system of who you know that will do you a favor 
instead of whether one complies with statutory or rule procedures. 
Exhibit A-17 (R. 201) shows exactly what Ryan Moon was entitled to. It is his 
hunting permit to hunt a Bull Moose in the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU. That is the only 
thing that Ryan had a "legal" right to. Nowhere in rule or law does he have a "legal" right 
to anything else, unless proper procedures established by rule are followed. 
The pertinent provisions of the PHU Rule 657-37-4(8)(a) and (b), state as follows: 
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(a) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent must 
request an amendment to the original certificate of registration 
for any variation of the following: 
(i) to allow hunters who have obtained a posted 
hunting unit permit to hunt within each other's 
posted hunting units;.... 
(b) Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration 
must be made in writing and submitted to the appropriate 
division regional supervisor and wildlife manager. 
(Emphasis added, Ex A-4, R. 163). 
The rule is clear that no transfer of an individual from one PHU to another PHU can 
be made without a written request by the landowner or agent of the PHU holder being 
submitted for the change to be made. Unless a written request is made and approved, there 
is no legal right to hunt in a PHU different from the one permitted originally. As such, Ryan 
Moon could not hunt in any other PHU than what appears on A-17 (R. 201) without the 
landowner or agent of the PHU where he wants to hunt submitting a written request and 
having the division approve it. There is also no legal right to have one's name on a sheet 
requesting the transfer without the written request of the PHU owner or agent. There are 
simply no exceptions. The Board's conclusion that leaving Ryan's name off the original 
request was simply a mistake that could be corrected without following the rule is not 
supported by law or reason. 
Cal Haskell (R. 759) and Terry Thatcher (R. 783), the agents for the two PHU units 
in question, both testified that they knew requests needed to be in writing for individuals who 
they wanted to transfer. Yet, each also testified that he never submitted anything in writing 
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for or on behalf of Ryan Moon and that his name never appeared on anything they submitted 
(R. 759, R. 787). Lou Cornicelli, DWR's Regional Wildlife Manager also testified that no 
written or verbal requests from Haskell or Thatcher had ever come to him on behalf of Ryan 
(R. 685). Cal Haskell knowingly left Ryan's name off the transfer list because he was only 
thinking of his private hunters (R.772) 
Wes Shields, DWR Inspection Chief, testified that the rule was clear; the request had 
to be in writing (R. 629). Judy Tutorow, the Division Licensing Coordinator likewise 
confirmed that the PHU owners/agents had to request a modification in writing (R. 1130). 
Department is not suggesting that Ryan Moon's name could not have been placed on 
a written request. In fact, it could have been had the proper procedure been followed. The 
Board's ruling basically held as a matter of law that complying with the rule was irrelevant. 
Such logic is without foundation. 
Further, the rule itself, and director Kimball (R. 322), Wes Shields (R. 595), Lou 
Cornicelli (R. 686, R. 689), and Bob Hasenyager, the Ogden District Regional Manager (R. 
715) testified that only a PHU agent/owner could request a transfer. Moon himself testified 
that Wes Shields told him that both operators had to agree (R. 846) and the transfer 
procedure was controlled by rule (R. 846). Haskell (R. 753) and Thatcher (R. 782-3) 
testified they were familiar with the rules regarding transfer and had submitted not only the 
October 3rd request (R.754), but had submitted another request for other hunters (R. 776-7). 
Shields (R.595) and Cornicelli (R. 688) testified that someone not a PHU owner/agent 
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could not submit a request either verbally or in writing to transfer the permit. No member 
of the public, not even Ryan himself, could transfer a permit from one PHU to another. 
Moon provided no evidence or testimony to the contrary. The Board summarily dismisses 
all evidence in the simple statement that there is "no evidence." 
The Board justifies its faulty conclusion by stating that the two PHU owners left Ryan 
Moon's name off the original transfer request by mistake. Department maintains that to 
correct an error, one simply complies with the rules and submits the transfer request again. 
The Board erred in equating statements by Haskell and Thatcher with the legal 
conclusion that he had a legal right to be on the list. If Ryan felt his name should be on a 
transfer list and wasn't, his cause of action is to force Haskell and Thatcher to submit a 
request in writing with his name on it. The procedure is not to have his father get other 
employees to circumvent the rule. 
Having improperly concluded that because Ryan had a "legal" right to have his name 
on the transfer request without complying with the rule, the Board next erred as a matter of 
law that Moon did not use his position to obtain a "special privilege" for Ryan, a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) (1996). 
The Board incorrectly concluded that Moon did not violate the transfer rule because 
this rule applied only to the PHU owners. All he did was "grease the wheels," concluded the 
Board (R. 141). "Greasing the wheels" through appropriate procedures is one thing (which 
Moon did not do) but "greasing the wheels" by using his position and influence to have his 
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son's name placed on the transfer sheet in violation of the prescribed rule is "abuse of 
position." The Department would have no problem with any employee, mother, father, or 
relative, helping a son through legal channels and by following appropriate procedures, to 
obtain permissions or permits granted by the Division. DWR employees are expected to help 
people obtain what they want "legally." No one, including Moon, however, has the right to 
use his/her position for a special privilege (obtaining a transfer that one is not entitled to 
because of one's failure to comply with rule) for private gain (obtaining a moose through an 
inappropriately transferred permit). The Department was within its discretion and was 
reasonable and rational in affirming that it is improper for employees to do so. 
The definition of "special privilege" is not easily found. The Board did, however, 
sustain the termination of a Motor Pool Employee in 1986 based on a violation of the 
"special privileges" portion of the Ethics Act. In Paul Urry v. Central Services Division, 2 
PRB 17 (1986), an employee who was responsible to obtain bids for car repairs prepared a 
bogus estimate to go along with an estimate prepared by his friend. The bogus estimate was 
always higher than his friend's estimate, hence the business always went to Urry's friend. 
The Board stated: 
Turning to the Ethics Act, Appellant contends that he did not 
violate section 67-16-4(3) of the State Code. The hearing 
Officer concluded otherwise.... Section 67-16-4(3) prohibits a 
public employee or officer from using one's official position to 
secure "special privileges" either for self or others. Hearing 
Officer Volker found that Mr. Urry had breached the just-cited 
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provision when he used his official position to take State 
automobiles to his friend Jonesy.... 
2PRB 17 at 8. 
DWR Rules of Conduct policy number II - 10.5 (R. 241) specifically states that 
employees "should never deviate from strict observance of city, county or State laws except 
as absolutely required in the performance of their official duties." Yet Moon used his official 
position to get lower level employees within DWR to place Ryan's name on the transfer 
sheet without proper procedures being followed. No other member of the public could get 
a transfer through that process. That is a "special privilege." Paul Urry used his position to 
send repair work to his friend by failing to abide by proper procedures for obtaining 
competitive bids. Moon used his position to get others to ignore proper procedures to get his 
son the right to hunt in a second PHU area. 
In Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 703P.2d 417,420 (Or. App. 
1985) the court stated: 
Petitioner clearly availed himself of his position in purchasing 
the automobile. It was only by reason of his employment in a 
position that he was aware of the opportunity, and it was only 
because of his position that he was able to use SAIF as his 
agent. In other words, but for his position, he would have been 
unable to purchase the car and thus to obtain a personal financial 
gain. To interpret "use" otherwise would effectively make 
waste paper out of the statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Utah Public Employees Association v. State, 610 P.2d 
1272 (Utah 1980), in discussing the efficacy of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) (1996) stated 
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that "[t]he Governor and all public employees have a responsibility to avoid all actual or 
potential conflicts of interest between their public duties and their private interests.... Id. at 
1274 (emphasis added). Instead of avoiding the very conflict the court refers to, he 
knowingly imposed himself in the dealings of his son through department channels for his 
son's benefit. 
Ryan testified "so my father had to, because it [Ryan's name] had been left off, go and 
talk to some other guy that would be able to authorize my name to be put on the paper" (R. 
1012). Department maintains that there was no procedure where Moon could simply "talk" 
to someone and get Ryan's name added. Moon "had" to obtain the permit transfer the way 
he did because he was going hunting with his son the next day (R. 689) and needed the 
approval immediately. That is no justification. No one else could do it that way. 
Comicelli and Hasenyager considered Moon a DWR director. Comicelli stated the 
request was an "odd request" because it wasn't from an operator but a client or a public 
hunter (R. 686). "It seemed kind of strange" (R. 686). Approval was granted because the 
request, seeking a PHU change in violation of rule, came from the director's office (R. 687; 
R. 690, R. 692, R. 713). Moon, from the directors office, used his position and influence to 
request the change. Hasenyager told Comicelli they comply and don't question the request 
when it comes from the director's office (R. 672, R. 713). Because of the "improper" 
request, Hasenyager told Comicelli to "Cover your butt and make a note" (R. 712-13), which 
he did. 
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Cornicelli had no contact with Haskell or Thatcher, but only with Moon at his DWR 
office in Salt Lake. Moon called Cornicelli from his DWR office in Salt Lake (R. 844) and 
left a message for Cornicelli to call him back at his DWR office (R. 685, R.847). Cornicelli 
called Moon at his DWR office to discuss the request (R. 686, R. 847). 
After "covering his butt" by making a note on G-60 (R. 233), Cornicelli faxed the 
letter not to Haskell or Thatcher, but to Moon at Moon's DWR office where a secretary 
retrieved it and took it to Moon (R. 849-50, G-60, R. 233). 
But for the fact of who he was and what he did, there would have been no transfer of 
the permit. Moon used his state office, state phone, state fax machine and his position to 
induce lower regional employees to grant a "special privilege," permission that, according 
to rule, Ryan was not entitled to unless the proper procedures were followed. 
The Board was in err as a matter of law that no special privilege was granted and that 
Moon didn't use his position. The Board incorrectly interprets the rules when it concluded, 
"There is no showing that Grievant received any personal advantage from having his son's 
name placed on the transfer where it belonged" (R. 140). First, Ryan had no legal right to 
have his name on the list without going through proper procedures. Second, the Board is in 
error in holding that Moon himself had to gain some benefit from what he did. That is not 
the standard of Section 4(3) of the Ethics Act. If Moon uses his position to obtain a "special 
privilege" for his son, the law is violated. The fact that his son was able to hunt and obtain 
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a Bull Moose through Moon getting his son's name inappropriately on a list, meets the 
threshold of the statute. 
Additionally, the Board erred when it stated that no special privilege had been granted 
because Ryan had the right to hunt for the remaining two weeks: "Randy Moon helped to 
'grease the wheels' by bringing Ryan's name to the attention of Cornicelli on October 16. 
Had he not done so, however, it seems likely that Ryan would not have had any use of the 
last two weeks in October to hunt" (R. 141, emphasis added). That is a false, unsupported 
conclusion. Ryan had every legal right to hunt in his proper PHU unit the entire hunting 
season. There is no testimony or evidence in the record to sustain such an erroneous 
conclusion. Whether his permit was changed to another PHU unit or not does not affect his 
right to hunt the entire period. The Board again states "Getting Ryan's name on the correct 
PHU did not constitute obtaining a 'special privilege'" (R. 141). The "correct" PHU is the 
PHU one is assigned, not some other list. Until correctly transferred, the "correct" PHU was 
the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU and nothing else. 
The Board did acknowledge that Moon "acted unwisely" and could have been "wiser" 
(R. 141). The Board's conclusion that because Rule 657-37-4(8)(a)(i) only applies to PHU 
owners, Moon could not have violated the ethics act, defies understanding when his behavior 
induced lesser employees of the department to place Ryan's name on the list in contravention 
to the rule. 
The Board repeatedly states that Ryan had a "legal" right to have his name on the list 
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and therefore no "special privilege" was granted. Ryan had no more "legal" right to be on 
the transfer authorization than any other hunter unless the rules were followed. Moon used 
his position to get other employees of the Department to place his son's name on the list in 
contravention to rule. This constitutes obtaining a "special privilege" for his son. This is 
an "abuse of position" and the Department was correct in its assertion. The Board is in error 
as a matter of law and this Court is urged to reverse the Board and reinstate the ground of 
"abuse of position" as a sustainable ground for termination. 
POINT VII 
WHILE THE POACHING INCIDENT ALONE IS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TERMINATION OF 
MOON, THE TWO CHARGES OF ABUSE OF POSITION 
AND POACHING JUSTIFY TERMINATION. 
In Utah Public Employees Association v. State, supra, upholding a restrictive policy 
against DWR employees being able to participate in drawings for special permits, the court 
stated: 
Although there is no evidence of impropriety, it is clearly within 
the prerogative of the Governor to adopt a policy so as to avoid 
even the appearance thereof... Given the valid public purpose 
of maintaining a completely above board drawing and the fact 
that the Governor's classification policy was rationally related 
to such objective, DWR employees have not suffered a violation 
of their constitutional rights to equal protection. 
610 P.2d at 1274 (emphasis added). 
That concern is the very essence of the severity of the charge of abuse of position. 
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The court continued by acknowledging that: "If a DWR employee is not directly involved 
in conducting the drawing, at the very least, he has direct contact with those employees who 
are." 610 P.2d at 1274. Moon not only had direct access to employees but used his position 
and that access to obtain something that no member of the public could obtain, just as the 
Supreme Court was concerned about. 
Director Kimball testified that 
The laws of the state are basically developed to provide as much 
opportunity for people to take place in what they value as a very 
prized thing. I certainly think it's probably one of our most 
serious charges that we deal with in a really responsible and 
ethical manner.... One of the things we're frequently chided with 
in the press and every place else is the fact that we fix drawings 
and we have two or three people in a family over a relatively 
brief time happen to draw out or selected in this drawing 
process. People ask to have our operation and our program 
investigated. To me it's a very responsible situation how we 
distribute permits and how we enforce the laws. 
(R. 356, emphasis added). 
Misusing DWR programs for personal family members is contrary to the mission 
Director Kimball testified to. Moon, as an authority figure, had authority over pretty much 
anyone in the organization (R. 362). Director Kimball wrote and testified that Moon had 
"violated the very trust of your office and department" (A-3, R. 160, R. 362). He continues: 
A person in our organization who has at that time the 
responsibility to oversee the distribution of hunting permits and 
hunting opportunities within our state in my opinion that takes 
advantage of his position and directs that a permit be given to 
his son without going through the proper procedures is 
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something that I think is a compromise to our organization.... 
It's not fair. We try to be as fair in the distribution of limited 
hunting opportunities as we possibly can be. That's why we 
have the drawing process. That's why we have a permit 
distribution process. That's why we have at times what are 
difficult application procedures. It's so that everybody has a fair 
chance as possible at taking part in a hunt when there are maybe 
only a few hundred people that are going to be able to do this 
and several thousand people that want to. 
(R. 363-4). 
Since Moon worked with the very program area, he had a particularly significant 
reason to be held to a higher standard of conduct. Self-serving interests cannot lessen the 
need to be above reproach. (R. 367). 
Director Kimball testified that "the transfer moose authority or opportunity was as 
serious [an] incident as the antelope incident. I considered both of them to be quite serious" 
(R. 3 84). Counsel for Moon acknowledged on the record pertaining to the antelope incident: 
"The agency is saying this is a very serious offense. We don't deny that it is serious" (R. 
409). Kimball testified that the two incidents were more than sufficient to justify the 
termination (R. 385). 
If this Court finds that the poaching incident alone is not sufficient to justify 
termination, it must look at the totality of circumstances of both allegations. The poaching 
incident involved Moon violating the very laws that DWR is obligated to enforce. The 
transfer of the permit issue deals with the very essence of fairness in the area of permits. 
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The Board (R. 143) voided conclusions of law 30 and 31 of the hearing officer's 
decision on improper grounds. The hearing officer concluded: 
The two incidents show a pattern of conduct which exhibits a 
less than high regard for complying with the Division's rules 
and policies. The violations are serious. A public servant must 
act with a high regard for his position and the public trust. His 
actions must promote the public interest and strengthen the 
faith and confidence of the public in the integrity of their 
government.... Randy Moon's actions did not show a high 
regard of honor for the correct process that was supposed to be 
followed. Respect for the process reflects good judgment on 
the part of an employee; a lack of respect for the process 
reflects questionable judgment on the part of an employee who 
held a position of trust within the Division. 
(R. 52). 
The hearing officer is absolutely correct in her analysis and application of the law to 
the facts established at the hearing. When the seriousness of both incidents is considered 
together, the director's decision that Moon should no longer work for the division for 
which he has shown such disrespect and disregard, is not an abuse of discretion, but is 
reasonable and rational. 
CONCLUSION 
Each incident alone is sufficient to sustain the termination of Moon. The 
Department did not abuse its discretion in so deciding. The Department therefore agrees 
with the Board's ultimate decision to sustain the termination. 
If the court determines that the poaching incident alone is not sufficient, the Board 
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erred in reversing the hearing officer as to the abuse of position allegation. As a matter of 
law the board made a wrong legal conclusion. This court should reinstate the decision of 
the hearing officer on this ground. 
Each incident individually and especially the two incidents taken together show 
such disregard by a top management employee of the division that the director's decision 
to terminate Moon was not an abuse of discretion but was reasonable and rational. This 
Court is urged to sustain the termination. 
DATED this of September, 1998. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Cross-Petitioner and 
Respondent, Department of Natural 
Resources 
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A D D E N D U M S 
ADDENDUM A 
Hearing Officer decision, Randy G. Moon v. Utah Department of Natural 
Resources. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218, issued June 23, 1997, (R. 34-52). 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
RANDY G. MOON, 
Grievant, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND DECISION. 
Case No. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 
Hearing Officer: Sherri R. Guyon 
AUTHORITY 
In compliance with Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406 (1996), an administrative hearing at 
step 5 was held May 16, 19. 27. and 28. 1997. in Conference Rooms 2112 and 1116 of the State 
Office Building. Salt Lake City, Utah. Randy G. Moon (Grievant) was present and was represented 
by Erik Strindberg, Attorney at Law. The Utah Department of Natural Resources (Department) was 
represented by Stephen Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, and William Woody, 
Investigator, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR and Division), was the Department 
Representative. A court reporter made a verbatim record of these evidentiary proceedings: testimony 
and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses were placed under oath. This 
Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer. Utah Code. Section 63-46b-2(l)(h)(1996)) now makes and enters 
the following: 
ISSUES 
1. Was Grievant's dismissal for: (a) the good of the public service? or (b) just cause? 
2. If not. what is the appropriate remedy? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Wildlife-Related Violations 
1. Randy G. Moon became a career service employee with the state of Utah on March L 
1993. At the time of his termination. Grievant held the position of Programs and Field Operations 
Administrator. Division of Wildlife Resources. Department of Natural Resources. His areas of 
responsibility included budget, hunting licenses and permits, hunter information and education, 
information services, and pilots. Grievant had no record of prior discipline. Randy G. Moon had 
served in several responsible positions, including being former Assistant Director. 
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2. On December 7. 1996, Grievant and his two sons. Nathan and Ryan, went hunting for doe 
antelope in the Crawford Mountain Hunting Unit in Rich County. Grievant's older son. Nathan (also 
a Division employee), had the antelope permit. Earlier in the day the three Moons hunted in the 
southern portion of the unit around Woodruff. Utah. Later in the day, they went to the northern 
portion of the unit around Sage Junction. 
3. The Moons drove east on Highway 30; they passed the Utah border sign on the north side 
of the road and the Wyoming border sign on the south side of the road: then they passed a power 
substation, and turned south on a dirt road. (See Grievant Exhibit 1.) They saw a herd of antelope 
to the west of the road which was being chased by a white Suburban: the antelope ran across the 
road. Nathan fired a shot at an antelope while the antelope continued running east. The hunters 
drove on a road that turned to the east. 
4. Grievant talked to a man in a white Suburban who said he had not seen the antelope. 
Grievant testified that the man said he thought the Utah/Wyoming border was either the road or the 
fence to the east. Grievant, in a Toyota 4Runner, and the man in the white Suburban headed west 
on the road. 
5. Two hunters. Glen and Jane Chen, had turned off Highway 30 where they had passed the 
Utah and Wyoming border signs and onto the dirt road: they had turned onto the road to the east 
where they saw a silver Geo. They saw a hunter fire a shot at some antelope in a bowl-like area to 
the south of them and to the east of the main dirt road. The Chens told the hunter they were not in 
Utah and the hunter left in his vehicle. 
6. Shortly thereafter, the Chens saw the Toyota and the Suburban travel down the road 
heading west. Mr. Chen said to the driver of the Toyota: "Aren't we in Wyoming?" Mr. Chen 
testified that Grievant answered: "Yes." Grievant testified that he. himself said: "According to the 
man in the truck, we are." The Toyota traveled west on the road and turned back onto the dirt road 
and drove to the south. 
7. The Chens on the side road saw that one antelope in the bowl-like area was lying down. 
Also, the Moons, who were on the dirt road, saw that one antelope was lying down. Mr. Chen saw 
two hunters approach the antelope. The hunter with the gun, Nathan Moon, fired three shots. He 
fired the first shot from a hill overlooking the bowl-like area. Nathan fired another shot in the bowl-
like area, and finally, he fired another shot point-blank at the antelope. (See Agency Exhibit 2.) 
Grievant said he thought the road or the fence was the Utah/Wyoming border. Nathan said he 
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thought they were in Utah and west of the power station. Ryan said he thought they were east of the 
power station, but he didn't know which state they were in: however, he thought probably Utah 
because he thought the din road paralleled the highway. 
8. Grievant. who had remained with the Toyota on the dirt road, motioned to his sons to 
return to the vehicle. The sons dragged the antelope near to the vehicle and gutted the animal. 
Grievant helped them get started gutting the animal until the sons buried the gut pile under the snow. 
The Moons returned to their home in Bountiful with the antelope marked with Utah tags. 
9. The Chens drove down the dirt road which the Moons had been on until they found the 
orange markers that marked the point where the road went back into Utah. The Chens noted a 
description of the shooter (Agency Exhibit 1) and the approximate time. 2:25 p.m.. and then drove 
to Randolph to report to the Poaching Hotline about what they considered to be an illegal activity. 
Ms. Chen talked to William Woody of DWR. who directed them to go to the court house to report 
the incident to the DWR Conservation Officer. 
10. Jim Gregory, a Conservation Officer with DWR in Rich County, had been patrolling the 
area that day, accompanied by Bob Hasenyager from the Ogden Regional Office.- Mr. Woody told 
Gregory and Hasenyager to go to the court house in Randolph to meet with the Chens. The Chens 
gave the information they had about the shooting of the antelope to the officer. Officer Gregory and 
Mr. Hasenyager went to examine the site of the antelope shooting at about 3:30 to 3:45 p.m. That 
same day. they examined tire tracks and footprints, and made notes and took photographs. They did 
not see a gut pile. Officer Gregory contacted Neil Hymas. a Wyoming Game Warden in Cokeville. 
Wyoming, and made an appointment with Mr. Hymas to visit the shooting site the following day. 
11. On December 8. 1996. at about 11:00 a.m.. Officer Gregory and Wyoming Game 
Warden Hymas examined the site of the alleged violation. Officer Hymas testified that the Utah and 
Wyoming state signs were clearly marked on Highway 30 and that the dirt road to the south was 
Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220. Warden Hymas stated that there was no open hunt in 
Wyoming in this area. He also stated that a shooting for a mercy killing was not allowable under 
Wyoming law. They documented tracks and bullet paths in the snow, uncovered a gut pile, and 
made plans to interview Randy and Nathan Moon on December 10. 1996. 
12. On December 10. 1996. Officer Hymas interviewed Randy Moon at the Wildlife 
Building in Salt Lake City. Grievant drew a map of the area (Agency Exhibit 7) and indicated to the 
officer that he thought the road was the state line. Grievant said he had told his son not to shoot at 
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the power station. Grievant also said that he thought the antelope might have already been hit. but 
he didn't tell his son so the hunt would not be spoiled. 
13. On December 10. 1996, Officers Hymas and Gregory interviewed Nathan Moon at the 
Wildlife Building in Salt Lake City. The Miranda Warning was given and signed by Nathan. 
Nathan Moon drew a map of the area (Agency Exhibit 8 and Grievant Exhibit 59) and prepared a 
written statement (Grievant Exhibit 58). Nathan told the officers that his party had crossed the state 
line and had turned south. Nathan said he thought they were in Utah and he saw people on the hill 
watching them. Nathan explained about the three shots that he had fired. He wrote that they had 
returned to Bountiful through Garden City and down Logan Canyon. Nathan testified at the hearing 
that Officer Gregory made notations on the map. Nathan testified that he felt coached about drawing 
the map. After the interviews. Officer Hymas went to the Moon's residence in Bountiful and got the 
antelope marked with Utah tags and took it to the evidence office in Green River. Wyoming. 
14. Randy Peck, a retired DWR Conservation Officer, testified that in his opinion the 
Utah/Wyoming border was hard to determine in the Crawford Mountain area. The road crossed over 
the border and there were no geographical formations constituting the border. Peck said that he had 
not been in the area, however, since 1994 and would not know how well the border was marked in 
December of 1996. The 1996 Proclamation and Hunting Guide contains a clear description of the 
hunting unit boundary. It states: Crawford Mtn. Rich County—"Boundary begins at the Utah-
Wyoming state line and Highway SR-16; then north on SR-16 to Highway SR-30 (Sage Creek 
Junction): north on the Rich County road toward Cokeville. Wyoming to the Utah-Wyoming state 
line: south along this state line to SR-16." (See Grievant Exhibit 5.) 
15. Randy G. Moon. Nathan R. Moon, and Stephen G. Rasmussen were cited by Wyoming 
Game Warden Hymas. (See Agency Exhibit 9.) Randy G. Moon was cited for violation of 
Wyoming Statute 23-6-205, specifically: "Did aid and/or counsel in taking an antelope in Wyoming 
during a closed season." Nathan R. Moon was cited for violation of Wyoming Statute 23-3-402. 
specifically: "Did take an antelope in Wyoming during a closed season/* Stephen G. Rasmussen 
was cited for violation of Wyoming Statute 23-3-402. specifically: "Did attempt to take antelope 
in Wyoming during a closed season." The court records show that the citations were filed on 
January 6, 1997. and a forfeiture was paid on January 30. 1997. Similar charges were dismissed by 
Rich County on April 14, 1997. (See Agency Exhibits 10,11.) 
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16. On December 30. 1996. Nathan Moon's employment with the Division of Wildlife 
Resources was terminated. 
17. Around December 12 or 13. 1996. John F. Kimball. Director. DWR. then Acting 
Director, became aware of the investigation of Mr. Moon. The investigation covered the antelope 
incident and a Posted Hunting Unit ( PHU) moose incident (the latter incident is set forth below) 
along with some other issues. DWR Director Kimball was briefed about the matters, reviewed the 
issues, and determined to place Randy Moon on administrative leave (suspension with pay) effective 
January 6, 1997, pending a final recommendation in the matter. 
18. On January 30. 1997. DWR Director John Kimball sent a Notice of Disciplinary 
Consideration to Randy Moon. (See Agency Exhibit 6.) The memo stated: "I am notifying you of 
my intent to impose disciplinary action for wildlife-related violations and the abuse of your position 
as related to the transfer of a moose permit, which were brought to my attention, and which must be 
explored. Because of the seriousness of your actions, the options I am considering include 
termination of your employment." The Notice included an opportunity to respond. 
19. On February 6,1997, Randy Moon wrote a memo to John Kimball in response. Grievant 
responded to: (1) the citation issued to him as an accessory in the antelope taking, (2) the transfer 
of a moose permit on behalf of his son. and (3) general considerations for review. Grievant said that 
his hunting group had made a mistake in shooting the antelope and should have contacted an officer. 
Grievant also said that he did not think he had acted improperly in the PHU moose transfer incident 
(discussed below) because he was not involved in the original request by the PHU operator of the 
Northern Region. (See Agency Exhibit 5.) 
20. On February 11. 1997. DWR Director Kimball informed Randy Moon of his intent to 
terminate Grievant"s employment effective immediately. (See Agency Exhibit 3.) Kimball cited 
various reasons, including: violating the laws Grievant was obligated to enforce, violating the trust 
of his office, having the potential of destroying the public's confidence in the DWR and its mission. 
discrediting the DWR. engaging in activities which are not in the best interests of the public or 
public service, and generally lessening the faith and confidence in the DWR. 
21. At the hearing, evidence and testimony regarding the consistent application of discipline 
were introduced. The DWR has had a number of employees who have previously received wildlife-
related citations: the disciplinary action taken has varied from case to case. (See Grievant Exhibit 
18-19. 34. 37-39. and 65.) 
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B. Abuse of Position 
22. On or about July 10, 1996, Grievant's younger son, Ryan Moon, drew a public hunting 
moose permit in the Utah Big Game drawing for the East Fork of Chalk Creek Posted Hunting Unit 
(PHU). Certain standards and procedures are provided by Division regulations that apply to posted 
hunting units organized for the hunting of big game. (See Agency Exhibit 4.) The moose hunt took 
place September 1 to October 31, 1996. 
23. The Certificate of Registration (COR) for East Fork Chalk Creek PHU lists as the 
operator Mr. Cal Haskell (Agency Exhibit 12). The COR for South Fork of Chalk Creek lists as the 
operator Mr. Terry Thatcher. (See Agency Exhibit 13.) 
24. The landowners file an application with the State biologists to determine the number of 
permits that will be issued for the PHU. (See Agency Exhibit 12-13.) The DWR biologists make 
recommendations and the Regional Wildlife Council and State Wildlife Board ultimately decide the 
number of permits. 
25. After the Big Game Drawing, Randy Moon and Ryan Moon had conversations with 
Cal Haskell about hunting on the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU. Hunters are required to make 
reservations with the office of the PHU to schedule their hunts. 
26. On October 3, 1996, a written request to allow three private hunters on the East Fork 
Chalk Creek PHU to use their permits on the South Fork Chalk Creek PHU wras signed by the two 
operators and Lou Cornicelli. an employee of the DWR Ogden Regional Office. (See Agency 
Exhibit 14 and Grievant Exhibit 60.) DWR rules allow a transfer of a permit from one unit to 
another if the rules are properly followed. Mr. Haskell testified that he got a copy of the typed 
portion of this document which had a United Sportsmen letterhead. 
27. Grievant testified that about the middle of October Cal Haskell called Grievant and told 
him that the name of Ryan Moon, a public hunter, had been left off the October 3, 1996 request for 
transfer of the three private hunters. Mr. Haskell said that Mr. Thatcher had told him that Ryan's 
name should be added to the list. 
28. In October of 1996, Grievant had a conversation with Wes Shields. Wildlife Section 
Chief in the Salt Lake Office, who handled the PHUs, about transferring permits from one PHU to 
another. The rules had been modified in 1995-96 and Wes Shields told Grievant that there were 
rules allowing for transfers. 
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29. At the hearing, Wes Shields was questioned about an incident involving his son when 
he was allowed to kill an animal on a hunting area that had been expanded. Mr. Shields explained 
that the Regional-staff made the decision to expand the hunting area, that it had been extended to the 
general hunting population, and that he personally was not involved in requesting the change. 
30. On October 16. 1996. Randy Moon called Lou Cornicelli at the DWR Ogden Regional 
Office. Mr. Cornicelli said that they had two or three conversations. Grievant requested that 
Ryan Moon's name be added to the October 3, 1996. written request for transfer. Grievant said that 
Cal Haskell wanted this done but Mr. Haskell couldn't get through on the phone. Mr. Cornicelli said 
that he had received no messages from Mr. Haskell. Furthermore. Mr. Cornicelli said that Grievant 
said nothing about Mr. Terry Thatcher. Mr. Cornicelli testified that he received no written request 
to add Ryan Moon's name to the list. 
31. Furthermore. Mr. Cornicelli said that he needed to check on this because he felt the 
request was made on behalf of the hunter and not the operator. Mr. Cornicelli checked with 
Robert Hasenyager of the DWR Main Administration Office. Mr. Hasenyager did not check the 
specific rules about transfers of permits for PHUs. Mr. Hasenyager told Mr. Cornicelli that they 
often try to carry out requests that come from the Director's office. Moreover. Hasenyager told 
Mr. Cornicelli to make the change, but also to make a notation about it. 
32. Mr. Cornicelli made a handwritten notation on the written request for transfer. It was 
dated 10/16/96 and stated: "As per conversation w/ Randy Moon. I am adding Ryan Moon to 
authorization list." Mr. Cornicelli signed the notation. (See Agency Exhibit 14 and Grievant 
Exhibit 60.) Mr. Cornicelli faxed this document to Grievant at about 3:35 p.m. on October 61.19%. 
Randy Moon said that he made copies of this document. Mr. Haskell testified that he did not get a 
copy of the handwritten portion of this letter until January of 1997. 
33. Mr. Cornicelli said that he did not send copies of this document to the DWR Salt Lake 
Office and that he had called Steve Kearl. Leslie Rock of the DWR Salt Lake Office testified that 
she did not receive copies of the request for transfer document. 
34. Grievant testified that Ryan Moon and he had hunted five times and on October 26. 
1996. Ryan shot a moose on the South Fork of Chalk Creek PHU. Ryan testified that the request for 
a transfer document was in their vehicle and that Terry Thatcher helped them get the animal out. 
35. On November 15.1996. Lenny Rees. the Hunter Education Coordinator under Grievant. 
informed Grievant of a disciplinary action that he took against an employee who had violated a rule 
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concerning abuses of authority. (See Grievant Exhibits 66-67.) For improperly issuing a hunter 
education certificate of completion card. Education Coordinator Rees. assessed the following 
discipline on the-employee: (1) ordered him to retrieve the card, (2) ordered him to take five days 
off without pay, and (3) ordered him not to wear his uniform for three months. 
36. On December 27,1996, Judi Tutorow, the Licensing Coordinator at the DWR Salt Lake 
Office, had a meeting with former DWR Director Bob Valentine and Acting Director John Kimball. 
Ms. Tutorow testified that Valentine and Kimball told her they were doing a thorough investigation 
on Randy Moon. They told her she would need to terminate Nathan Moon. Ms. Tutorow testified 
about a situation she knew about where someone was on another PHU without authorization in the 
Morgan area and this person had received a warning citation for the incident. Ms. Tutorow also told 
about a situation where she had made a correction for her sister-in-law on a licensing application. 
Her sister-in-law had mixed the debit card and credit card numbers and Ms. Tutorow corrected the 
data so the process could continue. She had not received any discipline for doing so. 
37. On January 13, 1997, a written request for transfer of public hunters from East Fork of 
Chalk Creek to South Fork of Chalk Creek was prepared and signed by the two operators and 
Lou Cornicelli. (See Grievant Exhibit 11.) 
38. On February 19, 1997, Mr. Hasenyager received a written notice from Director Kimball 
concerning the October 16,1996 incident where the handwritten addition of Ryan Moon's name was 
made to the typewritten request of transfer dated October 3, 1996. Director Kimball indicated that 
he thought Mr. Hasenyager should have questioned the wisdom or legality of Grievant's request and 
should have contacted the Director's Office before making a decision to act on the request. 
Director Kimball characterized this notice as a reprimand. (See Grievant Exhibit 62.) 
39. On March 4. 1997, William Woody received a letter from the Summit County Attorney 
declining to prosecute Randy Moon, Cal Haskell and Terry Thatcher for the PHU moose incident. 
(See Grievant Exhibit 20.) 
40. On March 12.1997, William Woody received a letter from the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office declining to prosecute Randy Moon for the PHU moose incident. (See Grievant 
Exhibit 21.) 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Wildlife-Related Violations 
1. A grievance filed in response to dismissal from career service employment is a 
disciplinary grievance. The agency bears the burden of proof in disciplinary grievances (Utah Code. 
Section 67-19a-406(2)(a)(1996)). 
2. The evidentiary standard by which an agency must meet its burden of proof is "substantial 
evidence" {Utah Code. Section 67-19a-406(2)(c)( 1996)). "Substantial evidence" means "more than 
a mere scintilla of evidence." but less than "the weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is 
such quantum and type of "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." ( Zissi v. State Tax Commission. 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992); Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
3. An employer, the Utah Department of Natural Resources in this case, "has the initial 
burden to show that the discipline was not disproportionate to the misconduct. Once the [Agency] 
fulfills that initial burden, it is incumbent on the employee to raise any due process concerns, 
including consistency, so that due process*issues can be dealt with properly." James M. Lunnen v. 
Utah Dept. of Transportation, and the Career Service Review Board of the State of Utah. 886 P.2d 
70 (Utah App. 1994). 
4. "Once the Agency fulfills its initial burden of providing a factual basis for its allegations 
and its burden of demonstrating that its sanction is not disproportionate, the employee must then 
raise due process concerns and/or rebut the Agency's evidence. If the employee fails to do so, there 
is no basis on which to find that the Agency's sanction amounts to an abuse of discretion.'" Lunnen. 
citing Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain. 824 P. 2d 439, 443 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, the 
standard to be applied in this case regarding the consistency of discipline analysis is whether the 
Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
5. The Department cites the following sources of authority that apply to the wildlife-related 
violations. 
a. DHRMR477-ll-l.(l)(a) states: 
11-1 Disciplinary Action 
(1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following 
reasons: 
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(a) Noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, 
including out not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards 
and workplace policies. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant did 
violate Department rules and that the discipline of termination was 
proportionate to the seriousness of the violations and that the 
Department official used reasonable discretion in determining the 
discipline. 
b. 1996 Proclamation 23-19-1 and R657-5-3 state: 
License. Permit, and Tag Requirements 
(1) A person may not engage in hunting protected wildlife or in the sale, 
trade, or barter of protected wildlife or their parts without first having 
procured the necessary licenses, certificates of registration, permits and 
tags and having at the same time the licenses, certificates of registration, 
permits, and tags on his or her person. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant" s son 
violated the above-cited policy and rule with the taking of an antelope 
in Wyoming and tagging it with Utah tags. The Department also 
presented substantial evidence that Grievant violated this policy and 
rule by aiding and counseling his son. 
c. Utah Code. Section 23-20-23 states: 
Aiding or assisting violation unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person to aid or assist any other person to violate any 
provisions of this code or any rules or regulations promulgated under it. 
The penalty for violating this section is the same as for the provision or 
regulation for which aid or assistance is given. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant aided 
or assisted his son in the taking of an antelope in Wyoming. 
6. Grievant and his son. Nathan, received citations from the state of Wyoming for the taking 
of the antelope in Wyoming and they paid their fines. The Department disciplined Grievant with 
termination for this incident and for another serious incident involving the transfer of a moose 
permit. Director Kimball determined that termination would be proper because Grievant held a 
supervisory position with DWR. basically a managerial position, within the organizational structure. 
Grievant had under his supervision several areas of responsibility that were directly related to 
hunting activities, specifically: licenses and permits, information and education, and information 
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services. He held a managerial position in DWR: he would be seen as an example by others and 
could reasonably be expected to adhere strictly to the policies and rules of DWR and the State. His 
position would carry with it a degree of trust. 
7. Wildlife resources are highly regarded in this State and the public carefully watches how 
these resources are handled and administered. DWR may certainly expect one of its own managers 
to act with utmost prudence and care in a situation involving wildlife. Grievant later acknowledged 
that he had made a mistake in not reporting the shooting incident to an official. However, at the time 
of the shooting incident, he did not try to stop the incident which took place to the east of the road, 
nor did he report the incident, contact an official, or turn in the animal. Grievant says that he and 
his sons were confused about the location of the Utah/Wyoming border, but it is the responsibility 
of a hunter to be aware of his location and know where he is hunting. The rules require hunters to 
have the proper licenses and permits for the area in which they are hunting. Grievant had time after 
the incident to report or take some action; he said he wanted to check into the boundary question, 
but the time to have remedied the matter was immediately after the incident. 
8. Grievant contends that his discipline was disproportionate because his off-duty conduct 
lacked two characteristics: (1) that there must by a continuing course of off-duty misconduct, and 
(2) that there must be a nexus between the off-duty conduct and Grievant* s employment. Grievant 
cites Walck v. City of Albuquerque. 828 P. 2d 966 (N.M. App. 1992) in which a police officer's 
termination was overturned. The officer was guilty of trespassing and criminal damage to property-
resulting from striking his wife's car in her male companion's driveway. The Court upheld a district 
court ruling reinstating Walck after finding that this one incident did not relate "to the reputation, 
efficiency or operations of the police department." Walck. 828 P. 2d at 968. Similarly, in Romero 
v. Employment Security Dept.. 691 P. 2d 72 (N.M. App. 1984). an employee was told three times to 
stop interrupting and yelling during a staff meeting. The employee received a five-day suspension 
and a 45-day probationary period for her actions which were found "in direct contravention of her 
superior's instructions." Romero, 691 P. 2d at 75. The Court stated that "mere inefficiency, ordinary 
negligence, or isolated instances of good-faith errors in judgment do not rise to the level of 
misconduct although such may be evidence going to the provisions of [state personnel rule]." Id. 
at 75. 
9. The Department cites Clearfield Cin* v. Department of Employment Security. 663 P. 2d 
440. (Utah 1983) in which the nexus issue is addressed. In Clearfield, the employee claimed that 
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his conduct was "off duty" and it had no connection with his employment. The court rejected his 
argument as it analyzed the individual situation and set forth the following standard: 
It-is only necessary that the misconduct have such "connection " to the employee's 
duties and to the employer's business that it is a subject of legitimate and significant 
concern to the employer (663 P. 2d at 443). 
10. The Department cites another case which examines the nexus issue. The D.C. Circuit 
Court generalized the reason for nexus as a legal concept in light of federal statutes. Among other 
things, the federal appellate court stated: 
The nature of the particular job as much as the conduct allegedly justifying the 
action has a bearing on whether the necessary relationship obtains. The question 
thus becomes whether the asserted grounds for the adverse action, if found 
supported by evidence, would directly relate either to the employee's ability to 
perform approved tasks or to the agency's ability to fulfill its assigned mission (Doe 
v. Hampton. 556 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977) at 272). 
11. In Kent v. Utah Department of Employment Security, 4 CSRB 40 (1992) the CSRB 
discussed what is related to one's job. 
There are certain moral standards, such as integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty, 
which need not be written into ^n employer's policies and work place rules. The 
public employing agency may reasonably expect adherence to such unwritten 
universal moral standards, which if breached, would substantially tarnish an 
employee's reputation and strain if not rupture the employment relationship (4 
CSRB 40, p. 9). 
12. Hunting activities are at the heart of both incidents for which Grievant was dismissed. 
The two incidents occurred from October through December 1996. Grievant's judgment and actions 
in relation to the hunting activities and in relation to the rules and statutes governing hunting 
activities are the issues in the violations Grievant is charged with. The two incidents comprise a 
pattern of violations. The nexus that exists between the off-duty hunting activities and Grievant's 
ability to perform responsibly on his job concerns Grievant's judgment and trustworthiness in 
adhering strictly to the very rules and statutes he is required to uphold and promulgate in his work 
responsibilities. To operate efficiently and fulfill its mission, DWR must have employees who 
exhibit sound judgment and strictly adhere to all the rules and statutes governing hunting activities. 
An employee who is in a supervisory position must also serve as an example and encourage his 
subordinates to strictly administer and comply with the rules and statutes governing hunting 
activities. DWR's employees must exhibit the highest respect for the rules and statutes at all times. 
Grievant's actions in the two incidents did not demonstrate the necessary high respect for the rules 
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and statutes governing hunting activities. The compromising of the credibility of a high-level 
employee of DWR will necessarily compromise the credibility of DWR itself. Such a situation 
creates a potential of destroying the public confidence in a public agency and its mission. 
13. Grievant presented examples of incidents where other employees in DWR had received 
wildlife citations in the past and had not been terminated from employment, thereby questioning the 
consistency of discipline in his case. Mr. Kimball the then acting DWR Director, was the person 
who handled disciplinary matters for DWR. He had been involved in some of the examples 
mentioned but not all of them. DWR's director has discretion to assess each individual case and 
weigh many relevant factors in making disciplinary decisions. An example was cited about an 
employee who killed an elk outside of the legal area. He received a one-day suspension and a letter 
of reprimand. However, the facts show that he was not in a high supervisory position and that he 
turned himself in when saying he had made an honest mistake. Another example was given of two 
biologists who were cited for taking two pheasants improperly. They turned themselves in and were 
not in supervisory positions and thus, were not terminated. An example was given of two 
employees who received two citations in 1989 for attempting to take crows when shooting across a 
highway. They were not in supervisory positions and received letters of warning. Another example 
was that of an employee in 1979 who was given a citation for taking sage grouse. He wrote himself 
the citation and gave himself no discipline. Another example was given of a citation for an unlawful 
taking of two elk in 1986. The employee paid the fine and no disciplinary action was taken by 
DWR. This employee was not in a supervisory position. Grievant cites the case of Dennis Weaver 
who was reinstated to his position by the PRB (predecessor of the CSRB) in 1987. (See Division of 
Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver. 3 PRB 22 (1986).) Weaver 
was terminated for not reporting the killing, the mutilating, and the hiding of a bear shot by 
Anderson, another hunter. The culpability of Weaver was seen as less than that of Anderson and 
Weaver was given a six-week suspension. Grievant contends that his own culpability as aiding and 
counseling is less than the culpability of the ones who actually shot the antelope. However. 
Grievant held a highly responsible position in DWR and is expected to act with greater care, 
compliance, and propriety in an incident involving wildlife. Also, Grievant and his sons tagged the 
antelope, transported it and began steps for processing it. Such actions combined with his 
responsible position constitute very serious infractions. 
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14. Substantial evidence shows that, notwithstanding examples of discipline for other 
employees. Director Kimball exercised reasonable discretion in determining a sanction that was 
proportionate to-the seriousness of Grievant's actions. Grievant administered programs under his 
supervision and had responsibilities for procedures and policies that directly related to hunting 
activities. The employees under him. the managers and supervisors over him. and the general public 
have reasonable expectations that Grievant will uphold the trust of his office. The Department has 
met its burden in showing by substantial evidence that the alleged violations occurred and that 
Director Kimball exercised reasonable discretion in determining that Grievant's actions violated the 
trust of Grievant's office, and that he had not acted in the best interest of the public. 
15. Based on the seriousness of the incident the discipline of termination for this action is 
reasonable based on the totality of the facts and circumstances and is for the good of the public 
service and for just cause. 
B. Abuse of Position Violations 
16. The same first four legal conclusions under the previous incident apply to this incident. 
17. The Department cites the following rules and statutes that apply to the abuse of position 
violations. 
a. Utah Administrative Code. R477-9-2.(l)(2) states: 
Employees shall not use their state position or any influence, power, authority or 
confidential information they receive in that position, or state time, equipment, 
property, or supplies for private gain. 
b. Utah Code, 67-16-4.(3) states: 
A public officer or public employee may not: use or attempt to use his official 
position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant used his 
official position to secure special privileges for his son in violation of 
this rule and statute. 
18. a. Utah Code. Section 67-16-2. Purpose of Chapter states: 
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth standards of conduct for officers and 
employees of the state of Utah and its political subdivisions in areas where there are 
actual or potential conflicts of interest between their public duties and their private 
interests. In this manner the Legislature intends to promote the public interest and 
strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of Utah in the integrity of their 
government. It does not intend to deny any public officer or employee the 
opportunities available to all other citizens of the state to acquire private economic 
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or other interests so long as this does not interfere with his full and faithful 
discharge of his public dunes. 
bA Natural Resources Policy Number 2-03-009B states: 
Declaration of Conflict of Interest 
No employee of the Department shall accept any full-time, part-time, or contract 
employment of any kind, or voluntary work related to your position resulting in 
a direct conflict of interest or potential for conflict of interest. [Emphasis added.] 
The above policy further states: 
There are several criteria that determine if there is a conflict of interest or potential 
for conflict of interest. Any one of these criteria by itself may constitute a conflict 
or potential for conflict: 
* * * * * * 
3. Using, or attempting to use. Department position to secure 
special privileges or exemptions for self or others. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant's 
actions in the moose permit PHU transfer for his son constituted a 
conflict of interest between his public duties and his private interests 
in violation of this statute and policy. 
19. a. Utah Administrative Code. R657-37-3.(5)(a) states: 
A person who has obtained a posted hunting unit permit through the big game 
drawing shall be provided an opportunity to hunt big game on a specific posted 
hunting unit commensurate to the opportunity provided to a person who has 
otherwise obtained a posted hunting unit permit. 
b. Utah Administrative Code. R657-37-4.(8)(a) states: 
A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent must request an amendment 
to the original certificate of registration for any variation of the following: 
(i) to allow hunters who have obtained a posted hunting unit permit to hunt 
within each other's posted hunting units. 
c. Utah Administrative Code. R657-37-4.(8) states: 
(b) Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration must be 
made in writing and submitted to the appropriate division regional 
supervisor and a wildlife manager. 
(c) Upon approval, an amendment to the original certificate of registration 
shall be issued in writing. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant verbally 
requested an amendment to the certificate of registration rather than 
in writing by the proper parties as required by the above-cited rules. 
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20. Utah Code. Section 67-16-10. Inducing others to violate chapter states: 
No person shall induce or seek to induce any public officer or public employee to 
violate any of the provisions of this chapter. 
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant induced 
a public employee to fulfill a request based upon Grievant's position 
in the Division. 
21. Grievant requested an employee of DWR to make a change based on a verbal request 
by him. DWR maintains that the request should have been in writing by the appropriate parties and 
that the proper procedure should have been followed. The rules and policies governing PHUs have 
specific requirements so that a proper procedure is followed in making changes. The employees of 
DWR must adhere carefully and prudently to the rules and policies so that the public will have 
confidence in the Division. Employees with responsible positions must act with a high standard of 
care in their actions. 
22. The rules and policies require that employees not act in a way that will create a conflict 
of interest between their public duties and their private interests or that will secure special privileges 
or exemptions for themselves or others. Grievant obtained permission for his son to hunt in an 
expanded area based upon a verbal request and not one obtained by a written request submitted by 
the proper parties. That was a special privilege or exemption for his son. The direct employee 
Grievant talked to and the person that employee talked to. in turn, complied with the request based 
upon Grievant's position in DWR. The employee who complied with Grievant* s request was 
induced to do so because of Grievant's higher position of responsibility. 
23. Grievant argues that he did not gain a special privilege for his son because the son had 
a right to hunt on the other PHU because he was a public hunter and because the private hunters 
already had permission to do. The process requires approval, however, and the process must be 
allowed to operate so that the wildlife resources are managed properly and that everyone has equal 
opportunities. The three private hunters were on a written list with the proper signatures. The public 
hunter. Ryan Moon, should have also been on a written list with the proper signatures. Other public 
hunters at a later date were on a written list with the proper signatures. 
24. Grievant cites two cases in which officials of the State misused their positions in an 
attempt to gain special privileges and contends that his actions were not as serious as those in the 
other two cases. In Discharge of Jones. 720 P.2d at 1362, a police officer deceived an arrestee into 
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selling the officer his vehicles in lieu of bail. The Court found that Jones' conduct was only possible 
as a result of his official position and the trust and confidence that accompany it. In Despain. 824 
P. 2d at 445. a correctional officer tried to avoid arrest by virtue of his position as a certified prison 
guard. He appealed to the responding police officers to understand that his arrest would jeopardize 
his employment. 
25. The Department presented cases concerning abuse of position issues. In Paul Urry v. 
Central Services Division, 2 PRB 17 (1986), an employee who was responsible to obtain competitive 
bids for State car repairs prepared a bogus estimate to go along with an estimate prepared by his 
friend. The bogus estimate was always higher than his friend's estimate. The State's auto repair 
business always went to Urry's friend. The employee did it solely because it was his friend. The 
Board stated: 
Turning to the Ethics Act, Appellant contends that he did not violate Section 
67-16-4(3) of the State Code. The Hearing Officer concluded otherwise . . . Section 
67-16-4(3) prohibits a public employee or officer from using one's official position 
to secure "special privileges" either for self or others. Hearing Officer Volker 
found that Mr. Urry had breached the just-cited provision when he used his official 
position to take State automobiles to his friend Jonesy. . . . (2 PRB 17 at 8). 
26. In State v. Rou. 366 So.2d 385 (Florida 1978), the Supreme Court interpreted "special 
privilege" in a statute very similar to Utah's Section 67-16-4(3). The Court said: 
The term "special privilege" as used in the context of the state's code of conduct for 
puolic officers has a meaning which is readily apparent to a person of common 
understanding. Viewed in their plain and ordinary sense the words of the statute 
"give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted by the statute." The 
words themselves are simple enough and contain no inherent complexities or 
ambiguities. Webster's Dictionary defines "special privilege" as a "privilege 
granted . . . to an individual or group to the exclusion of others and in derogation 
of common right." 
27. In Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission. 703 P.2d 417. 420 (Or. App. 
1985). the court applied a common and ordinary meaning of "use" to its ethics code. "The ordinary 
dictionary definition of use' is 'to make use of: to avail oneself of. . . .,M The court continued: 
Petitioner ciearly availed himself of his position in purchasing the automobile. It 
was only by reason of his employment in a position that he was aware of the 
opportunity, and it was only because of his position that he was able to use SAIF 
as his agent. In other words, but for his position, he would have been unable to 
purchase the car and thus to obtain a personal financial gain. To interpret "use" 
otherwise would effectively make waste paper out of the statute. (703 P.2d at 420.) 
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28. Grievant circumvented the established process when he verbally requested and received 
a transfer of permit to another PHU for his son. Ryan. The established process required a written 
request by three-specific parties. Grievant's action was a very serious misuse of his position for 
special privilege. 
29. Grievant raised the consistency of discipline issue and presented examples of other DWR 
employees who had not been disciplined as severely or who had not been disciplined at all for 
incidents in which they had been involved. These employees' incidents were distinguishable from 
Grievant's incident of an abuse of position. Wes Shields' son was allowed to hunt on a limited area 
that was extended. However, Mr. Shields did not make the request for this action; the Region staff 
made the decision to extend the area to the general hunting population. Mr. Shields did not secure 
a special privilege by using his position and he was not disciplined. Mr. Hasenyager received a 
written reprimand for not checking with Director Kimball before complying with Grievant's verbal 
request to add Mr. Moon's son's name to the list of hunters. The discipline Mr. Hasenyager received 
was not as serious as Grievant's discipline because his actions were not as serious. Grievant made 
the request to add his son's name based on a verbal request rather than a written request by the 
proper parties; Mr. Hasenyager decided to grant the request based upon the belief that it was a 
request from the Director's Office, and based upon Grievant's position in the Director's Office. 
Grievant's violations were much more serious than those of Mr. Hasenyager. Ms. Tutorow told 
about the hunter who was on the wrong PHU and who received a warning citation for the incident. 
There was no showing that the hunter misused his position to obtain permission to be on the PHU 
or that he did not follow the proper procedures to obtain permission to be on the PHU. Ms. Tutorow 
also told about helping her sister-in-law change some mixed credit card and debit card numbers on 
a license. Ms. Tutorow was not disciplined but there was no showing that this particular process 
required a written request and approval by a certain process including board approval. Mr. Rees 
cited an example of discipline he imposed for an incident involving abuse of authority which 
included, among other things, a five-day suspension. The facts did not show that the disciplined 
employee used his position to secure a special privilege or exemption for himself or for a relative. 
They did not show that he was in a high supervisory position. The evidence did not show that he 
induced another employee to act upon his request. The Rees* incident is distinguishable in several 
important aspects from Grievant's actions. 
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30. Grievant was involved in two separate, and serious incidents. The two incidents show 
a pattern of conduct which exhibits a less than high regard for complying with the Division's rules 
and policies. The violations are serious. A public servant must act with a high regard for his 
position and the public trust. His actions must promote the public interest and strengthen the faith 
and confidence of the public in the integrity of their government. Director Kimball found that 
Grievant's actions were not proper for an employee in a high-level position in the Division. The 
examples of discipline of other employees in DWR did not show the same degree of seriousness of 
violations and the same high supervisory position of employment. The evidence did not show that 
the discipline for this Grievant was disproportionate given the serious violations that occurred. 
Grievant contends that he was not involved in the original written request for transfer of permits for 
the three private hunters and that his verbal request on behalf of his son Ryan was not. therefore, a 
serious enough incident to merit the discipline of termination. However, Randy Moon's actions did 
not show a high regard of honor for the correct process that was supposed to be followed. Respect 
for the process reflects good judgment on the part of an employee; a lack of respect for the process 
reflects questionable judgment on the pai-t of an employee who held a position of trust within the 
Division. 
31. The Department has met its substantial evidence burden by showing that Grievant was 
in a high position in DWR and that his violations of rules and policies were the very rules and 
policies for which he. himself, was responsible. He was responsible for budgets, hunting licenses 
and permits, hunter education, information services, and pilots. Grievant's violations dealt with 
hunting permits, transfers of permits, and use of public position for private gain. The public 
scrutinizes the actions of those State employees who administer the hunting activities, and the State 
employees' actions must be beyond reproach or the efficiency of DWR and its mission are 
compromised. Director Kimball exercised reasonable discretion in determining that termination was 
a proportionate discipline for Grievant's two very serious violations. 
32. Substantial evidence shows that Grievant was dismissed for the good of the public 
service and for just cause. 
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DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Grievant's appeal is 
hereby respectfully denied. 
DATED this 3 3 day of C W r ^ - . 1997. 
It VO AAA/ i^r W O 
Sherri R. Guyon 
Hearing Officer/Presiding Officer 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
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ADDENDUM B 
Career Service Review Board decision, Randy G. Moon v. State of Utah 
Department of Natural Resources. 6 CSRB 59, issued February 9, 1998, (R. 
133-157) 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
RANDY G. MOON, : 
: DECISION AND 
Grievant and Appellant, : FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
NATURAL RESOURCES, : 
: Case No. 6 CSRB 59 (Step 6) 
Agency and Respondent : Case No. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 (Step 5) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate review of the 
above-entitled case on November 24,1997. The following Board Members heard oral argument and 
then deliberated in an executive session: Paul G. Maughan, Chair, Tim Moran, 
Gloria Eileen Wheeler and Dale L. Whittle. Excused absence: Kathleen Hirabayashi. 
Randy G. Moon (Grievant and Randy Moon) brings this appeal before the Board. Randy Moon 
appeals from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing officer's decision which upheld his dismissal from the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR and the Department). Grievant was present and represented 
by Erik Strindberg, Attorney at Law. DNR was represented by Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen G. Schwendiman, and assisted by Joanne M. McHugh as the Department's designated 
management representative. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Two Separate, Unrelated Charges 
Grievant raises two issues on appeal: Did Randy Moon engage in an abuse of his 
employment position regarding the Posted Hunting Unit (PHU) incident? Second, did Grievant 
commit a serious wildlife violation on December 7. 1996, which alone would be cause for his 
dismissal? 
The record evidence as a whole does not support the Department's allegation that 
Randy Moon abused his position with respect to the PHU incident. Therefore, the evidentiary/step 5 
decision is reversed on the PHU issue. However, conversely, the record evidence clearly shows that 
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Grievant knowingly aided and assisted (also "counseled" and "abetted") his son Nathan in the 
"taking" of an antler less antelope or pronghorn within Wyoming during a closed hunting season and 
without a license for hunting in that state. This violation is sufficiently serious enough standing 
alone that it supports the Department's dismissal of Randy Moon. 
B. The Board's Appellate Standards of Review 
We review the Grievant's appeal under provision of the Utah Administrative Code 
(Supp. 1997) at R137-l-22(4)(a) through (c), which read as follows: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational in accordance with the 
substantial evidence standard. If the board determines that the factual findings of 
the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct 
the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings 
based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine 
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
granted to the evidentiary /step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable 
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the above 
provisions. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth at Utah Code §§67-19a-101 through -408 
{Supp. 1997) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures, which is a sub-part of the 
Utah State Personnel Management Act at §§67-19 et seq. The CSRB's administrative rules are 
published in the Utah Administrative Code at R137-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1997). This Board-level 
or step 6 appeal hearing constitutes the final administrative review in the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Randy Moon's appeal from dismissal. Both the Board's 
evidentiary/step 5 and this appellate/step 6 proceeding are properly designated as formal 
adjudications pursuant to Rl 3 7-1-18(2)(a) (as amended May 16,1997). Therefore, those provisions 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining to "formal adjudications" are 
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applicable to the CSRB's step 5 and step 6 hearings (§§63-46b et seq.) 
THE ABUSE OF POSITION INCIDENT 
Grievant has not challenged any of the hearing officer's factual findings by alleging a defect 
or error regarding the Agency's abuse of position charge. The Board finds neither reversible nor 
harmful error in these step 5 factual findings. As Grievant has not challenged any of the findings 
nor has he marshaled1 the evidence against any of these statements of fact, the Board hereby accepts 
all 18 factual findings from numbers 22 through 40, as set forth in the step 5 decision pertaining to 
the abuse of position allegation. We hold that the step 5 decision's factual findings are correct as 
stated as well as being both reasonable and rational, according to our appellate standard of review 
atR137-l-22(4)(a)(1997ed.). 
A. Factual Background 
Ryan Moon (Ryan) is one of Randy Moon's five children. During fall of 1996, Ryan was 
an 18-year-old high school senior. In July of 1996, Ryan had won a big game hunt animal drawing 
which allowed him to participate in the State's moose hunting season during September-October. 
The Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) regulates all big game hunting activities in Utah. 
Big game hunting in Utah takes place on a PHU. A PHU is a privately-owned large section 
of land on which hunting is permitted by a few public hunters, but mainly private hunters. Typically, 
the private hunters on a PHU belong to a sportsmen's club or a hunting association. In DWR's July 
drawing, Ryan won a public permit to hunt a moose on the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU (East Fork 
PHU) near the Coalville-Upton area of Utah. Although PHUs are owned and controlled by private 
hunting clubs, DWR rules require that in addition to those private-paying, client-members of a 
particular sporting association or hunting club, a few public hunters (selected through an annual 
random public drawing) must be given permission free of membership fees and other related private 
fees to hunt on PHUs. DWR issues authorized lists of public and private hunters for PHUs which 
are known as Certificates of Registration, or CORs for short. CORs contain the names and total 
numbers of private hunters as well as public hunters that may hunt on a PHU during a particular 
hunting season. Hunting on PHUs is controlled by DWR through the requirement of a COR. CORs 
list each hunter's name and type of animal that each listed hunter is permitted to shoot during the big 
game hunting season on a designated PHU. Hence, teenaged Ryan had proper authorization to hunt 
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for and ''take" one bull moose on the East Fork PHU during September-October of 1996 
(Exht.A-12). 
B. Transferring Hunters Between PHUs 
During fall of 1996, Cal Haskell owned and operated the East Fork PHU; similarly, Terry 
Thatcher was Haskell's counterpart for the South Fork PHU. Haskell and Thatcher are the co-
owners of the United Sportsmen's [Hunting] Club which owns and operates these two adjoining 
PHUs. Neither PHU operator, Haskell nor Thatcher, observed bull moose or cow elk on the East 
Fork PHU during the 1996 big game hunting season. Moreover, while Haskell received the assigned 
hunters' names on copies of their hunting permits for his East Fork PHU, he did not receive the 
approved COR from DWR until May 1997 (T. II, 506, 507). This long delay evidences serious 
processing problems between DWR officials and PHU owners during this period. A similar COR 
amendment processing problem caused Grievant to become involved in behalf of his son, Ryan. 
During September 1996, Haskell realized that hunters were not finding cow elk or bull moose 
on his East Fork PHU. Therefore, he proposed to his partner and counterpart, Terry Thatcher, that 
they transfer three private/United Sportsmen hunters with East Fork PHU permits to the South Fork 
PHU where these animals, both cow elk and bull moose, were known to be (T. II, 507, 508-09; III, 
592). In early 1996, DWR amended the big game hunting rules to specifically allow transfers from 
one PHU to another, and set forth procedures necessary for a transfer to take place. All PHU owner-
operators, such as Haskell and Thatcher, had to submit their requests in writing to DWR when 
contemplating a transfer of hunters from one PHU to another (T. II, 371, Exht. A-4, R657-37-4-
(8)(a),-(b)and-(c)). 
Haskell refers to a PHU transfer request which lists hunters' names being reassigned from 
one PHU to another as a ''reciprocal," which is his shortened term for a ''reciprocal agreement," as 
DWR staff refer to it. On October 2, Haskell filled out a reciprocal or PHU transfer: he included the 
three private hunters' names who would be allowed to change their cow elk hunting area from the 
East Fork to the South Fork PHU. Thatcher accepted this transfer of hunters as proposed by his 
business partner, Haskell (T. II, 543, 545). After Haskell signed his name, he gave the reciprocal 
document to Thatcher to sign, which the latter did (Exht. A-14; T. II, 53 8,544).2 However, Thatcher 
noticed that Haskell had left off young Ryan's name from the reciprocal request and brought that 
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omission to Haskell's attention (T. II. 526, 541). 
As Haskell had already faxed the reciprocal copy to DWR's regional office in Ogden, he tried 
numerous times to telephone Lou Comicelli. DWR's Northern Regional Manager in Ogden. 
Comicelli had to approve all PHU reciprocals in the Northern Region. Consequently, Ryan's name 
had to be officially added to the reciprocal document, thus authorizing Ryan's big game hunting 
transfer from the East Fork to the South Fork PHU (T. II, 512, 541). Haskell was not able to 
establish telephone contact with Comicelli despite his attempts over nearly two weeks. Because of 
his strong dislike of using telephone answering machines, Haskell left no recorded message for 
Comicelli regarding his effort to amend his reciprocal to include Ryan's name. Haskell did not even 
leave a recorded request for a return call from Comicelli.3 
During the step 5 hearing, the Department's counsel asked Haskell if he was familiar with 
the rule which states that any request to amend a COR must be in writing—referring to DWR's rule 
provision at R657-37-4(8)(b). ("Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration must be 
made in writing and submitted to the appropriate division [DWR] regional supervisor and wildlife 
manager.") In response to counsel's question, Haskell replied, "Yes," he knew of the rule and that 
is why he faxed his reciprocal to Comicelli (T. II, 513). However, Haskell had not succeeded in 
contacting Comicelli, nor even Comicelli's subordinate, DWR biologist Steve Kearl (T. II, 515-16, 
524). Because Haskell had not been able to reach Comicelli after many days of trying, he finally 
telephoned a person he knew at DWR who he believed would be able to resolve his problem by 
making direct telephone contact with Comicelli. Hence, Haskell initiated a phone call to Randy 
Moon, whom Haskell had known for about ten years and with whom he had even done some 
hunting, and fittingly enough from Haskell's perspective—was Ryan's father (T. II, 507,512; T. Ill, 
590). 
Haskell had previously initiated several telephone conversations with Grievant during the 
September 1996 hunting season (T. Ill, 590-92). When Haskell explained his difficulty contacting4 
Comicelli on the telephone, Grievant asked him, "Do you want me to call him?" Haskell replied, 
"Yes, if you will, because I haven't been able to get hold of him [Comicelli]" (T. II, 513). During 
this Grievant-Haskell phone conversation, Haskell admitted that he had left Randy's son's name 
(Ryan) off of the PHU transfer request (T. Ill, 593). Upon Haskell's request to Randy Moon for 
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assistance in contacting Cornicelli. Randy Moon responded: "Well, I'm around today. Let me see 
if I can get a call through to Lou [Cornicelli]" (T. Ill, 594). 
Clearly, Haskell very much wanted Grievant to telephone Cornicelli rather than he himself, 
because when Haskell learned that young Ryan had won the big game moose drawing in July, 
Haskell was excited and testified that he "called and talked to Randy and congratulated him [on 
behalf of his son, Ryan]." It was Haskell who initiated this congratulatory telephone call (T. II, 520). 
In fact Haskell called Grievant "two or three times [in September] and told him that we just weren't 
seeing the moose" this season on East Fork PHU (T. II, 521). Haskell's telephone call to Randy was 
a goodwill gesture between two long-time hunting-friends. In times past, both Randy Moon and his 
brothers had hunted on Haskell's PHU as club members of United Sportsmen. Moreover, Haskell 
testified that he and Randy Moon had hunted together once already during the 1996 fall big game 
season (T. II, 522). Further, Haskell testified that he knew Randy Moon better and he felt more 
comfortable calling Randy, rather than Ryan, about his PHU's hunting conditions (T. II, 522). 
C. PHU Transfer Approval Authority 
Cornicelli acknowledged that Haskell had called him on October 2, and talked with him 
about transferring three private hunters from Haskell's PHU to Thatcher's adjoining PHU (T. II, 
435). Cornicelli told Haskell how to compose the reciprocal agreement and the information required 
on it (T. II, 431). At the time Cornicelli had never previously had experience amending a COR or 
reciprocal for the purpose of a PHU transfer; therefore, he reviewed the PHU transfer rule at 
R657-37-4(8)(a) through -(c). The rule provision required that the transfer agreement be submitted 
in writing. Cornicelli, employed less than a year with DWR at that time, inquired of his subordinate. 
Biologist Steve Kearl, whether it would be appropriate for him (Cornicelli) to approve the Haskell-
Thatcher transfer request (T. II, 431-32). Kearl told Cornicelli that he had authority to do so. 
Cornicelli also called Mike Welch, Program Manager for DWR's Wildlife Section, and asked him 
whether it was the Northern Region or the DWR headquarters in Salt Lake City that had authority 
to review and approve Haskell and Thatcher's reciprocal agreement. Welch, too, said that 
Cornicelli had authority to make the decision. With both Kearl and Welch having told Cornicelli 
that he as Northern Regional Manager had the authority to approve Haskell's reciprocal agreement, 
Cornicelli approved it on October 3 (T. II, 433). Thus, the three private-client hunters were now 
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officially transferred from East Chalk to South Chalk PHU. 
As a result of Randy Moon's October 16 telephone conversation with Comicelli, Comicelli 
first learned of Ryan's name being omitted from the PHU transfer request (T. Ill, 593). Comicelli 
then inquired of his supervisor, Robert Hasenyager, regarding the propriety of Grievant's request. 
Also, on October 16 Comicelli added his approving comment5 and signature, thereby finally adding 
Ryan's name to the Haskell-Thatcher PHU transfer request (T. II, 441). Comicelli testified that if 
Haskell had sent him merely a written request to add Ryan's name to the transfer, that he (and 
DWR) would have easily approved it (T. II, 448-49). Alternatively, Comicelli could have told 
Grievant to tell Haskell or Thatcher to put their request about adding Ryan's name in writing and 
send it to him by fax transmission or by mail. Clearly, according to the rule provision the 
responsibility to amend a COR or request a PHU transfer was the PHU owner/agent's responsibility. 
Such an instruction by Comicelli, or even Hasenyager, would have placed the responsibility back 
where it properly belonged, with Haskell and Thatcher, and they could have been instructed to place 
it in writing as a learning opportunity. 
In retrospect,6 Hasenyager said that he later regretted not having looked up the PHU transfer 
rule following Grievant's telephone conversation with Comicelli. Hasenyager stated that in his 
opinion, he had erred by not looking at the transfer rule which requires a PHU owner/operator to 
place his request in writing (T. II, 469). According to DWR rule, a transfer had to be initiated by 
the PHU owner/operator, not by the affected hunter(s). (T. II, 344-45; Exht. A-4 R657-37-4(8)). The 
evidence shows that a PHU transfer must be accomplished according to the existing rule provisions 
(Exht. A-14). Importantly, DNR witness Wes Shields testified that DWR does not have a written 
procedure, rule or guideline to deal with Ryan's situation where a name is negligently omitted from 
a PHU transfer request (T. II, 366-67). 
D. The Board's Legal Conclusions on the Abuse of Position Charge 
The Board does not agree with all of the step 5 decision's legal conclusions. Some of the 
evidentiary legal conclusions are erroneous. Therefore, we must void the erroneous conclusions in 
their entirety based upon reversible error. 
The step 5 decision inaccurately concludes in legal conclusion 17 that, "The Department 
presented substantial evidence that Grievant used his official position to secure special privileges 
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for his son in violation of this rule [R477-9-2(2)] and statute [Utah Code, 67-16-4.(3) (Supp. 1996\." 
The just-mentioned DHRM R477-2(2) administrative rule provision states: 
Employees shall not use their state position or any influence, power, authority or 
confidential information they receive in that position, or state time, equipment, 
property, or supplies for private gain. 
The above-referenced subsection of Utah Code, §67-16-4(3) (Supp. 1996) states: 
A public officer, employee, or legislator may not:.. . 
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to: 
(a) further substantially the officer's or employee's economic interest; or 
(b) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others. 
The evidentiary record contains no evidence showing that Randy Moon misused or received 
for personal benefit any "'state time, equipment, property, or supplies for private gain/' Grievant's 
telephone call to Cornicelli resulted at most in his son Ryan's name being placed on the October 2/3 
PHU transfer request (Agency Exht. 14). However, Ryan had a legal right to have his name on that 
list Haskell and Thatcher properly determined that Ryan's name should have been on the reciprocal 
agreement but that it had been negligently omitted. They had authority as the governing PHU 
landowners/agents to amend their PHU transfer's listing of hunters' names by including Ryan's 
name along with the three private hunters' names. By correcting the PHU transfer request by 
inserting including Ryan's name, Ryan only received permission to hunt on the South Fork PHU in 
place of the North Fork PHU due to his winning the big game drawing in July. There is no showing 
that Grievant received any personal advantage from having his son's name placed on the transfer 
where it belonged. 
In legal conclusion 17, the step 5 decision cites no example or incident of "state time, 
equipment, property, or supplies for private gain*' that accrued to either Grievant or his son Ryan. 
There is no record evidence to support the proposition that Randy Moon or Ryan gained any "state 
time, equipment, property, or supplies for private gain." Consequently, Grievant did not violate Utah 
Administrative Code R477-9-2(2) (1996). 
The step 5 decision further states that Randy Moon violated Utah Code, Subsection 67-16-
4(3) (Supp. 1996), of the Utah Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act. That statutory provision 
states in part that, "A public officer . . . may not: . . . (3) use or attempt to use his official position 
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t o : . . . (b) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others."7 The hearing officer stated 
that "The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant used his official position to 
secure special privileges for his son in violation of this rule and statute/' However, there is no 
evidence or factual finding in the evidentiary decision which supports this erroneous conclusion. 
Ryan received the right to hunt on the East Chalk PHU through the random big game 
drawing. Randy Moon had no connection to Ryan's drawing a hunting permit for that area. Also, 
when Haskell and Thatcher decided to switch PHUs, the three private hunters and the sole public 
hunter, Ryan, Grievant had no direct connection to this transfer between PHUs. For our hearing 
officer to legally conclude that somehow Grievant obtained a special privilege or exemption for Ryan 
to hunt on either PHU is legal error. No example, illustration or incident of a special privilege or 
exemption is given in the evidentiary decision. And that is because no such benefit was bestowed 
on Ryan. Admittedly, Randy Moon helped to ""grease the wheels"' by bringing Ryan's name to the 
attention of Cornicelli on October 16. Had he not done so, however, it seems likely that Ryan would 
not have had any use of the last two weeks in October to hunt. During the nearly two weeks from 
October 3 through 16, Haskell had failed to get Ryan's name on the reciprocal agreement. By 
DWR's rules, Ryan was entitled to the entire hunting period of September 1 through October 31. 
Getting Ryan's name on the correct PHU did not constitute obtaining "special privilege" for Ryan. 
Rather, the addition of Ryan's name merely remedied an error made by Haskell, which Haskell 
acknowledged having made, and of which Thatcher had knowledge. 
Concededly, Grievant acted unwisely after Haskell called him on October 16 and told him 
that Ryan's name had been erroneously omitted from the Haskell-Thatcher reciprocal agreement. 
Randy Moon could have been more diplomatic and wiser to have told Haskell that because Haskell's 
request concerned Grievant's son, Haskell should therefore contact another person at DWR 
headquarters or at the Northern Region Office other than himself. Randy Moon did, indeed, act in 
an "'unwise" manner regarding Haskell's call for assistance with contacting Cornicelli. Nonetheless, 
acting unwisely is not the same as engaging in a conflict of interest, for example, by requesting 
Cornicelli to add Ryan's name to the PHU transfer request to which it rightfully belonged. Thus, 
Randy Moon's acting on Haskell's behalf by contacting Cornicelli and in the interests of his high 
school-age son did not violate the State's conflict of interest provisions in either the State's Ethics 
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Act at §67-19-4(3), in the Department's Policy Number 2-03-009B or in R477-9-2(2). Grievant 
secured no special privileges or exemptions for himself or for others. That Grievant did not refrain 
from involvement in Ryan's transfer problem—just for the sake of appearance—worked out to his 
own detriment albeit there was no violation of rule or law. The record evidence does not support 
an allegation that Grievant abused his position as claimed by DWR. 
This Board concludes that Haskell and Thatcher properly initiated their written amendment 
to their existing CORs on October 2/3. Their PHU transfer request or reciprocal agreement (as they 
call Exht. A-14) was their responsibility and theirs alone according to R657-37-3(4)(a). They 
correctly transferred the three private hunters but erred by overlooking and omitting Ryan's name 
on that document. Haskell and Thatcher had complied with R657-37-4(c) by placing their transfer 
request in writing to Cornicelli on behalf of the three private hunters. But they failed to submit a 
follow-up written amendment that added Ryan's name to their October 2/3 amendment which 
contained the three private hunters' names in writing. It is dispositive that this error is Haskell and 
Thatcher's, not Randy Moon's. 
Hence, our hearing officer legally erred by requiring that Grievant should have placed his 
request in writing and not made a verbal request to Cornicelli. Whether Grievant should have used 
a written process instead of a verbal process is a moot point. DWR places responsibility for 
amending CORs solely upon the PHU landowners, not upon any third person or party (R657-37-
3(4)(a), -(b), and R657-37-4(8)(a)). Thus, Randy Moon should not be faulted for not making a proper 
written request instead of his verbal request. 
We conclude that Grievant did not violate §67-16-10 which prohibits anyone (such as 
Grievant) from inducing a public officer (such as Cornicelli) by persuading or influencing the person 
to do or not do something that is requested. Cornicelli did not immediately approve Randy Moon's 
request for his son's name to be added to the Haskell-Thatcher PHU request. Instead, he first 
inquired of his two knowledgeable DWR supervisors and one subordinate. They each told him that 
he had authority to decide the issue of the PHU amendment generally, and the status of Ryan's name 
specifically. Thus, Cornicelli had not been directly "induced" by Grievant to sign the PHU agreement 
because he based his decision on what his three experienced DWR colleagues had told him. By 
including Ryan's name on Haskell and Thatcher's reciprocal agreement, Cornicelli acted with 
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correctness. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's proposition that Randy 
Moon obtained a special privilege or exemption either for himself or for Ryan. Grievant* s 
involvement was limited to assisting Haskell in having Ryan's name added to the reciprocal 
agreement—where it lawfully belonged. The element of Ryan's ''permission*' arose from the big 
game drawing and from Haskell and Thatcher's exchange of hunters from the former's to the latter* s 
PHU. Randy Moon obtained no hunting privilege or benefit for Ryan that Ryan had not previously 
received through the July big game drawing. 
Evidentiary conclusions 24-27 are quotations from and citations to case law examples which 
deal with ethics and special privilege. We find no fault with these cases, other than they do not apply 
to the facts and circumstances of Grievant's situation regarding the PHU reciprocal agreement. 
Conclusion 29 is a lengthy, detailed discussion on the subject of the Department's 
consistency of applying discipline in similar cases. This issue is moot inasmuch as the Board legally 
concludes that Grievant's limited participation in the PHU transfer controversy did not merit the 
discipline that he received for this incident Additionally, it is not reasonable to fault Randy Moon 
for improperly submitting a verbal PHU transfer request (rather than a written request) when by 
DWR rule only the PHU owners/mangers may submit transfer requests. Manager Cornicelli 
carefully inquired of his supervisors for direction on this problem. Based on the above and on our 
prior legal conclusions, the Board hereby nullifies evidentiary conclusion 29. 
Step 5 conclusions 30 and 31 are hereby voided. Pertaining to the PHU transfer incident 
Randy Moon was charged with "knowingly transferring a permit authorized on behalf of [his] son/' 
allegedly violating R657-37-(4)(8)(a)(i). This specific provision relates only to a "landowner 
association or posted hunting unit agent." Grievant held neither status at the time of this PHU 
incident. Nevertheless, this provision plainly states that hunters may be allowed on other PHUs in 
an exchange of hunting privileges between PHUs. As a matter of law, Grievant did not violate the 
foregoing rule provision; he was not in a situation or status where it applied to him—he was not a 
PHU agent nor was he a public hunter with a permit to hunt. Both as a father and as a DWR senior 
administrator. Randy Moon sought to correct that error. Grievant was brought into this PHU 
incident by Haskell for the purpose of rectifying the omission of Ryan's name from the amendment. 
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A legitimate problem existed. However, as stated above, Grievant should have tactfully declined 
from attempting to cure the problem himself. Moreover, Grievant did not gain any personal or 
family benefit, privilege or advantage, nor did Ryan receive any benefit, special privilege or 
advantage that he was not entitled to by law. 
Contrary to the step 5 decision's conclusions, the evidence as a whole does not show a 
violation of a rule, a statute or an abuse of authority or position by Randy Moon regarding his son's 
right to hunt moose on either Haskell's or Thatcher's PHU. As the Board legally concludes that no 
violation of rule or statute occurred, then Randy Moon was not culpable of any abuse of position nor 
an abuse of his authority in this PHU incident. 
Our hearing officer linked both incidents, the PHU matter and the Wyoming antelope killing 
episode, together and essayed that their total combined alleged misconduct justified Grievant's 
dismissal for both just cause and for the good of the public service (Step 5 conclusions 30. 32; see 
Utah Code. §67-19-18(1) (Supp. 1997)). Albeit we have concluded as a matter of law that Randy 
Moon did not violate any particular statute, and neither a DWR nor a DHRM rule provision 
regarding the Department's allegation of an abuse of his position or of his authority as a senior DWR 
administrator. The CSRB hearing officer did not separate these two allegations to determine their 
individual assessment of a penalty, if one of the allegations were not upheld. Rather, the step 5 
decision states in conclusion 30 that the ''two incidents [together] show a pattern of conduct" relating 
to serious violations. However, having reversed the step 5 decision's ruling on the PHU incident, 
we now turn to the Wyoming antelope killing incident as the single determining factor in Grievant7 s 
dismissal. 
THE WYOMING ANTELOPE KILLING INCIDENT 
A. Factual Background 
The following events are based upon the step 5 decision's factual findings, including some 
additional facts taken from testimony in the four transcript volumes and from the case exhibits. 
On December 7. 1996, Randy Moon took his sons Nathan (19) and Ryan (18) to hunt 
antelope in the Crawford Mountain Hunting Unit in Rich County, Utah. Nathan was the only one 
of the three who had a permit to hunt an antelope (or pronghorn). During the afternoon the Moon 
party drove north to Sage Junction, Utah. From there, they drove east on U.S. Highway 30 and 
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arrived at the north-south running Utah/Wyoming border. Both the Utah and Wyoming border signs 
were visible on the east-west highway. Close to the Utah-Wyoming border and just off 
U.S. Highway 30 was an electrical power substation on the south side of the roadway. Randy Moon 
turned his vehicle southward, left U.S. Highway 30, and drove down a dirt road. This dirt road is 
Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220. The Moons spotted an antelope herd to the west of the 
Lincoln County Road 220. The antelope herd was also positioned west of a north-south running wire 
fence. This wire fence designates the Utah/Wyoming border. The Moons observed that the antelope 
were being pursued eastward by a man driving a white Suburban. Nathan fired his gun at one 
antelope in the running herd. Grievant then drove his Toyota 4-Runner down the left fork of the dirt 
road in a southeasterly direction. 
When the white Suburban came alongside, Grievant spoke with the driver. The latter said 
he had not seen where the antelope went. Randy Moon testified that the Suburban driver said that 
he thought the Utah/Wyoming border was either the main branch of the dirt road (Lincoln County 
Road 220) or it was the fence west of that road. Both Grievant in his 4-Runner and the Suburban 
driver turned around on the left fork dirt road and headed west to the main branch of the dirt road 
(Finding of Fact 4). 
A married couple, Glen and Jane Chen, turned off the highway, drove south on the main dirt 
road, then took the southeastern fork behind the Moons. The Chens observed a hunter in a silver 
Geo shoot at some antelope in a bowl-like or depression area. The Chens told this hunter that he was 
not in Utah (implying that he was in Wyoming, instead). Soon the Chens resumed driving and saw 
the Grievant's Toyota 4-Runner and the Suburban heading west. Mr. Chen inquired of the Toyota 
driver (Randy Moon), *'Aren't we in Wyoming?" Grievant responded: 4fcYes, according to the man 
in the truck, we are/' Chen also testified that Grievant stated to him (Chen) that "[WJe're in 
Wyoming and that the border was back behind us at the fence line'' (T. 74). Grievant next drove 
down the western or main branch of the forked dirt road, turned around, headed northwards, and then 
parked along the roadside by a draw. The draw led from the edge of Lincoln County Road 220 
down into the bowl area. 
Both the Chens in their same position and the Moon brothers in their new location observed 
an antelope lying down in the bowl-like depression between some low hills. Nathan and Ryan left 
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Grievant's 4-Runner and moved toward the downed antelope. Nathan fired three shots at the 
antelope from different positions as he moved toward the downed antelope. When Nathan arrived 
at the antelope, which was still alive, he fired a point-blank shot which killed the animal. Upon later 
questioning by the Department's officials, Nathan stated that he thought his group was in Utah and 
west of the nearby power substation. Ryan was not sure which of the two states they were in when 
the antelope was shot by Nathan and killed. At Randy Moon's urging, Ryan and Nathan dragged 
the antelope's carcass to their 4-Runner. Grievants' sons ''gutted" the dead animal and covered their 
"gut pile" with snow at the edge of the dirt road. Grievant participated in the gutting by giving 
instruction. Shortly after the gutting, the Moon party returned to their home in Bountiful with the 
antelope's carcass in their vehicle. They had affixed a Utah hunting tag to the antelope. 
The Chens reported Nathan's shooting of the antelope and its gutting. That afternoon they 
spoke with DWR law enforcement personnel. Both Glen and Jane Chen were subsequently 
interviewed about Nathan's shooting of the antelope. The Chens related what they had seen and their 
brief discussion with Grievant as to his location. They described the position of the Moon party's 
location both before and during Nathan's shooting of the antelope. 
On December 8,1996, Wyoming Game Warden Neil Hymas and his Utah counterpart, DWR 
Conservation Officer Jim Gregory, investigated together the site of the antelope killing. They 
examined tire tracks, found footprints, documented bullet paths in the snow, uncovered the gut pile, 
noted the local topography, observed the clearly marked Utah and Wyoming border signs along 
U.S. Highway 30, and noted that Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220 ran directly southward from 
the shooting site and eventually angled westward further down the road. 
At the time of Nathan's shooting of the antelope, Wyoming law prohibited open hunting 
on antelope and even any mercy killing of them. On December 10, Officer Hymas interviewed 
Randy and Nathan Moon at DWR headquarters in Salt Lake City. Following the investigatory 
interviews, Officer Hymas retrieved the antelope carcass from Randy Moon's residence. On the 
carcass, Officer Hymas found a Utah hunting tag. Randy and Nathan Moon each received a citation 
for unlawful hunting activities in Wyoming during a closed hunting season. 
Nathan Moon, then a probationary employee with DWR, was dismissed on December 30, 
1996. 
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On January 30, 1997. DWR Director John Kimball served a Notice of Disciplinary 
Consideration upon Randy Moon which contemplated disciplinary options, including his dismissal. 
Director Kimball provided an opportunity for Grievant to respond and rebut the allegations. 
Grievant responded with a February 6 memo explaining his version of the PHU moose transfer 
incident and the Wyoming wildlife violation over the antelope killing. On February 11, DWR 
Director Kimball notified Randy Moon of his dismissal from the division. Director Kimball's letter 
cited three reasons for Grievant's dismissal. These reasons are summarized in the step 5 decision's 
Finding of Fact 20, which states: 
. . . Kimball cited various reasons including: violating the laws Grievant was 
obligated to enforce, violating the trust of his office, having the potential of 
destroying the public's confidence in the DWR and its mission, discrediting the 
DWR, engaging in activities which are not in the best interests of the public or 
public service, and generally lessening the faith and confidence in the DWR. 
B. Substantial Evidence Against Grievant 
During the evidentiary hearing, both parties' witnesses provided considerable testimony and 
both counsel offered argument about whether certain sites at the antelope killing scene were inside 
Utah's border or within Wyoming's. Grievant has not sufficiently shown evidence during his step 6 
appeal that the step 5 decision erred by placing this incident within Wyoming's border and under its 
jurisdiction. Many of the witnesses drew numerous maps or portions of maps which became exhibits 
for offering their various perspectives on the hunting scene's topography, the location of the Utah-
Wyoming border, the nature and location of the dirt roads in proximity to the power substation and 
the location of the north-south running wire fence. The witnesses' descriptions included the hills, 
the bowl-like depression, the actual shooting site and the disposal site of the animal's gut pile. 
Additionally, both the Department and Grievant offered their own respective sets of enlarged photos 
in support of their claims as to whether Nathan's antelope killing took place within Utah or 
Wyoming. Finally, numerous witnesses testified for both parties regarding their opinions as to the 
antelope having been taken within Utah or Wyoming. After reviewing the evidence (including the 
case exhibits and testimony), reading the step 6 briefs, listening to and considering the oral argument 
offered during the step 6 proceeding, this tribunal supports our hearing officer's determination that 
substantial evidence adequately supports the findings that Nathan* s killing of the antelope took place 
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in Wyoming. 
Grievant had in his possession at the time of the hunt a Utah Hunting Proclamation for 1996, 
which describes the Crawford Mountain area hunting boundaries in the Sage Junction area 
(Exht. G-5. p. 51). Hunters may also utilize a DWR telephone call-in number to the Ogden DWR 
office to resolve their questions on hunting matters; this information is found in the Proclamation 
booklet (Ibid.) 
Further, the three Moons each admitted to driving east on U.S. Highway 30 past the 
Wyoming border sign before turning south onto the dirt road (T. Ill, 614; 726; 778). A person with 
reasonable understanding would realize that he was now in Wyoming or at least so close to the Utah-
Wyoming board as to exercise extreme care as to his actual hunting location. West of the power 
substation there is the north-south running fence which defines the Utah-Wyoming border in the area 
where Grievant and his sons intended to take an antelope. In addition to the boundary-fence line, 
there were also painted steel posts, boards, cement markers and signs designating the border line and 
a noticeable paint spot on U.S. Highway 30 (T. I, 197-98, IV, 922; Exht. A-19 which shows all of 
the foregoing items). In their testimony, both Grievant and Nathan admitted that when they turned 
south from U.S. Highway 30 onto Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220 they each believed that they 
were in Wyoming (T. Ill, 687, 744). The Moons observed an antelope herd run from well west of 
the border fence, jump the wire fence, and continue eastwards into Wyoming. The location where 
Nathan did his shooting as he faced east was "'several hundred yards" east of the boundary fence, 
according to Glen Chen's testimony (T. L 75). After the antelope herd jumped the Utah-Wyoming 
boundary fence, they continued running easterly. Nathan fired one shot, missed and the antelope 
continued running easterly further into Wyoming. Soon after parking near the draw, Nathan fired 
three more shots and killed the antelope with his last round. 
There is ample substantial evidence in the record to show that Grievant either knew or should 
have known that he and his sons were within Wyoming when Nathan was shooting at the antelope. 
The evidence introduced in the evidentiary hearing, including both parties' several hand-
drawn maps and their enlarged, colored photographs regarding the Utah-Wyoming border, more 
strongly and credibly weigh in favor of the Department's version of the facts. Had Grievant any 
doubts—any reservations whatsoever—regarding his and his sons' whereabouts, he should have 
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interrupted Nathan's hunting and determined with specificity their exact location with respect to the 
borderline. Randy Moon should have been alerted to the likely possibility that he and his sons were 
in Wyoming when both the Suburban driver and Mr. Chen opined that they were in Wyoming as they 
conversed with him. Grievant's failure to marshal the facts as required also requires us to find in 
favor of the Department on this issue. 
The evidence is dispositive in showing that Nathan did, indeed, kill the antelope within 
Wyoming, not Utah. Wyoming Game Warden Neil Hymas cited Grievant for violating Wyoming 
Statute 23-6-205 which prohibits either the aiding or counseling in the taking of an antelope during 
a closed season in Wyoming. Nathan Moon was similarly cited for taking an antelope during a 
closed season in Wyoming, according to Wyoming Statute 23-3-402. Neither Grievant nor Nathan 
contested their citations in court; they paid their respective fines on January 30,1997. By paying his 
fine in court. Randy Moon entered a guilty plea. Grievant's guilty plea in court settles all discussion 
and argument regarding whether this incident took place as a legal hunting activity in Utah or as an 
unlawful hunting activity in Wyoming. Grievant's paying of the forfeiture fine is dispositive on the 
issue of his guilt and his conviction of a misdemeanor-level legal violation for participating in an 
unlawful hunting activity within Wyoming. 
C. Aiding, Assisting and Counseling in Wyoming 
The CSRB hearing officer concluded that Grievant specifically aided and assisted Nathan in 
the taking of a doe antelope in Wyoming (Step 5 Decision, p. 10). DWR Director Kimball 
characterized the illegal act in the following terms in his dismissal letter to Randy Moon: 
. . . [Y]ou counseled, aided and assisted in the unlawful possession of protected 
wildlife (transportation of a doe antelope unlawfully taken in the State of 
Wyoming). These actions are a criminal violation of Section 23-20-23 U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, placing you in the category of a Class B Misdemeanor in the 
State of Utah (Exht. A-6). 
In his termination letter to Grievant, DWR Director Kimball used the word "counseled" in 
addition to "aided" and "assisted." Utah law contains only "aided" and "assisted." "Counseled" is 
not found in the Utah statute (§23-20-23), but "counseling" is found in Wyoming's statute. 
Wyoming's Lincoln County Court Record alleges that Randy Moon, "Did aid and/or counsel in 
taking antelope . . . during a closed season" (Exht. A-9). 
The CSRB e1 identiary examiner stated with specificity that it was Nathan's fault for taking 
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the antelope in Wyoming and then "tagging it with Utah tags" which violated Utah's law. However. 
Randy Moon also violated Utah law when he "aided and assisted" in the antelope's taking by 
Nathan. Accordingly, Utah hunting law states: 
A person may not aid or assist another person to violate any provision of the 
Wildlife Resources Code or any rule or proclamation promulgated under it. The 
penalty for violating this section is the same as for the provision for which aid or 
assistance is given. (Exht. G-5, p. 17). 
Grievant aided, assisted and counseled in the antelope's taking by his actions when: he drove 
his vehicle around the hunting area to get Nathan situated to shoot: he got Ryan and Nathan's 
attention (by whistling, waiving and calling out to them) to bring the carcass back to the vehicle 
when they left the carcass on the ground and started back to the 4-Runner without it; he assisted in 
the animal's gutting; he conveyed the carcass in his 4-Runner to his own home; and he saw to the 
hanging of the carcass outside on his property. Randy Moon told D WR Officer William Woody that 
it was his intent ''to process'' the animal until it was unexpectedly retrieved by Wyoming Game 
Warden Hymas. All of the foregoing factual statements are documented in the record. As a matter 
of law, Grievant aided and counseled (i.e., assisted) in the unlawful taking of an antelope for which 
he was fined by a Wyoming court. Grievant's hunting citation and his guilty plea in court are 
conclusive evidence of his wildlife violation in Wyoming. 
D. Grievant's Arguments 
First, Grievant argues that he "did not know that the act [of Nathan's shooting the antelope] 
was illegal at the time.'' The reason, avers Randy Moon, is that he did not know it was an illegal act 
because he "did not know where the Utah border ended" (Grievant's Step 6 Brief, pp. 7-8). 
Grievant's circular argument that he did not know he was participating in an illegal act because he 
did not know which state he was in at the time of Nathan's shooting is defective in its reasoning. 
Hunters are responsible for knowing where they are hunting. State law makes hunters responsible 
for their actions. Randy Moon was the responsible driver of his hunting party's vehicle. After 
Nathan fired his first shot at the antelope heard, Grievant drove his 4-Runner southwards on the 
eastern fork of the dirt road, stopped and viewed the topography. Next, Grievant had two brief 
conversations: one with the white Suburban driver and one with Mr. Chen, both of whom suggested 
they were in Wyoming, not Utah (T. 1,185; 38,42, 52). Shortly afterwards. Randy Moon drove his 
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vehicle along the western or main fork of the dirt road which is Wyoming's Lincoln County Road. 
Grievant is solely responsible for having placed his hunting party within Wyoming rather than in 
Utah as his hunting party proceeded to take the antelope. Randy Moon aided, assisted and counseled 
Nathan in the unlawful killing of the antelope; that it was Nathan who shot the gun and killed the 
antelope does not exculpate Grievant from his illegal actions. 
Second, Randy Moon asserts that according to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Kehl 
v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), there must be shown ''culpability, knowledge and 
control" on the alleged offender's part to substantiate just cause for an employee's dismissal. The 
Utah Supreme Court first analyzed these three "just cause" components in a case which upheld the 
Utah Department of Employment Security's (UDES) triad of standards for determining whether just 
cause exists for eligibility of receiving unemployment insurance (UI). The court affirmed UDES's 
application of these three standards for determining eligibility for UI. The only case in which this 
Board relied upon the three Kehl standards was that of Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert 
O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, at p. 21 (1987). The Utah Supreme Court did not 
rely upon the Kehl standards in its decision of In the Matter of the Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 
1356(1986), nor in any subsequent case based upon the "just cause" criterion. Neither has the Court 
of Appeals applied the Kehl standards subsequently in its decisions concerning CSRB disciplinary 
and dismissal cases, not even for other public employees or private sector employees. After issuing 
the Anderson and Weaver decision in 1987, this Board has not relied subsequently upon the three 
Kehl standards for establishing whether just cause is present or not in disciplinary or dismissal cases. 
It soon became clear that Utah's appellate courts were reserving the Kehl triad of standards only for 
UDES' UI appeals.8 Thus, the elements of culpability, knowledge and control are used by Utah's 
appellate courts only for determining UI cases, not for general disciplinary or dismissal cases. 
Third, Randy Moon likens his dismissal to that of Dennis Weaver in the Board's step 6 
decision in Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson andD. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 
22, at p. 21 (1987). This case concerned two Parks and Recreation Division regional managers who 
held peace officer authority. The Board overturned its hearing officer and reinstated Anderson's 
dismissal after the hearing officer had first reinstated both managers in his step 5 decision. With 
Weaver, the Board imposed a more severe penalty than that imposed by the hearing officer, although 
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the Board's overall sanction was less than dismissal. 
More especially, Grievant likens himself to Weaver and draws an analogy to the latter's 
lesser misconduct than to Anderson's greater misconduct. Weaver did not shoot the bear; Anderson 
did. (Grievant argues that he did not kill the antelope, his son Nathan did.) Neither Anderson nor 
Weaver reported the bear killing to DWR as required by law. (Grievant says that he did not deny 
the shooting of the antelope once he was found out on December 10.) Weaver suggested concealing 
the dead bear cub, but did not do it. (Randy Moon claims he did not physically gut the antelope, but 
just offered advice to his sons.) Also, Weaver suggested the taking of souvenirs from the bear's 
carcass, but did not do it himself. (Randy Moon only "allowed" a Utah hunting tag to be placed on 
the antelope's ear, and "allowed" the carcass to be placed in his vehicle.) Weaver, did participate 
in the hunting party's cover-up of the bear cub's killing. However, the Board drew a distinction 
between Anderson's greater culpability in shooting the bear cub and his fundamental legal 
responsibility to disclose to DWR authorities what he had done. Thus, Weaver was found to be 
marginally less culpable, and the Board did not conclude that his dismissal was warranted. 
Nevertheless, this tribunal concludes that Randy Moon has a greater culpability than did 
Weaver. Grievant's greater culpability is more analogous to Anderson's, than to Weaver's lesser 
culpability. Grievant had received two oral warnings by fellow hunters that he was likely in 
Wyoming, not Utah. A reasonable person would have carefully verified his location before having 
his party engage in potentially illegal hunting (poaching) activities. Grievant was the person in his 
party who urged that the carcass be brought back. Randy Moon is the person who hung the illegally 
taken antelope at his residential property. Grievant is the one who was a senior administrator and 
former assistant director of DWR who received a citation and was fined for his party's hunting 
activities on December 7, 1996. Randy Moon was one of only a handful of persons in the top 
managerial positions at DWR. Grievant brought embarrassment to DWR because Wyoming Game 
Warden Hymas drove to Salt Lake City, talked with DWR Director Kimball and others on Kimball's 
staff, and went out to Grievant's residence to retrieve and return the antelope's carcass to Wyoming. 
Grievant pleaded guilty to breaking Wyoming's hunting law while holding the office of a senior 
administrator directly under the supervision of Director Kimball. In breaking Wyoming's hunting 
law. Randy Moon brought serious disrespect to his division and his coworkers. The December 7 
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antelope hunting incident involved many hours of investigation by Inspector William Woody and 
Conservation Officer Jim Gregory as well as the efforts of Wyoming Game Warden Neil Hymas. 
Finally, citizens Jane and Glen Chen spent many hours being interviewed, traveling to DWR 
sites and later testifying that one of Utah's senior administrators had participated in breaking 
Wyoming's closed hunting law. The above people spent their time in the investigation, in being 
interviewed, in traveling to designated locations, and in testijEying at the step 5 proceeding. All of 
these peoples' time and efforts were necessary due to Grievant's illegal activity and his employment 
status with DWR as a senior divisional administrator. 
During his term as an assistant or deputy DWR director, Grievant had assigned to him 
responsibility for the Law Enforcement Section of DWR. In that capacity Randy Moon was the 
manager over those DWR staff who held sworn peace officer status. These are the people, who like 
Conservation Officer Jim Gregory, enforce Utah's hunting laws and had the duty to curtail or prevent 
illegal hunting activities. Randy Moon knew or should have known that he may not become involved 
with the illegal killing of an antelope within Wyoming's border. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Grievant's misconduct and dismissal based 
upon the single incident of the Wyoming antelope killing (poaching) is supported by just cause and 
serves to advance the good of the public service, according to the Utah statutory provision at §67-19-
18(1). 
E. The Antelope Killing as a Single Disciplinary Incident 
Randy Moon held a very responsible managerial position in DWR from 1993-95. During that 
period, Grievant served as an Assistant Director (a.k.a. Deputy Director) of DWR. For a time 
Randy Moon was the Assistant Director over the division's Law Enforcement Program. More 
recently, from 1995 until his dismissal in February 1997, Grievant was the DWR's Administrator 
of Programs and Field Operations. With this position title, Grievant had oversight over fiscal 
activities and over the Information and Education Programs. In the latter capacity, he held 
responsibility for issuing permits and licensing activities in the division. Having previously held 
responsibility for DWR's Law Enforcement section and over permits and licenses at the time of the 
antelope killing incident, Grievant knew or should have known that if he and his sons were hunting 
on the Wyoming side of the border—and caught— their actions would constitute a flagrant wildlife 
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violation. 
Randy Moon compared himself with many other D WR employees who had been disciplined 
with far fewer sanctions than he. However, when these comparisons are scrutinized, Grievant's 
actions: (1) were committed by a person in a higher DWR managerial position than the other 
employees, (2) compare unfavorably because many of the other employees voluntarily turned 
themselves in and some even wrote themselves citations, and (3) constituted big game poaching in 
a neighboring state and then upon being found out, being subjected to Wyoming's judicial 
punishment—which resulted in disgracing Utah's DWR staff in particular, and the division in 
general. All things considered, the antelope incident on its own was a very serious, even an 
egregious, incident. Grievant's culpability is substantial. 
Grievant argued during the evidentiary hearing, in his Step 6 Brief and in oral argument, that 
without the PHU moose transfer incident, there is not sufficient wrongdoing to justify his dismissal. 
Grievant cites Director Kimball's testimony to support this opinion (T. 1,144). Grievant's counsel 
asked Director Kimball: 
QUESTION: I know what bothers you. I'm asking if the antelope incident alone would have 
been enough to terminate him? 
ANSWER: It wasn't alone. [So] I can't tell you that. 
Grievant's attempt to get Director Kimball to say that the antelope incident on its own was not 
sufficient to justify termination did not succeed. Thus, the record evidence through Kimball's 
testimony does not state that even if the antelope incident were the only incident considered, that 
incident by itself would not merit dismissal. That extrapolation is a distortion of what Director 
Kimball stated under oath. 
Randy Moon was deeply involved in the antelope poaching incident. He was not an idle 
bystander as he would let people believe. He had ample warnings through geographical markers and 
from fellow hunters that he was in Wyoming or on the borderline before Nathan shot and killed the 
antelope. Grievant organized the effort to take the carcass home to his family. He took it to his 
residence. When picked up by Game Warden Hymas, the antelope was about to be processed by 
Randy Moon at his residence. Although Grievant is a 15-year9 State employee (a mitigating factor), 
the nature of his participation in the antelope incident along with his senior status at DWR are so 
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compelling (as aggravating factors), that his dismissal is neither excessive, disproportionate nor 
otherwise constitute an abuse of discretion {Utah Admin. Code, Rl37-1 -21 (3)(b)). The hearing 
officer's factual findings regarding the antelope killing incident are reasonable and rational. As a 
matter of law, the Board makes an ultimate conclusion that the Department's dismissal of Randy 
Moon is reasonable and rational. 
DECISION 
Grievant's appeal to the Board is denied based upon the foregoing factual findings and legal 
conclusions concerning the Wyoming antelope killing incident. 
<? DATED this 7 dav of February 1998. 
[MAJORITY OPINION. 
Paul G. Maughan, Chairman 
Tim Moran, Board Member 
Dale L. Whittle, Board Member 
Paul G. Maughan 
Chairman 
Career Service Review Board 
DISSENTING OPINION. 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Board Member 
The majority decision in this case upholds the Department's decision to terminate Mr. Moon's 
employment. My dissent is based on the harshness of the penalty. Mr. Moon was first employed 
by the state of Utah in the Governor's Office as a Science Advisor. He served the State under three 
governors and for 11 years in that capacity (1982-93). In 1993 Grievant became the DWR Assistant 
Director within the Department of Natural Resources. He served in the latter capacity until his 
dismissal in February 1997. For nearly all of his 15-plus years with the State, Randy Moon had an 
apparently exemplary record. He progressed in his career to an extremely responsible position, and 
must have been held in esteem by both his supervisors and his peers over that extended period in 
order to have advanced to such a position. Granted that his error in helping his son Nathan to violate 
State hunting laws was a serious one, but it still seems excessively harsh that one such error is 
sufficient to destroy a person's career. Had the Department's position been based solely on the 
argument that this error was sufficient to terminate Mr. Moon, I might have been somewhat inclined 
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to uphold the decision, although still finding it troublesome. However, the Department tried to 
bolster its position through accusing Mr. Moon of an earlier indiscretion with respect to an assigned 
hunting area. This accusation had the flavor of someone in the Department being "out to get" Mr. 
Moon. That is, the accusation was not raised at the time the alleged indiscretion occurred, but was 
searched out after the violation involving Mr. Moon's son, Nathan. In the PHU incident, Mr. Moon 
seems actually to have taken a very logical approach to solving a problem within a rather restrictive 
time frame. I found it troublesome that the Department was accusing Mr. Moon of violations of 
policy and using the accusation to help justify the termination in the antelope hunting incident. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The correct procedure for "marshaling the evidence" in challenging the veracity of factual findings is set forth in 
the Agency's Step 6 Brief at pp. 11-12, along with supporting case law from Utah Court of Appeals' decisions. We 
do not think it necessary to cite those same cases again or to even cite additional cases on this point. 
2. Haskell and Thatcher testified that they did not receive a copy of the reciprocal agreement with Cornicelli's 
signature affixed until January 1997. No reason was given for such a long delay even though the hunting season had 
ended on October 31. 
3. It is reasonable to assume that if Haskell had followed through and contacted Cornicelli, or left a message for 
him, or faxed him or requested his return call, that Grievant's alleged abuse of position incident would not have 
arisen to his detriment as it did. 
4. Testimony revealed the numerous problems with the telephone connections to DWR's Northern Regional Office 
in Ogden. Haskell and Grievant described their frustrations at times in trying to deal with the "phone system in 
Ogden" because "we have problems getting through from our own [DWR SLC] office" (T. Ill, 593). 
5. Cornicelli's approval comment reads: "As per conversation w/ Randy Moon. I am adding Ryan Moon to [the] 
authorization list." This comment was added to Exht. A-14, then signed by Cornicelli and dated October 16. 
6. Hasenyager received what he unofficially called "a letter of reprimand" (T. II, 480-81) from DWR Director John 
Kimball regarding Grievant's telephone request to Cornicelli. Kimball charged Hasenyager with not complying 
with the DWR rule which states that a PHU transfer request must be made in writing, according to Hasenyager 
(T. II, 469). But Kimball's letter to Hasenyager is titled "Notice to address a personnel problem" (Exht. G-62). The 
rule provision referred to by Hasenyager is DWR's R657-37-3(4)(b). This rule provision states that "written 
permission from the landowner association must be in the person's possession while hunting." R657-37-3(5)(a) 
further states that the holder of a big game drawing must be accorded the same "opportunity to hunt big game on a 
specific posted hunting unit" as that available to a private hunter. Because Hasenyager viewed Grievant's "request" 
as coming from the Director's Office (i.e., DWR Director Kimball's Office), through Randy Moon, he testified that 
he mistakenly assumed at that time "that the details have been dealt with" (T II, 472). 
Admittedly, it is puzzling how Hasenyager and DWR officials applied the above rule provision regarding 
"written permission," which must originate with the PHU agent [meaning, Haskell and Thatcher], and "must be in 
the person's possession while hunting." Clearly, DWR rule R657-37-3(4)(a) made it Haskell and Thatcher's 
responsibility to provide "written permission" which must be in Ryan's possession in order for him to hunt on the 
South Fork PHU. It is reasonable to suppose that Haskell and Thatcher submitted their "written permission" request 
of October 2/3 to Cornicelli for the sole purpose of transferring the three private hunters from East Chalk to South 
Chalk PHU, as stated in Exht. A-14. Accordingly, Exht. A-14 should reasonably satisfy the above rule because: (1) 
it was in writing, (2) it came from the two PHU agents, Haskell and Thatcher. When Thatcher told Haskell that they 
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had erroneously left off Ryan Moon's name, Haskell expected to have their "written permission" authorization, i.e., 
Exht. A-14, amended per their request, by having Ryan's name added to their existing transfer request, that is, 
Exht. A-14. Grievant's telephone call to Cornicelli on October 16 regarding the disposition of Ryan's name on the 
PHU transfer request resulted only because Haskell failed in his attempts to contact Cornicelli. Grievant was only 
acting as an intercessor on behalf of Haskell and Thatcher. Grievant had no duty to place in writing Haskell and 
Thatcher's transfer of permits request for Ryan, whose name should have been on the PHU agents' October 2/3 
written request. Grievant only served as a go-between on behalf of Haskell and Thatcher, not as the initiator of a 
privileged request which would provide a distinct advantage, special privilege or benefit to Ryan Moon. 
7. The step 5 decision did not accurately quote the statutory sub-provision which it cites. The correct text is given 
in this step 6 decision. 
8. The following case citations show that Utah's two appellate courts have only applied the Kehl standards (700 
P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) to UDES' (since July 1, 1997, the Utah Department of Workforce Services) UI appeals. For 
example, see Green v. Board of Review, 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, at 29, 728 P.2d 996 (Utah 1986); Department of the 
Air Force v. Swider, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 75, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991); Wagstajfv. Department of 
Employment Security, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 32-34, 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 1992), at pp. 32, 33-34. 
9. Counsel for both parties made reference to Randy Moon's 20-year service as a State employee. Grievant's 
testimony is that he worked for five years at Research Park in Salt Lake City (1977-82). Next, he became the State 
Science Advisor from 1982 till March 1993. At the latter time, he served as an assistant director and later as a senior 
administrator for DWR (March 1993 till February 1997). Grievant has approximately 15 years' tenure as a State 
employee. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 format adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) (1996) 
67-16-4 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
67-16-4. Improperly disclosing or using private, con-
trolled, or protected information — Using posi-
tion to secure privileges or exemptions — Ac-
cepting employment which would impair 
independence of judgment or ethical perfor-
mance. 
A public officer or public employee may not: 
(1) accept employment or engage in any business or professional 
activity which he might reasonably expect would require or induce him to 
improperly disclose controlled information which he has gained by reason 
of his official position; 
(2) improperly disclose controlled, private, or protected information 
acquired by reason of his official position nor use such information for his 
or another's private gain or benefit; 
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to secure special privileges 
or exemptions for himself or others; 
(4) accept other employment which he might expect would impair his 
independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties; or 
(5) accept other employment which he might expect would interfere 
with the ethical performance of his public duties. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 128, § 4; 1989, ch. 
147, § 14; 1991, ch. 259, § 69; 1992, ch. 280, 
§ 60. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted "con-
trolled" for "confidential" in Subsections (1) and 
(2). 
Cross-References. — Division of Securities, 
confidential information, misuse of informa-
tion, § 61-1-18.3. 
Evidentiary privilege as to communications 
to public officers, § 78-24-8(5). 
Evidentiary privilege, generally, Rule 501, 
U.R.E. 
ANALYSIS 
Prosecution of insurance fraud cases. 
Special hunting permits. 
Prosecution of insurance fraud cases. 
A public prosecutor who is involved with a 
corporation that investigates possible arson 
and insurance fraud cases for insurance com-
panies should not also be representing the state 
in the prosecution of similar cases. State v. 
Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 1986). 
Special hunting permits. 
Governor's policy statement barring Division 
Government records, Title 63, Chapter 2. 
Insurance commissioner, confidential infor-
mation, § 31A-16-109. 
Officers not to profit out of public moneys, 
Utah Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 8. 
Official misconduct an offense, §§ 76-8-201, 
76-8-202. 
Personal property audits and records confi-
dential, § 59-2-705. 
Tax returns confidential, §§ 59-7-537, 59-10-
545, 59-12-109. 
of Wildlife Resources employees from partici-
pating in future drawings for "once-m-a-life-
time" hunting permits for buffalo, big horn 
sheep and moose did not violate employees' 
right of equal protection of the law; even though 
there was no evidence of impropriety, it was 
within the prerogative of the governor to adopt 
a policy to avoid the appearance of impropriety 
apparently prompted by previous dispropor-
tionate distribution of permits within the divi-
sion. Utah Pub. Employees' Ass'n v. State, 610 
P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ADDENDUM D 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)(e) (1996) 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 67-19-18 
67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not retained in 
exempt position. 
Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt 
position who is not retained by the appointing officer, unless discharged for 
cause as provided by this act or by regulation, shall: 
(1) be appointed to any career service position for which the employee 
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to the employee's last position in the 
career service provided an opening exists; or 
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service position for which the 
employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsec-
tion (1) of this section. The director shall maintain a reappointment 
register for this purpose and it shall have precedence over other registers. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-17, enacted by L. § 34-35-5 and enacted §§ 67-19-1 to 67-19-6, 
1979, ch. 139, § 23. 67-19-7 to 67-19-12, 67-19-13, 67-19-15, and 
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this 67-19-16 to 67-19-29. 
act," in the preliminary language, means Laws Cross-References. — Grievance and ap-
1979, ch. 139, §§ 1 to 35, which amended peals procedure, § 67-19a-301 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Holland v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 
856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disci-
plinary action — Procedure — Reductions in 
force. 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted: 
(a) to advance the good of the public service; or 
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to main-
tain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to 
the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in 
office. 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, disability, 
national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including 
the exercise of rights under this chapter. 
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural and docu-
mentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions. 
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with 
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would 
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public 
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal to 
the department head as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5) (a) A career service employee may not be demoted or dismissed unless 
the department head or designated representative has complied with this 
subsection. 
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the 
employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have 
the reply considered by the department head. 
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67-19-18 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department 
head or designated representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted if 
the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of 
workload, or lack of work are governed by retention rosters established by 
the director. 
(b) Under those circumstances: 
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be 
eliminated, subject to review by the director. 
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated 
before any career service employee, 
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order of 
their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be 
discharged first. 
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be 
computed according to rules established by the director, allowing 
appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in state 
government, including any active duty military service fulfilled 
subsequent to original state appointment. 
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in 
force shall be: 
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsec-
tion 67-19-17(2); and 
(B) reappointed without examination to any vacancy for which 
the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of the date 
of the separation. 
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to 
the department head for an administrative review. 
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 working days 
after the employee's receipt of written notification of separation. 
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head 
according to the grievance and appeals procedure of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L. act," at the end of Subsection (6)(c)(ui), literally 
1979, ch. 139, § 24; 1983, ch. 332, § 9; 1991, means Laws 1983, ch. 332, §§ 1 to 9, which 
ch. 204, § 5; 1995, ch. 130, § 4. appear as various sections throughout this 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- chapter (see Table of Session Laws in Tables 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added subsection volume). However, given the context m which it 
designations and substituted "service" for "in- is used, it seems that the term is meant to refer 
terest" in Subsection (1), substituted "disabil- to Laws 1979, ch. 139, §§ 1 to 35. See note 
lty" for "physical handicap" in Subsection (2), under same catchhne following § 67-19-17. 
and made related and stylistic changes. Cross-References. — Grievance and appeal 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this procedure, § 67-19a-301 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Dismissal of employee. by procedures conducted within the bounds of 
State employee accountant who pleaded this section and Utah Rule Admin P R468-11 
guilty to forging U.S. Treasury checks and who Kent v Department of Emp. Sec, 860 P2d 984 
had failed to keep his supervisor informed of Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
the progress of the case was properly dismissed 
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ADDENDUM E 
Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-20(1) (1994) 
State of Utah 
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 
January 1,1994 
[ATTORNE Y GENERAL, 
^ C I 0 1993 
RECEIVED 
STEPHEN G SCHWENDIMAN 
ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
236 STATE CAPITOL 
Career Service Review Board 
B. Sealing Evidence. The administrator, the board, or the hearing officer may exercise authority to 
seal the record when circumstances so warrant. 
C. Media Presence. All hearings at the evidentiary/step 5 and appellate/step 6 levels are open to 
the media, unless otherwise closed due to R137-1-19A above, except that television cameras shall 
not be permitted at the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings. 
D. Dissemination. The administrator has discretion to release copies of legal decisions, orders, and 
rulings to a media representative upon the latter's request. Portions of or entire legal decisions 
and orders may be withheld if deemed to be of a privileged or confidential nature, or if the 
record is sealed. 
R137-1-20. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings. 
A. Authority of Hearing Officers. The hearing officer is empowered to: 
1. maintain order, insure the development of a clear and complete record, rule upon offers 
of proof, and receive relevant evidence; 
2. set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative testimony and exclude any witness 
whose later testimony might be colored by the testimony of another witness or any person 
whose presence might have a chilling effect on another testifying witness; 
3. rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed findings; 
4. require the filing of memoranda of law and the presentation of oral argument with respect 
to any question of law; 
5. compel testimony and order the production of evidence and the appearance of witnesses; 
and 
6. admit evidence that has reasonable and probative value. 
B. Conduct of Hearings. A hearing shall be confined to those issues related to the subject matter 
presented in the original grievance statement. 
1. An evidentiarv proceeding shall not be allowed to develop into a general inquiry into the 
policies and operations of an agency. 
2. An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely to receive evidence that either refutes or 
substantiates specific claims or charges. It shall not be made an occasion for irresponsible 
accusations, general attacks upon the character or conduct of the employing agency or the 
employee or others, or for making derogatory assertions having no bearing on the claims 
or specific matters under review. 
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new hearing for the record, 
held de novo, with both parties being granted full administrative process as follows: 
1. The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual findings based solely on the evidence 
presented at the hearing without deference to any prior factual findings of the agency. 
The CSRB hearing officer shall then determine whether: (a) the factual findings made 
from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support with substantial evidence the allegations made 
by the agency or the appointing authority, and (b) the agency has correctly applied 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes. 
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2. When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with the procedures set forth 
above that the evidentiary/step 5 factual findings support the allegations of the agency or 
the appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether the 
agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In making this latter 
determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision of the agency 
or the appointing authority unless the agency's penalty is determined to be excessive, 
disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing 
officer shall determine the appropriate remedy. 
D. Discretion. Upon commencement, the hearing officer shall announce that the hearing is 
convened and is henceforth on the record. The hearing officer shall note appearances for the 
record and shall determine which party has the burden of moving forward. 
E. Closing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments have been 
presented, the hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the proceeding, unless one or 
both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief within a specified time. 
F. Posthearing Briefs. When posthearing briefs or memoranda of law are scheduled to be 
submitted, the record shall remain open until the briefs are received by the hearing officer and 
incorporated into the record, or until the time to receive such briefs has expired. After receipt 
of posthearing documents, or upon the expiration of the time to receive posthearing documents, 
the case is then taken under advisement, and the tolling period commences for the issuance of 
the written decision. 
G. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Following the closing of the record, the hearing officer 
shall make and enter a written decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
decision and order is filed with the administrator and without further action becomes the decision 
and order of the evidentiary hearing. 
H. Disseminating Decisions. The administrator shall disseminate copies of the decision and order 
to the persons of record for each party. 
I. Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at issue, the past 
employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of cither mitigating or sustaining the 
penalty in the event that the employee is found guilty of the disciplinary charge alleged. 
J. Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds that the action complained of which was 
taken by the appointing authority was too severe, even though for good cause, the hearing officer 
may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of 
the respective parties. 
K. Compliance and Enforcement. State agencies and officials are expected to comply with decisions 
and orders issued by a hearing officer, unless an appeal is taken to the appellate/step 6 level. 
Enforcement measures available to the board include: (1) involving the governor, who may 
remove most state officers with or without cause ,and with respect to those who can only be 
removed for cause, refusal to obey a lawful order may constitute sufficient cause for removal; (2) 
a mandamus order to compel the official to obey the order; and (3) the charge of a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
L. No Rehearings. Rehearings are not permitted. 
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ADDENDUM F 
Division of Wildlife Resources, Administrative Procedures, Rules of 
Conduct, II-10.5, January 1982, R. 241. 
Administrative Procedures January 1982 
Rules of Conduct 
II - 10.4 Debts 
Public confidence is impaired when employees manage their affairs so loosely 
as to be in debt constantly. All personnel should, therefore, pay as promptly 
as possible all just obligations and legal liabilities incurred, 
II - 10.5 Abuses of Authority 
The authority a Division employee may exercise is specified by law. These 
bounds should not be transgressed bocause it places an employee in a position 
where he/she has no legal protection and exposes the employee and the Division 
to serious criticism and possible civil suit. Employees are members of the 
local community and are expected to conduct themselves as respectable 
citizens. They should never deviate from strict observance of city, county or 
State laws except as absolutely required in the performance of their official 
duties. 
Personnel shall not engage in hunting and fishing activities for which a 
license is required without having in possession the appropriate license* 
II - 10.6 Rumors 
Malicious rumors about other members of the Division should netrer be 
repeated. Critical or personal remarks which might tend to cause dissension 
or rumors about other employees should be avoided. Such remarks will be 
interpreted as marks of disloyalty. 
Employees are encouraged to privately resolve personal differences and to help 
maintain a spirit of unity and cooperation. Publicly criticizing the laws and 
regulations which they are required to enforce, but about which they may have 
a contrary personal opinion, must be avoided. 
II - 10.7 Use of Intoxicants 
The use of intoxicants while on duty is strictly forbidden. In addition, 
"off-hours" drinking to excess seriously reflects on the entire Division. The 
use of intoxicants while driving a State vehicle is strictly forbidden. 
The employee's reputation, as well as the reputation of the Division, is at 
stake whenever intoxicants are involved. Excessive use of intoxicants at any 
time, shall constitute grounds for dismissal. 
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ADDENDUM G 
Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-22(4) (1997) 
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(11) Rehearings. Rehearings are not permitted. 
(12) Reconsideration. 
(a) Section 63-46b-13 of the UAPA is incorporated by reference within this rule, and 
requests for reconsideration of an evidentiary/step 5 decision will be conducted in 
accordance with that section, except for the time period which is stated below. 
(b) The written reconsideration request must contain specific reasons why a 
reconsideration is warranted with respect to the factual findings and legal conclusions 
of the evidentiary/step 5 decision. The same CSRB hearing officer shall decide the 
propriety of a reconsideration. A request for reconsideration is filed with the 
administrator. To be timely the written request for reconsideration shall be filed within 
ten working days upon receipt of the evidentiary/step 5 decision according to the time 
period at Subsection 67-19a-407(l)(a)(i), not Section 63-46b-13. 
(c) An appeal to the appellate/step 6 level from a CSRB hearing officer's reconsideration 
decision and order must be filed within ten working days upon receipt of the 
reconsideration or within ten working days after expiration of the time for receipt of 
the reconsideration, whichever is first. 
R137-1-22. The Board's Appellate/Step 6 Procedures. 
(1) Transcript Production. The party appealing the CSRB hearing officer's evidentiary/step 5 
decision to the board at the appellate/step 6 level shall order transcription of the 
evidentiary/step 5 hearing from the court reporting firm within ten working days upon 
receipt of acknowledgment of the appeal from the administrator. 
(a) The appellant shall share an equal fee payment with the CSRB Office to the court 
reporting firm. Transcript production cost-sharing applies equally only to the appellant 
and to the CSRB Office. The CSRB Office receives the transcript original; the 
appellant receives a transcript copy. 
(b) The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office about obtaining a transcript copy, or 
may directly purchase a copy from the court reporting firm. 
(2) Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board at step 6 is based upon the evidentiary record 
previously established by the CSRB hearing officer during the evidentiary/step 5 hearing. 
No additional or new evidence is permitted unless compelled by the board. 
(a) The appellant in an appellate/step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of the 
evidentiary/step 5 hearing. After receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 30 calendar 
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days to file an original and six copies of a brief with the administrator. Additionally, 
the respondent must be provided with a copy of the appellant's brief. 
(b) After receiving a copy of the appellant's brief, the respondent then has 30 calendar days 
to file an original and six copies of a brief with the administrator. The appellant may 
file an original and six copies of a reply brief which addresses the respondent's brief. 
(c) After receiving both parties' briefs, the administrator distributes the briefs and the 
CSRB hearing officer's evidentiary/step 5 decision to the board members. 
(d) Each party is responsible for filing its original and six copies with the CSRB Office and 
for exchanging a copy with the opposing party. 
(e) Briefs shall be date-stamped upon their receipt in the CSRB Office. 
(f) The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or waived only for good cause 
as determined by the CSRB chair or vice-chair, or the administrator. 
(3) Rules of Procedure. The following rules are applicable to appeal hearings before the board 
at the appellate/step 6 level: 
(a) Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party or upon its own motion, the board 
may dismiss any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the appeal is clearly 
moot, without merit, improperly filed, untimely filed, or outside the scope of the 
board's authority. 
(b) Notice. The board shall distribute written notice of the date, time, place, and issues for 
hearing to the aggrieved employee, to the employee's counsel or representative, to the 
appropriate agency official, to the agency's counsel or representative, and to the 
agency's management representative, at least five working days before the date set for 
the hearing. 
(c) Compelling Evidence. The board may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeal 
hearings, according to Subsection 67-19a-202(3). 
(d) Oral Argument/Time Limitation. The board grants up to 20 to 25 minutes to each party 
for oral argument. The board may grant additional time when deemed appropriate. 
(e) Oral Argument Set Aside. If the board determines that oral argument is unnecessary, 
the parties shall be notified. However, the parties' representatives may be expected to 
appear before the board at the date, time, and place noticed to answer any questions 
raised by the board members. 
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(f) Argument or Memoranda. The board may require the parties to offer oral argument or 
submit written memoranda of law. 
(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of review are based upon the 
following criteria: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence 
standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing 
officer are not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a 
whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factual findings, and also make 
new or additional factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing 
officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB 
hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according 
to the correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 
decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing officer, 
including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational 
based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
(5) Appeal Hearing Record. The proceeding before the board shall be recorded by a certified 
court reporter, or in exceptional circumstances by a recording machine. 
(6) Appellate Review. Upon a party's application for review of the CSRB hearing officer's 
evidentiary/step 5 decision, the board's appellate/step 6 decision is based upon a review of 
the record, including briefs and oral arguments presented at step 6, and no further 
evidentiary hearing will be held unless otherwise ordered by the board. Section 63-46b-10 
of the UAPA is incorporated by reference. 
(7) Remand. Until the board's decision is final, the board may remand the case to the original 
CSRB hearing officer to take additional evidence or to resolve any further evidentiary issues 
of fact or law with instructions or may make any other appropriate disposition of the appeal. 
(8) Distribution of Appellate Decisions. The board's decision and order is issued on the date 
that it is signed and dated by the CSRB chair, vice-chair or another board member. After 
the board's appellate/step 6 decision is issued, it is distributed according to Rl37-1-8(3). 
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ADDENDUM H 
Utah Personnel Review Board State Employees' Grievance and Appeals 
Procedure. Rule 19.8.2 (1983) 
U T A H P E R S O N N E L R E V I E W B O A R D 
S T A T E E M P L O Y E E S 1 
G R I E V A N C E A N D A P P E A L S 
P R O C E D U R E 
1 9 8 3 E D I T I O N 
The statutory basis for the Utah State Employees1 Grievance and Appeals 
Procedure is set forth in the Utah Personnel Management Act, which originated 
as Senate Bill 179 (1979). That act became effective July 1, 1979. Senate 
Bill 73, enacted during the 1980 legislative session, provided further 
amendments to the original legislation; as did Senate Bill 271 in 1981. The 
1983 Legislature enacted S.B. 85 and H.B. 196 both of which again amended the 
grievance and appeals process. 
Statutory references may be found at Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18, and 
Sections § 67-19-25 through § 67-19-29, 1953, as amended, and in the 
corresponding annual volumes of Laws of Utah. 
19.5.4 The Board shall employ an administrator who shall serve as 
Executive Secretary to the Board and such additional staff as necessary. 
19.5.5 Employees of the Board shall serve as exempt from the career 
service of the State. 
19.6 Authority 
19.6.1 The Board shall have authority to subpoena witnesses, 
documents, or other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, 
hearing or other proceeding. 
19.6.2 Any Board member may administer oaths, certify official acts, 
and subpoena witnesses, documents or other evidence in conjunction with any 
inquiry, investigation, hearing or other proceeding. 
19.6.3 The Board may, at its discretion, order that an Employee be 
placed on the reappointment roster as provided for at Utah Code Ann. 67-19-17 
for assignment to another Agency. 
19.7 Rules of Procedure: 
19.7.1 Written notice of the date, time and place for hearing by the 
Board shall be given to the aggrieved Employee, to the Employee's 
Representative, to the Agency, and to the Agency's counsel or representative 
at least 5 days before the date set for the hearing. 
19.7.2 Informal evidentiary procedural rules are applicable in 
appeals before the Board. 
19.7.3 The Board may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals 
and can remand cases back to the Hearing Officer for additional evidence and 
testimony. 
19.7.4 Hearings before the Board may be reported either by a 
certified court reporter or by a recording machine. The complete transcript 
of the hearing shall constitute the record of the hearing together with all 
written decisions, orders, exhibits and written briefs. 
19.8 Standards of Review: 
19.8.1 The Board's decision shall be supported by credible 
substantial evidence. 
19.8.2 The Board's standards of review consist of determining 
whether the Hearing Officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence 
and whether that decision is warranted by the facts. 
19.9 Board Decisions: 
19.9.1 The Board shall render a written decision and order within 40 
working days after the close of the hearing. 
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ADDENDUM I 
Utah Admin. Code R477-1 l-l(3)(e) (1996) 
State of Utah 
Human Resource Management Rules 
July 1996 
Mso Mailable at tatp.ffawN.dtonvnt-u% 
pursuant to 67-19-6(1) Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
R477-11. Discipline. 
11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
(1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following reasons: 
(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, including but not limited to 
safety policies, agency professional standards and workplace policies; 
(b) work performance that is inefficient or incompetent; 
(c) failure to maintain skills and adequate performance levels; 
(d) insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a superior; 
(e) misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the public service; 
(f) any incident involving intimidation, physical harm or threats of physical harm against 
co-workers, management, or the public. 
(2) All disciplinary actions of career service employees shall be governed by principles of due process. 
In all such cases, except as provided under Subsection 67-19-18(4), the disciplinary process shall 
include all of the following: 
(a) The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the 
reasons. 
(b) The employee must reply within five working days in order to have the agency representative 
consider the reply before discipline is imposed. 
(c) If an employee waives the right to respond or does not reply within the time frame established 
by the agency representative or within five days, whichever is longer, discipline may be imposed 
in accordance with these rules. 
(3) After a career service employee has been informed of the reasons for the proposed discipline and 
has been given an opportunity to respond and be responded to, the agency representative may 
discipline that employee, or any non-career service employee not subject to the same procedural 
lights, by imposing one or more of the following: 
(a) Written reprimand 
(b) Suspension without pay up to 30 calendar days per incident requiring discipline 
(c) Demotion of any employee through one of the following methods: 
(i) An employee may be moved from a position in one class to a position in another class 
having a lower entrance salary if the duties of the position have been reduced for 
disciplinary reasons. 
(ii) A demotion within the employee's current pay range may be accomplished by lowering the 
employee's salary rate back on the range, as determined by the agency head or designee. 
(d) Dismissal 
(i) An agency head shall dismiss or demote a career service employee only in accordance 
State of Utah Human Resource Management Rules Page 63 
Effective July 2,1996 
with the provision of Subsection 67-19-18(5) . See R477-11 -2 of these rules. 
(e) When deciding the specific type and severity of the discipline to administer to any employee, 
the agency representative may consider the following factors: 
(i) Consistent application of rules and standards 
(B) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(iii) The severity of the infraction 
Civ) The repeated nature of violations 
(v) Prior disciplinary/corrective actions 
(vi) Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions 
(vii) The employee's past work record 
(viii) The effect on agency operations 
(ix) The potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
(4) If an agency determines that a career service employee endangers or threatens the peace and 
safety of others or poses a grave threat to the public service or is charged with aggravated or 
repeated misconduct, the agency may impose the following actions, as provided by 67-19-18-(4), 
pending an investigation and determination of facts: 
(a) Paid administrative leave 
(b) Temporary reassignment to another position or work location at the same rate of pay 
(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed, the employee be notified in writing of the discipline, the 
reasons for the discipline, the effective date and length of the discipline. 
(6) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and appeals procedure as provided by law for 
career service employees only. The employee and the agency representative may agree in writing 
to waive or extend any grievance step, or the time limits specified for any grievance step. 
11-2. Dismissal or Demot ion . 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained under R477-10-2 and 
R477-11-1 of these rules, and through the process outlined in this rule. 
(1) An agency head or appointing officer may dismiss or demote a non-career service status employee 
without right of appeal by providing written notification to the employee specifying the reasons for 
the dismissal or demotion and the effective date. 
(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a career service position unless the agency 
head or designee has observed the Grievance Procedure Rules and law cited in R137-1 -13 and 
Title 67 , Chapter 19a and the following procedures: 
(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the employee in writing of the specific reasons for the 
dismissal or demotion. 
(b) The employee shall have up to five working days to reply. The employee must reply within five 
working days for the agency representative to consider the reply before discipline is imposed. 
(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by the agency head or designee. 
State of Utah Human Resource Management Rules Page 64 
Effective July 2,1996 
ADDENDUM J 
Utah Admin. Code R657-37-4(8)(a) and (b) (1996), R.162-167 
R657. Natural Resources, Wildlife Resources, 
R657-37. Posted Hunting Units for Big Game. 
R657-37-1. Purpose and Authority. 
(1) Under authority of Section 23-23-3, this rule provides 
the standards and procedures applicable to posted hunting units 
organized for the hunting of big game. 
(2) Posted hunting units are established to: 
(a) provide income to landowners; 
(b) create satisfying hunting opportunities; 
(c) increase wildlife resources; 
(d) provide adequate protection to landowners who open their 
lands for hunting; and 
(e) provide the general public access to private lands for 
hunting big game. 
R657-37-2. Definitions. 
Terms used in this rule are defined in Sections 23-13-2 and 
23-23-2. 
R657-37-3. Operation by Landowner Association. 
(1)(a) Posted hunting units must be operated by a landowner 
or landowners who own land within the posted hunting unit or a 
posted hunting unit agent who leases or otherwise controls hunting 
on land within the posted hunting unit. 
(b) A landowner or landowner association may appoint posted 
hunting unit agents to protect private property and operate the 
posted hunting unit, however the landowner or landowner association 
must assume ultimate responsibility for the operation of the posted 
hunting unit. 
(2) (a) The minimum allowable acreage for a posted hunting 
unit is 10,000 contiguous acres. 
(b) The Wildlife Board may approve a posted hunting unit that 
is less than 10,000 contiguous acres only if it is in the best 
interest of wildlife, landowners, and the public. 
(3) (a) Posted hunting units shall consist of as much private 
land as possible. 
(b) All public lands, including federal or state lands, may 
be included within a posted hunting unit only if: 
(i) the public land is completely surrounded by private land; 
(ii) the public land is otherwise inaccessible to the general 
public; and 
(iii) the landowner complies with all federal and state 
requirements applicable to operating the posted hunting unit on 
public lands. 
(c) The Wildlife Board may grant variances to land which may 
be included within a posted hunting unit. 
(4) (a) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent 
may enter into reciprocal agreements with any other landowner 
association or posted hunting unit agent to allow hunters who have 
obtained a posted hunting unit permit to hunt within each other's 
posted hunting units as provided in Subsection R657-37-4(8). 
(b) If a person is authorized to hunt in one or more posted 
hunting units as provided in Subsection (a) , written permission 
from the landowner association must be in the person's possession 
olG? 
while hunting. 
(5) (a) A person who has obtained a posted hunting unit permit 
through the big game drawing shall be provided an opportunity to 
hunt big game on a specific posted hunting unit commensurate to the 
opportunity provided to a person who has otherwise obtained a 
posted hunting unit permit. 
(b) A person who has obtained a posted hunting unit permit 
may hunt only in the posted hunting unit for which the permit was 
issued, except as provided under Subsection (4)(b). 
R657-37-4. Application for Certificate of Registration. 
(1) Applications for posted hunting units are available from 
division offices and division game biologists. 
(2) In addition to the application, the landowner association 
shall provide: 
(a) a management plan specifying the big game management 
objectives for the posted hunting unit which must be consistent 
with division objectives for the respective big game units; 
(b) a petition containing the signature and acreage of each 
participating landowner agreeing to establish and operate the 
posted hunting unit as provided in this proclamation, Title 23, 
Chapter 23 of the Wildlife Resources Code and Rule R657-37; 
(c) a 1:100,000 USGS land ownership map of the proposed 
posted hunting unit; 
(d) the name of the designated posted hunting unit agent; and 
(e) a $5 non refundable application fee. 
(3) The division shall, upon request of the applicant, 
provide assistance in preparing the management plan and map for the 
proposed posted hunting unit. 
(4) Applications must be completed and returned to the 
division game biologist in the region in which the posted hunting 
unit is to be established prior to August 1. 
(5) The division may return any application that is 
incomplete or completed incorrectly. 
(6) The division shall forward the application and required 
documentation to the Wildlife Board for consideration. 
(7) Upon receipt of the application, required documentation 
and appropriate fee the Wildlife Board may: 
(a) issue a certificate of registration authorizing the 
landowner association to operate a posted hunting unit; or 
(b) deny the application and provide the landowner 
association with reasons for the denial. 
(8) (a) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent 
must request an amendment to the original certificate of 
registration for any variation of the following: 
(i) to allow hunters who have obtained a posted hunting unit 
permit to hunt within each other's posted hunting units; 
(ii) season dates; 
(iii) method of harvest; 
(iv) permit and tag allocation; 
(v) additional property to be included within the posted 
hunting unit; and 
(vi) any other matter related to the management and operation 
of the posted hunting unit not originally included in the 
certificate of registration. 
(b) Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration 
must be made in writing and submitted to the appropriate division 
regional supervisor and wildlife manager. 
(c) Upon approval, an amendment to the original certificate 
of registration shall be issued in writing. 
(9) The Wildlife Board shall consider any violation of the 
provisions of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code and any information 
provided by the division, landowners, and the public in determining 
whether to issue a certificate of registration for a posted hunting 
unit. 
(10) Posted hunting unit certificates of registration are 
issued on an annual basis and shall expire on January 31. 
R657-37-5. Renewal of a Certificate of Registration. 
(1) The landowner association may request the Wildlife Board 
to renew a certificate of registration for a posted hunting unit by 
completing and submitting a renewal application and a non 
refundable $5 renewal fee. 
(2)(a) Any changes from the previous year's certificate of 
registration must be indicated on the renewal application. 
(b) The Wildlife Board shall consider the previous 
performance of the posted hunting unit including the actions of the 
landowner, landowner association and posted hunting unit agent when 
reviewing renewal of the certificate of registration. 
(3) (a) If the landowner association requests additional land 
to be included in the posted hunting unit, the application must 
contain the signatures of the additional landowners and a 
1:100,000 USGS land ownership map showing the new proposed 
boundary. 
(b) If the landowner association requests land to be 
withdrawn from the posted hunting unit, the application must 
include: 
(i) a copy of the previously submitted petition with the 
appropriate landowners' signatures deleted; and 
(ii) a 1:100,000 USGS land ownership map showing the new 
proposed boundary. 
(4) Renewal applications must be submitted to the division 
prior to September 1. 
(5) The division shall forward the renewal application to the 
Wildlife Board for consideration. 
(6) Upon receipt of the application, required documentation 
and appropriate fee the Wildlife Board may: 
(a) issue a certificate of registration authorizing the 
landowner association to operate a posted hunting unit; or 
(b) deny the application and provide the landowner 
association with reasons for the denial. 
(7) The Wildlife Board shall consider any violation of the 
provisions of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code, Rule R657-37, any 
of the stipulations specified on the certificate of registration, 
and any information provided by the division, a member of a posted 
hunting unit, or the public in determining whether to renew a 
certificate of registration for a posted hunting unit. 
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R657-37-6. Posted Hunting Unit Agents. 
(1) A landowner association may appoint one posted hunting 
unit agent per 1000 acres, up to a maximum of 15 agents, to monitor 
access and protect the private property of the posted hunting unit. 
(2) Each posted hunting unit agent shall wear or have in his 
possession a form of identification prescribed by the Wildlife 
Board which indicates he is a posted hunting unit agent. 
(3) A posted hunting unit agent may refuse entry into a 
posted hunting unit to any person, except owners of land within the 
unit and their employees, who: 
(a) does not have in his possession a posted hunting unit 
permit; 
(b) endangers or has endangered human safety; 
(c) damages or has damaged private property within a posted 
hunting unit; or 
(d) fails or has failed to comply with reasonable rules of a 
landowner association. 
(4) In performing the functions described in this section, a 
posted hunting unit agent shall comply with the relevant laws of 
this state. 
R657-37-7, Permit Allocation. 
(1) The division shall issue posted hunting unit permits for 
hunting big game to permittees: 
(a) qualifying through a general public drawing; or 
(b) named by the posted hunting unit agent or landowner. 
(2) Permits shall not be issued to a landowner, landowner 
association or posted hunting unit agents. 
(3) The division and the landowner association shall, in 
accordance with the tables provided in Subsection (4) , jointly 
determine: 
(a) the total number of permits to be issued for the posted 
hunting unit, including the number of permits issued through the 
big game drawing; and 
(b) the number of permits that may be offered by the 
landowner association to the general public as defined in 
Subsections 23-23-2(4) and 23-23-2(5). 
(4) Permits may be allocated as follows: 
TABLE 1 
MOOSE AND PRONGHORN 
Posted Hunting Unit's Share 
Option Antlered Antlerless 
1 60% 0% 
2 60% 40% 
Public's Share 
Option Antlered Antlerless 
1 40% 0% 
2 40% 60% 
TABLE 2 
ELK AND DEER 
Posted Hunting Unit's Share 
Option 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Public* s Share 
Option 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Antlereci 
90% 
85% 
80% 
75% 
50% 
Antlered 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
50% 
Antlerless 
0% 
25% 
40% 
50% 
0% 
Antlerless 
100% 
75% 
60% 
50% 
0% 
(5) If the division recommends that antlerless deer or elk 
should not be taken within a posted hunting unit because of 
decreased or declining populations, up to 90% of the permits 
recommended for that posted hunting unit may be allocated to the 
landowner association. At least 10% of the permits allocated to 
the posted hunting unit shall be offered to the public through the 
big game drawing. 
(6) If public land is included within the unit boundaries the 
public shall receive additional permits based on the percentage of 
public lands included within the unit. 
(7) Landowner associations shall provide access free of 
charge to any person who has received a posted hunting unit permit 
through the general public big game drawing, except as provided in 
Section 23-23-11. 
(8) If the division and the landowner association disagree on 
the number of permits to be issued, the number of permits allocated 
for a species or sex of big game, or the method of take, the 
Wildlife Board shall determine the number of permits to be issued 
based on the biological needs of the big game herds, including 
available forage, depredation, and other mitigating factors. 
(9) A posted hunting unit permit entitles the holder to hunt 
the species and sex of big game specified on the permit and only in 
accordance with certificate of registration and the rules and 
proclamations of the Wildlife Board. 
(10) Antlerless permits may be sold by landowner associations 
to any eligible person regardless of whether the person has 
obtained a bull or a buck permit through the general public big 
game drawing. 
(11) A person may not obtain more than one permit for each 
species of big game, except antlerless deer permits. 
(12) A complete list of the current posted hunting units, big 
game hunts, and the date, time, and number of permits available for 
public drawing shall be published in the annual proclamation of the 
Wildlife Board for taking big game. 
R657-37-8. Permit Cost. 
The fee for permits allocated to any posted hunting unit is 
f 1 
the same as the cost of the applicable limited entry, premium 
limited entry or once-m-a-lifetime permit available through the 
general public big game drawing. 
R657-37-9, Possession of Permits and License by Hunters 
Restrictions. 
(1) A person may not hunt m a posted hunting unit without 
having in his possession: 
(a) a valid posted hunting unit permit; and 
(b) the necessary hunting licenses, tags, and stamps. 
(2) A posted hunting unit permit: 
(a) entitles the holder to hunt only in the unit specified on 
the permit pursuant to the rules of the Wildlife Board and does not 
entitle the holder to hunt on any other public or private land, 
except as provided under Subsection R657-37-3(4) (b) ;and 
(b) constitutes written permission for trespass as required 
under Section 23-20-14. 
(3) Prior to hunting on a posted hunting unit each permittee 
must: 
(a) contact the relevant landowner association and request 
the posted hunting unit rules and requirements; and 
(b) make arrangements with the landowner association for the 
hunt. 
R657-37-10. Season Lengths. 
(1) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent may 
arrange for permittees to hunt on the posted hunting unit during 
the following dates: 
(a) general season buck deer, general season bull elk, 
pronghorn, and moose seasons may be established September 1 through 
October 31; 
(b) archery buck deer and archery bull elk seasons may be 
established beginning with opening of the general archery deer 
season through October 31; 
(c) muzzleloader deer and elk seasons may be established 
September 1 through the end of the state muzzleloader season; 
(d) antlerless elk seasons may be established August 15 
through January 31; and 
(e) antlerless deer seasons may be established August 15 
through December 31. 
(2) The Wildlife Board may make variances to the seasons 
provided in Subsection (1) for good cause. 
R657-37-11. Rights-of-way. 
Landowner associations may not restrict established public 
access to public land enclosed by the posted hunting unit. 
KEY: wildlife, posted hunting unit 
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ADDENDUM K 
Career Service Review Board decision, Division of Parks and Recreation v. 
Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, issued February 13, 
1987. 
^ c 7 q t ^ 1^0 7 
Office of A(TOiiNEv GENERAL 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTffld STATE CAPITOL 
In the Matter of the Appeal o f : : 
DIVISION OF PARKS and RECREATION, : 
Appel lant , D E C I S I O N 
v . A N D 
ROBERT 0. ANDERSON AND * O R D E R 
D. DENNIS WEAVER, 
Respondents/Grievants. : CASE No. 3 PRB 22 (1986) 
The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Personnel 
Review Board ("Board11) as an appeal hearing, pursuant to notice, on December 
18, 1986. The following Board members were present: Bruce T. Jones, 
Chairman; Anita C. Bradford; Dalmas H. Nelson; Mary Graham-Payne; and Jose L. 
Trujillo. 
The Division of Parks and Recreation ("Appellant" and "Division") was 
represented by Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Tax 
and Business Regulation Division, and Assistant Attorney General J. Stephen 
Mikita, both of the Attorney General's Office. Division director Jerry A. 
Miller and Department of Natural Resources' personnel manager, Margo 
Silvester, were present. L. Zane Gill, Attorney at Law and legal counsel to 
the Utah Public Employees' Association represented Mr. Anderson ("Anderson," 
"Grievant"), who was not present. John T. Caine, Attorney at Law, served as 
legal counsel for Mr. Weaver ("Weaver," "Grievant"), who was present. 
A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before 
the Board, which has not been transcribed. However, a two-volume 
transcript was transcribed and typed from the record established at the 
Step 5 or evidentiary level hearing. Both parties, the Division and the 
Grievants, had access to the Step 5 transcript for the purposes of submitting 
legal briefs and for making oral argument before the Board. Thus prior to 
this Step 6 appeal hearing, Board members received each Grievant's brief 
together with Hearing Officer John Paul Kennedy's Finding of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision ("Step 5 Decision"). 
The Board's statutory authority is found under provision of the State 
Personnel Management Act, at Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Sections 
67-19 et seq., especially sections 67-19-20 through 67-19-25 which set fortn 
the Board1s responsibilities and appellate jurisdiction. The Board's 
regulatory provisions are published as the State Employees' Grievance and 
Appeals Procedure (1983 ed.), commonly cited as Board Rules. This case 
proceeded properly and timely before the Board which has jurisdiction over the 
Division's appeal. 
Subsequent to hearing oral argument on December 18, 1986 the Board took 
the case under advisement and then deliberated in an executive session with 
all members present on December 29. Now being fully apprised of the facts and 
issues as well as both the oral and written arguments, the Board hereby makes 
and enters its conclusions, decision and order. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 
A. Dismissal. 
At the time of his dismissal from the Division, Robert 0. Anderson had 
served with that agency for nearly twenty-four years. His most recently held 
position was that of Regional Manager II, for the agency's Northern Region. 
Anderson was issued a letter of dismissal, dated March 10, 1986 under the 
signature of Division director Jerry A. Miller, which stated in part: 
Based on the fact that you hold the position 
of Regional Manager II (a top leadership position 
in the Division), you are a member of the 
Management Team and a Category I Peace Officer, 
you should have been a leader in reporting the 
bear killing to proper authorities. Instead you 
proceeded to take parts of the bear as souvenirs, 
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watched as others took parts of the bear and 
moved the bear to conceal it. You then agreed to 
the "cover up" of the entire incident. MDU are 
guilty of malfeasance and nonfeasance in office. 
I cannot trust you to use sound judgment to 
faithfully execute your individual responsibility 
let alone your duty and responsibility to lead 
subordinates. You have violated the trust placed 
in you by the Division of Parks and Recreation, 
the Department of Natural Resources and the State 
of Utah (Mgt. Exh. #5). 
Similarly, D. Dennis Weaver had accrued sixteen years of service with the 
Division at the time of his dismissal on March 14, 1986. Prior to his 
termination from the agency, Weaver had been serving as a Regional Manager II, 
with the Division's Central Region. In his March 10 letter of dismissal to 
Weaver, Division director Jerry A. Miller stated: 
Based on the fact that you hold the position 
of Regional Manager II (a top leadership position 
in the Division), you are a member of the 
Management Team and a Category I Peace Officer, 
you should have been a leader in reporting the 
bear killing to proper authorities. Instead you 
suggested taking the bear hide as a souvenir, 
watched as others took parts of the bear and 
moved the bear to conceal it. MDU then agreed to 
"cover up" the entire incident. You are guilty 
of malfeasance and nonfeasance in office. I 
cannot trust you to use sound judgment to 
faithfully execute your individual responsibility 
let alone your duty and responsibility to lead 
subordinates. MDU have violated the trust placed 
in you by the division of Parks and Recreation, 
the Department of Natural Resources and the State 
of Utah (Mgt. Exh. #6). 
In respective letters dated March 20, 1986 the Department of Natural 
Resources' Executive Director, Dee C. Hansen, sustained both Grievants' 
terminations (Mgt. Exh. // 7, 8). Both employees appealed their penalties 
through the State's grievance and appeals procedure for career service 
employees. An evidentiary hearing was held on May 8-9, 1986 before a Board 
hearing officer. Hearing Officer John Paul Kennedy issued his Step 5 Decision 
under date of June 4, 1986. Therein the trier of facts determined that 
substantial evidence was lacking to support a finding that either of the 
Grievants had been discharged for just cause. Specifically, the hearing 
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officer concluded that the penalties of dismissal for not reporting the 
killing of the bear were too severe in light of prior service records and that 
the evidence did not support a finding that either Grievant was guilty of 
malfeasance. However, he did conclude that both were guilty of nonfeasance 
for failing to report the incident of the bear being shot and killed and thus 
imposed a six calendar weeks1 suspension without pay for Anderson and a four 
calendar weeks1 suspension without pay for Weaver. These suspension 
penalties, concluded the hearing officer, were justifiable given the Grievants 
non-reporting of the bear-killing incident. Thus, hearing officer Kennedy 
ordered Grievants1 retroactive reinstatement with full benefits and salary, 
minus his imposed suspension penalties (Step 5 Decision, pp. 5-6). 
Pursuant to the issuance of the Step 5 determination, the Division 
initiated a timely appeal for an appellate level review with the Board. 
B. Step 5 Level Issues and Conclusions of Law. 
The "Notice of an Administrative Hearing Before the hearing officer at 
Step 5" placed the following two issues before the Hearing Officer for his 
adjudication: 
1. Were the Grievants dismissed from State employment for just 
cause? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy?2 
In addressing these two particular issues, we take particular notice of 
hree of the hearing officer's Conclusions of Law: 
1. The evidence does not support a finding that 
either Grievant was guilty of malfeasance in 
office. Neither Grievant was on duty at the time 
of the incident. There was no showing that there 
is a duty under any statute or regulation to 
report the killing of an animal out of season 
without a permit (despite the Hearing officer's 
specific request for such a citation). Utah Code 
Annotated 23-20-4, cited by the State, does not 
stand for the proposition that an off-duty peace 
officer has a duty to report the unlawful taking 
of an animal. 
• * * 
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3. Both Grievants were guilty of "nonfeasance," 
both having failed to report the incident and 
such failure continuing into their normal working 
hours. The hearing officer concludes that it is 
reasonable for Management to have expected that 
responsible supervisors such as the Grievants 
should have reported an incident like the killing 
of a bear out of season. Such report should have 
been made within a reasonable time to appropriate 
authorities. 
* * * 
6. Management was justified in determining that 
the high level positions of the Grievants 
constituted adequate reason for more severe 
discipline of the Grievants than that which was 
given to the other State employees involved in 
the incident. Moreover, because Anderson had 
primary responsibility for killing the bear and 
reporting the incident, Management would have 
been justified in issuing more severe discipline 
to Anderson than to Weaver. However, the hearing 
officer concludes that the degree of additional 
severity of discipline issued to the Grievants as 
compared to the other State employees is not 
justified in these cases. 
Pursuant to the foregoing conclusions the hearing officer reduced both 
Grievants1 dismissals to suspensions. 
C. Division's Appeal. 
The Division's brief on appeal sets forth four points which, it claims, 
constitute reversible error or prejudicial error of a magnitude sufficient to 
warrant a reversal of the Step 5 determination. Appellant's stated four 
points are quoted as follows: 
1. The hearing officer erred when he acted as if 
he were the primary decision maker instead of 
management. This is the wrong standard. He 
ignored important and critical evidence as to the 
punishment meted out. All such is prejudicial to 
the division's decision and grounds for reversal. 
2. In ruling that the grievants were off-duty 
peace officers and therefore had no obligation to 
report the bear killing incident and that this 
meant no malfeasance is reversible error. 
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3. The hearing officer made significant errors 
in his Findings of Fact which led to prejudicial 
and reversible errors in his Conclusions of Law. 
4. The hearing officer has found an obligation 
to report the Bear incident, yet held no 
malfeasance because there is no obligation to 
report. Such is an irreconcilable conflict which 
is reversible error. 
D. Standard of Review 
In reaching a decision, the Board must first consider its standard of 
review (Board Rules, 19.8.1 and 19.8.2) and the standard of review for the 
hearing officer, as follows: 
1. It is appropriate to set forth the standard of review of a step 5 
hearing officer. The roles of the step 5 hearing officer and the Board are 
different. The hearing officer shall have "an ability to arbitrate and 
resolve personnel administration disputes and to handle employment relations 
in a large work force." Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-20(6). It is intended 
that the hearing officer conduct a hearing de novo for the purpose of taking 
and weighing the evidence, making conclusions of law and reaching a decision. 
The hearing officer, following the full and complete hearing and the closing 
of the record, will make and enter a written decision and order containing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The hearing officer's decision and 
order will be filed with and distributed to the parties by the Executive 
Secretary and shall, without further action, become the decision and order of 
the Board (Board Rules, 18.16.1 and 18.16.3). The hearing officer is not 
bound by the factual determinations of the agency. However, upon making 
factual findings, a hearing officer must then decide if such findings 
constitute just cause for the agency action. In regard to this latter duty of 
the hearing officer, latitude and discretion should be given to the agency's 
decision if made in good faith and if supported by the findings of fact based 
on the evidence. 
The function of a hearing officer in regard to a decision based on the 
factual findings is not to ignore the decision of the agency, which is 
presumed to be equipped and informed by experience to deal with a specialized 
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field or area of knowledge which the hearing officer should respect. Even 
though the hearing officer is not bound by the agency decision, the decision 
should be accorded considerable weight and deference if it is supportable by 
substantial evidence as elicited by the hearing officer in making factual 
findings. More particularly, this means that after making factual findings de 
novo, a hearing officer should set aside an agency decision only if the 
hearing officer then finds that the factual findings and evidence supporting 
the agency decision are not adequate to justify the decision of the agency to 
a reasonable person in light of evidentiary facts including, without 
limitation, the substantiality of the evidence supporting the factual findings 
of the hearing officer, the determination of which party has the burden of 
proof (the agency in disciplinary cases and reductions in force), the presence 
of mitigating and/or extenuating circumstances, an employee's service record, 
any disparity of treatment or selective enforcement of rules, the adequacy of 
forewarning or guidance, the consistency in the application of rules and 
procedures, the presence of discriminatory or preferential treatment, 
longevity of employment, and past rules' violations, etc. The agency decision 
then, if supported by substantial evidence, should be given deference by the 
hearing officer and considered together with all of the evidentiary factors 
noted above in reaching a decision. 
2. The Board is statutorily empowered to serve as a "quasi-judicial" 
tribunal to hear cases taken on appeal to "the final administrative appeal 
body" of the state employees' grievance procedure. (See Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, Section 67-19-20(5), subsections (a) and (b).) The Board's 
review of an appeal encompasses both questions of law and fact or mixed 
questions of law and fact, as determined solely on the record made by the 
parties at the evidentiary or Step 5 proceeding. Thus, the findings of facts 
and conclusions made by hearing officers at Step 5 will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless they are (i) not adequately supported by credible substantial 
evidence, or (ii) unless they are clearly erroneous, or unsupported, or 
(iii) unless they are unwarranted by the facts and circumstances, as e.g., 
where prejudicial error of a harmful nature or reversible error is present 
(Board Rules, 19.8.1 and 19.8.2). As stated previously, in Utah Department of 
Transportation v. Thomas V. Rasmussen 2 PRB 19 (1986), this Board recognizes 
the established principle of according considerable weight and deference to 
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the hearing officer's Step 5 findings and conclusions. Those findings and 
conclusions are entitled to a presumption of correctness and should not be 
overturned so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, and the Board in its appellate review should not substitute its 
judgment on matters of evidence for that of the hearing officer — unless 
harmful prejudicial or reversible error is present. (See 73A C.J.S., Public 
Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 225, "Harmless or Prejudicial 
Error," p. 300.) It is further noted, however, that an evidentiary examiner's 
findings and conclusions are not necessarily unassailable and may even be 
reversed by an appellate board when those findings and conclusions are not 
clearly erroneous. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 492 (1951). The 
Board has authorized the Executive Secretary to appoint impartial and 
qualified hearing officers (Board Rules, 19.5.3). As noted in the just-cited 
Rule and Rule 18.16.3 cited above, the hearing officers represent the Board in 
making factual findings, conclusions of law, and reaching a decision. In 
addition, the Board itself "may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals 
and can remand cases back to the hearing officer for additional evidence and 
testimony" (Board Rules, 19.7.3). In summary, the first level of review of 
the Board is to determine whether its hearing officers have made factual 
findings which are supported by substantial evidence (Board Rules, 19.8.2), 
meaning that the evidence must be adequate to a reasonable person to support 
said findings. As noted above, if the Board determines that the factual 
findings are not or may not be based on substantial evidence, or are otherwise 
inadequate, the Board can itself compel evidence or remand the case back to 
the hearing officers as its fact finding representatives. 
Once the factual findings are established, whether by acceptance of the 
hearing officer's findings, by compelling additional evidence, or by reversal 
of the hearing officer's findings, it is next in the purview of the Board to 
review the decision of the hearing officer based upon the factual findings. 
In this regard, the Board's standards of review consist of determining whether 
the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence and 
whether that decision is warranted by the facts (Board Rules, 19.8.2). In 
order for a decision to be warranted by the facts and supported by substantial 
evidence, the Board must consider and determine questions of law, including 
whether factual findings are warranted by law and whether conclusions of law 
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and the decision are warranted by the findings of fact, 73A C.J.5., Public 
Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 242 "Law Questions in General." The 
Board is "entitled to review the record, receive additional information, make 
findings of fact, and make its decision based thereon," Ron v. Office of 
Community Operations, Memorandum Decision C-86-3311 of Third Judicial District 
Court of Utah. Thus, in our review of a decision of a hearing officer, 
neither the agency action nor the decision of the hearing officer is 
necessarily conclusive. The Board must determine whether its representative, 
the hearing officer, correctly reviewed the agency action and whether the 
hearing officer applied the appropriate standard of review in the evidentiary 
level decision. In making its review the Board must, like the hearing 
officer, consider all of the evidentiary factors noted in Paragraph Dl above. 
In essence, the Board must review the decision of the hearing officer to 
determine if the hearing officer applied the correct standard of review to the 
agency action and whether the agency action and the decision of the hearing 
officer are warranted by the credible facts. This does not constitute a 
reweighing of the evidence, but it is a question of law as to the standard of 
review applied by the hearing officer of the agency action and as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the hearing officer's decision. If 
this were not so, the Step 6 Board review would be unnecessary except for the 
purpose of establishing that there is some credible evidence in support of the 
decision of the hearing officer. We believe this to be a much too restrictive 
interpretation of Rule 19.8.2 of the State Employees1 Grievance and Appeals 
Procedure. 
This Board — as an administrative appellate body — is properly entitled 
to attach value and credit to the evidence adduced at Step 5 (which is not the 
same as re-weighing that evidence), but it is a process which does consider 
the competency and adequacy of the evidence in support of the hearing 
officer's findings, conclusions and determination. Hinkson v. Bonannie, et 
al. , 205 P. 2d 242, 115 Ut. 376 (1949). Whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the hearing officer's findings (or whether those findings are 
contrary to the evidence) is a question of law which is reviewable by this 
Board. Strader v. Kansas Public Employees1 Retirement System, 479 P. 2d. 860, 
(Kan. 1971). 
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Notwithstanding the above-stated appellate pr inciples and accompanying 
case c i ta t ions , the Board understands that i t i s not a regular t r ibunal wi th in 
the state 's j ud i c i a l system. I t i s , as noted previously on p. 7, a 
quasi - jud ic ia l body, one with essential ly administrative powers and 
functions. Thus, the Board i s not subject to the formal rules of evidence nor 
to the standard rules of c i v i l procedure. 
III. 
ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As required by the above discussion, the Board will first review below the 
factual findings and conclusions of the hearing officer to determine if there 
is substantial evidence in support thereof, and then review the decision of 
the hearing officer in light of the credible factual findings and the facts 
contained in the record. 
A. The Bear-Killing Incident: 
During October 1985 Messrs. Anderson and Weaver were part of a 
thirteen-member elk hunting party situated at a place called "Barton's 
Country" on East Mountain, near Joe's Valley Reservoir, in the Manti-La Sal 
Mountains of Emery County, Utah. In addition to Anderson and Weaver, five 
other members of the hunting party were State employees with the Division: 
Blaine Luke, Rod Hunsaker, Ray Keith, Kean Luke and Dave Lucchesi. The job 
titles of the just-named employees included maintenance supervisor, park 
manager and park ranger. And five of the seven just-named Division employees 
— including Grievants — held peace officer status. The six remaining 
hunters were citizens, several of whom were relatives of the above-cited 
Division employees. 
On October 4 Anderson did not participate actively in an elk drive as did 
most of the other hunters. The latter positioned himself by sitting on a log 
near the hunting party's campground. The story which Anderson related to the 
other hunters and Wildlife Resource investigators' generally, was that upon 
hearing a noise behind him he turned and was startled to find a bear running 
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toward him. The bear, Anderson stated, was about forty feet distant, when he 
first noticed it; he then swung around to face the bear's direction and 
brought his rifle to the hip and fired from a left-handed position. Anderson 
later claimed that he had fired at the bear reflexively, without thinking or 
intending to kill the animal. After the shot was fired, the bear then 
continued running off in another direction through the brush. 
Hunsaker later stated that Anderson told him the bear had raised up when 
he (Anderson) first saw it (T. I, 163); Weaver too related that Anderson had 
told him that it was on its feet, standing (Mgt. Exh. 2, p. 87). \fet during 
the investigative interview and in his written statement Anderson related: "I 
didn't know if it was even a cub or what but it looked 12 feet tall when I saw 
it. It wasn't standing. It was running on all fours. ..." (Mgt. Exh. 1, 
Anderson Interview; Anderson Statement.) He testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that the bear was running, not standing (T. II, p. 265). 
When found later, the bear had traveled about two hundred feet from where 
it had been first seen by Anderson when he had fired at it. The bear was a 
cinnamon-colored black bear cub about three feet in length, weighing about one 
hundred pounds. The bear cub was found to have been fatally wounded with a 
gunshot to the stomach area, and had bled considerably with about two feet of 
entrails hanging out, before it had collapsed and died in the underbrush. 
During the investigation Anderson acknowledged shooting the bear (Mgt. Exh. 
1); later, at the hearing he hedged his testimony: "I don't believe I hit the 
bear" (T. II, pp. 266, 271). Circumstantial evidence points to Anderson 
having shot the bear. 
Robert G. Anderson (a citizen and not to be confused with the Grievant, 
Robert 0. Anderson) approached the Grievant shortly after the shooting. 
Together both Andersons and Ray Keith walked to the site where the bear had 
first been noticed by Grievant Anderson, which was the animal's location when 
the Grievant had discharged his rifle at it. From that place, both Andersons 
and Keith followed the bear's blood-spotted trail till its carcass was located 
about two hundred feet from where it had been first observed by Grievant. 
Citizen Robert G. Anderson later reported that Grievant Anderson was "visibly 
upset" at finding a dead bear cub. Other hunters also commented later on 
Grievant's distraught condition. 
As the elk hunters trickled back into camp, the bear-killing episode 
became common knowledge and the focus of conversation among the members of the 
hunting party. 
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Three sequential events then occurred which are significant to this case. 
From the bearfs place of death, the carcass was moved from a sunny location to 
a shady one nearby. Weaver stated that it had been his decision to move the 
dead bear about fifteen feet in order to get the carcass out of the sun so 
that it wouldn't bloat (Mgt. Exh. 2, p. 11; T. II, pp. 198-99). Anderson 
stated that the carcass had been moved about ten feet (Mgt. Exh. 1, p. 9, T. 
II, p. 300). Hunsaker, who assisted in dragging the bear, reported the 
carcass being moved about a hundred yards over to a lone pine tree to conceal 
it (Mgt. Exh. 3). Those moving the carcass were identified as both Grievants, 
together with Hunsaker, Mike Anderson (Grievant's son) and Randy Gillette 
(Mike's brother-in-law). Grievants were both charged with having moved the 
dead bear in order to conceal it, albeit both denied any intended concealment. 
After the removal party laid the animal's carcass down, several hunters 
removed the bear's ears, or part at least of one ear, and claws by cutting 
them off with knives. Weaver suggested taking the animal's pelt and head, but 
made no such effort. Others, including Anderson, Mike Anderson and Randy 
Gillette, removed several claws. Hunsaker acknowledged cutting off an ear. 
Weaver was present and observed the so-called taking of souvenirs from the 
bear's carcass. Anderson admitted removing several of the bear's claws, and 
he too observed the other hunters remove claws and ear parts. 
After some discussion as to whether the bear-shooting episode should be 
reported to the Wildlife Resource Division's conservation officers, that 
decision was left entirely to Grievant Anderson. Anderson did not report the 
incident, nor did Weaver, nor did any of the other hunters who were also 
Division employees. 
In late October 1985 a citizen informant revealed the bear-killing episode 
to authorities. This led to an investigation by Wildlife Resource Division 
officials, which in turn, prompted Anderson's and Weaver's dismissal from the 
Division of Parks and Recreation. Additionally, the other five Division 
employees received disciplinary penalties which included reprimands and 
suspensions ranging between two and five days without pay. 
B. Off-Duty Willful, Substantial Misconduct: 
With respect to Step 5 Decision, Conclusion No. 1, the Division's appeal 
asserts that error occurred in the lower forum when the hearing officer ruled 
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that Grievants' complained-of misconduct was not grounds for dismissal because 
it took place during off-duty status, essentially while they were on 
vacation. The hearing examiner stated that he had found no statute or 
regulation which would have required Grievants to report the bear-killing 
episode; on that basis he ruled that Anderson and Weaver were not guilty of 
malfeasance in office. The correct issue for the conclusion of law is not 
whether the conduct constituted malfeasance or nonfeasance, but whether the 
off-duty misconduct was sufficiently job-related as to warrant a public 
employer's penalties in light of the facts and circumstances present in this 
case. 
The Utah Code establishes statutory standards relevant to this case 
regarding demotion and dismissal of career service employees, as follows: 
Dismissal or demotions of career service 
employees shall only be to advance the good of 
the public interest, and for such just causes as 
. . . malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office 
(Section 67-19-18(1)). 
Malfeasance has been authoritatively defined in Personnel Management Rules and 
Regulations, (1985 ed.), published by the State's Division of Personnel 
Management ("DFW"), as: "Intentional wrongdoing; deliberate violation of law 
or standard; mismanagement of responsibilities." (p. 1-3) Malfeasance may 
occur on duty and thus be performed "in office"; or, it may take the form of 
serious wrongdoing that is entirely improper conduct, conduct that is 
committed while off-duty — conduct that consists of substantial wrongdoing, 
or that consists of highly improper misbehavior, such misconduct which is 
found to be job-related by its nature. For example, on related off-duty 
misconduct, see Borsari v. Federal Aviation Administration, 699 F. 2d 106 
(1983). 
Substantial error resulted when the hearing officer ruled that because 
Grievants were off-duty, no malfeasance occurred (Conclusion No. 5). Instead, 
a specific finding of wrongful conduct should have been made. Thus, it was 
inconsistent and harmful error to have ruled that Grievants' misconduct in the 
bear incident was of a non-culpable nature, and that Grievants erred only in 
not reporting the incident upon returning to work. The evidentiary findings 
and conclusions are significantly defective in not having established 
job-related off-duty wrongdoing. 
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With respect to Conclusions No. 1 and No. 2, the Step 5 Decision further 
errs by assigning culpability to Grievants only for not having reported the 
bear kill. The hearing officer attached no blame for several additional acts 
of wrongful misconduct. 
Shooting the bear may have been an illegal act; it was done out of season 
and without a permit. (See Utah Code Annotated, Section 23-20-4.) The taking 
of souvenir parts from the bear may also have been an illegal act, according 
to a conservation officer/investigator (T. I. p. 184; Section 23-20-4 Utah 
Code Annotated). Whether or not ultimately illegal, failure to report or take 
appropriate action with respect to these matters was wrongdoing. 
Aside from the actual shooting of the bear (which should have been 
reported to conservation officers), additional wrongful actions were committed 
which very seriously disparage Grievants1 (especially Anderson's) employment 
relationship. The evidence supporting the matters below demonstrates that 
Finding of Fact No. 9 was not, in part, supported by substantial evidence: 
1. The hearing officer made a finding that it had not been Grievants1 
intent to conceal the bear from anyone's view (Finding No. 9. g.). Yet others 
in the party testified that concealment was a motive. Setting aside the 
Grievants1 somewhat self-serving explanation, the act by Anderson and Weaver 
to move the bear toward shade — as Regional Managers, peace officers and 
State employees — gave rise to the appearance of moving the bear in order to 
further conceal its carcass. Under the circumstances even the appearance 
of concealment was wrongful conduct. These senior Division administrators 
set a blemished example for the other Division employees, five of whom were 
also peace officers, as well as for the six citizens also present. 
2. The hearing officer found that Anderson had removed several of the 
bear's claws. Others who assisted in moving the bear cut off portions of ears 
and claws. Anderson and Weaver were present but did not object, and as 
just-stated, Anderson participated in what later was designated as 
souvenir-taking. The hearing officer noted that no parts of the bear were 
taken from the mountain (Finding No. 9. e, f.), but he attached no finding of 
misconduct or wrongdoing to Anderson for his improper action in the matter of 
the souvenir-taking, fet Anderson's taking of claws was direct job-related 
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willful misbehavior, due to his public employment with an agency responsible 
for the state's parks and outdoor recreation programs. Given Anderson*s and 
Weaver's positions as Regional Managers, wherein they functioned as senior 
administrators, such behavior was non-exemplary, reproachful, improper, and 
wrongful. 
The magnitude of Grievants1 unbecoming conduct was of a very serious 
level. In a comparable case, discipline imposed on a Colorado conservation 
officer was affirmed because the evidence showed that the offender's "poor 
judgment caused the incident which was well publicized and subjected the 
Division of Game, Fish and Parks to adverse publicity detrimental to the 
public interest." The state employee "had created [an] impression with 
onlookers that he violated [the] very restrictions he was responsible for 
enforcing" which constituted "conduct unbecoming a wildlife conservation 
officer." Hatfield v. Civil Service Commission, 495 P. 2d 1148, 30 Col. App. 
506. Anderson's misconduct was not only "unbecoming" to a public manager, but 
also well publicized (Anderson Exh. 1 ) . 
3. The hunting party collectively discussed whether the bear-killing incident 
should be reported to Wildlife Division officials. The matter was left to 
Anderson, who decided not to report the incident (Finding No. 9.h.). 
The evidentiary examiner found that Grievants had "put it [the bear 
incident] out of their minds until the investigation in January, 1986" 
(Finding No. 9.i.); and that "Neither Grievant took any action to influence 
other members of the hunting party not to report the incident. ..." (Finding 
No. 9.j.) That finding is disputed by both Grievants' testimony: Anderson 
related that he had trouble sleeping at nights due to thinking about the 
October 4 events (T. II, p. 291); Weaver recalled discussing the situation 
with his wife after returning from the hunting trip (T. II, pp. 113, 194-95, 
226). Thus testimony showed that neither Grievant blanked his mind of the 
incident upon returning home (T. II, p. 278). We believe this demonstrates 
that the Grievants knew the misconduct was serious but they intentionally 
continued in their improper actions. The decision of Anderson not to report 
the incident influenced the others not to report the incident. 
4. The hearing officer acknowledged that the Division director was justified 
in imposing "more severe discipline of the Grievants than that which was given 
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to the other state employees involved in the incident," because of their "high 
level positions" (Conclusion No. 6). He even concluded that Anderson deserved 
a more severe penalty than Weaver because Anderson "had primary responsibility 
for killing the bear and reporting the incident" (jLbid.). Indeed, when the 
evidence is considered in the aggregate (the actual killing of the bear, 
moving of the carcass which gave rise to at least the appearance of 
concealment as viewed by some of the hunters, Anderson's participation in 
removal of the bear's claws, dereliction by Grievants of their peace officer 
responsibilities, setting an unworthy example to lower-ranking Division 
employees and to the citizens present, non-disclosure of the entire incident 
until a law enforcement investigation was initiated and, influencing others 
not to report the incident), the misconduct is substantial, wrongful and 
sufficiently related to their official employment positions as public managers 
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and peace officers to warrant dismissal, at least in the case of Anderson. 
A failure to make accurate findings and conclusions supportable by substantial 
evidence regarding Grievants' wrongful actions, based upon the evidence in the 
record, warrants voiding the Step 5 Decision. 
C. Nonfeasance. 
The lower forum's examiner concluded that Grievants had been nonfeasant 
only in not properly reporting Anderson's shooting of the bear to authorities 
(Conclusion No. 3) , not malfeasant. He then concluded than nonfeasance for 
non-reporting did not constitute just cause for dismissal. These conclusions 
are not supported by substantial evidence. Even standing alone, proven 
nonfeasance may be sufficient to meet the statutory just cause standard to 
sustain either demotion or dismissal (Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-18(1)). 
Concededly, the facts and circumstances in a given case may not always warrant 
the penalty imposed by management, even if nonfeasance is proven by the 
evidence (Board Rules 19.8.2.). Although a tribunal may find adequate 
substantial evidence to support a given disciplinary action, other 
circumstances, however, may be relied upon to alter management's decision. 
For example, counsel referred to the Merit Systems Protection Board's ("MSPB") 
case of Gregory v. Department of Education, AT 531D8110809 (1981), in which an 
administrative law judge held: 
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The Board [MSPB] will still make a separate 
determination whether the agency imposed penalty 
is clearly excessive, disproportionate to the 
substantiated charges, or arbitrary, capricious, 
or unreasonable. 
Anderson's offenses were much greater than Weaver's offenses. While both 
Grievants' behavior was wrongful in connection with the failure to report, 
Grievant Anderson's actions were more serious because of a greater duty which 
he had. While Anderson killed the bear and participated in the mutilation, it 
is not these facts alone which cause his culpability to be greater than 
Weaver's. It is the fact that Anderson's conduct initiated the incident and 
created the responsibility to report and appropriately deal with the incident 
that caused Anderson's duty to report to be greater than others in the hunting 
party. Whether or not his actions with respect to killing the bear were 
excusable, his failure to report the incident was of greater consequence 
because of his resulting primary duty to report the incident and his influence 
with respect to such reporting upon the others. 
The Division's Brief (pp. 15-17) lists seventeen factors individually 
considered by Director Miller, pursuant to the latter1s testimony, as he 
pondered the October 4 incident and the Grievants1 official public positions 
within the agency, tet the hearing officer disdained all of this evidence and 
sought to mitigate simply on the basis of long term service records. 
Conversely the issue of long-term service should also be considered from the 
point of view that as long term employees as well as senior managers, 
Grievants should have been expected to know that their actions were improper 
and unacceptable. Length of service must be considered from both 
perspectives. Given Anderson's managerial position, peace officer status, and 
culpability, the mitigation of Anderson's dismissal was an arbitrary act on 
the hearing officer's part. Alternatively, substantial evidence clearly 
supports Anderson's greater degree of culpability. Weaver was nonfeasant for 
not reporting, but to a much lesser degree. Given Anderson's position and his 
degree of involvement in off-duty misbehavior, his dismissal alone was not 
unreasonable nor excessive, nor does it violate the so-called fairness 
doctrine because it doesn't "shock one's sense of fairness." Alfieri v. 
Murphy, 366 N.Y.S. 2d 10, 47 A.D. 2d 820 (1975). 
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D. Peace Officer Status, 
Both Grievants held peace officer status (Findings Nos. 5, 10, 16; T.I, 
pp. 197, 217; II, 154, 257, 258). The trier of facts concluded that as sworn 
peace officers neither Grievant had committed malfeasance in office because 
neither had been on duty at the time of the October 4 hunting incident. 
Rather he concluded that the Division had failed to show by evidence that even 
if a peace officer killed a protected game animal out of season without a 
permit, said peace officer was required to report the unlawful taking (i.e., 
killing) of such animal pursuant to Utah Oode Annotated, Section 23-20-4. 
The Utah Code Annotated establishes and defines peace officer status at 
Section 77-la-l through 4. Therein four types or levels of peace officers are 
recognized: (1) peace officer, (2) correctional officer, (3) reserve and 
auxiliary officers, and (4) special function officer. Under provision of 
Section 77-la-la peace officer specifically includes "employees of the 
Department of Natural Resources designated as peace officers by law." Both 
Grievants wore uniforms with badges much of the time (T. II. pp. 63-64). 
Section 63-11-17 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, governs the 
appointment of peace officers within the Division of Parks and Recreation. 
The pertinent provision states: 
The board shall have power to enact appropriate 
regulations to protect state parks property from 
misuse or damage and to preserve the peace within 
state parks by deputizing peace officers of the 
state's political subdivisions as agents'of the 
division of parks and recreation. The officers 
and administrators of the division and such other 
persons the division may deputize shall have the 
same power and shall follow the same procedure in 
making arrests and the handling of prisoners and 
in the general enforcement of this act as other 
peace officers. (Emphasis added.) 
The just-cited provision authorizes the Board of Parks and Recreation or 
the Division director to designate peace officers to enforce laws and 
regulations within State parks. Division employees with peace officer status 
may be those individuals whose primary duties consist of law enforcement 
responsibilities, or those whose primary duties are not in the law enforcement 
area but who are designated and trained as "reserve" or "auxiliary" peace 
officers, pursuant to Section 77-la-3, thus providing a backup service to law 
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enforcement personnel on an as-needed basis. Thus Grievants1 peace officer 
status most closely corresponds with that of the "reserve" or "auxiliary" 
category. As such, Grievants were authorized peace officers, according to 
Utah law. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 67-15-10.5 sets forth grounds on which peace 
officer status may be revoked. Grounds for suspension or revocation include: 
(e) Any conduct or pattern of conduct that would 
tend to disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopardize 
public trust and fidelity with regard to law 
enforcement. (Emphasis added.) 
To hold that Grievants were off-duty at the time that the wrongful conduct 
was committed and that they were trained only in park law, not wildlife law, 
and therefore they are not responsible or culpable for their actions as peace 
officers is erroneous. Section 67-15-10.5(e) does not distinguish between 
on-duty and off-duty. A peace officer is held accountable to a higher 
standard of personal conduct both on and off the job. Application of 
incredibly poor judgment as well as violation of wildlife statutory 
prohibitions fall within the ambit of peace officer off-duty conduct. 
Director Miller held Grievants responsible for committing "a serious breach of 
trust, public trust" (T. II pp. 130). They breached their public trust not 
only before five other fellow peace officers, but also in front of six private 
citizens. 
Utah's Supreme Court has previously held peace officers responsible for 
off-duty misconduct that adversely affects the employer's rightful interests. 
In Clearfield City v. Oept. of Employment Security, 663 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983), 
the court declared that misconduct occurring outside the hours of employment 
need only be connected (i.e., related) to the employer's rightful interest in 
order to be subject to sanction: 
It is only necessary that misconduct have such 
'connection' to the employee's duties and to the 
employer's business that it is a subject of 
legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer. 
Reversible error resulted in not holding Grievants sufficiently responsible 
for their off-duty misconduct as peace officers in concert with their roles as 
senior public managers. 
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It was unreasonable to have found Grievants not malfeasant as off-duty 
peace officers who had no duty to report the unlawful taking of the bear while 
concomitantly finding them nonfeasant for having failed to report the incident 
as supervisors. (Cf. Conclusions Nos. 1,3) Malfeasance and nonfeasance are 
merely labels for wrongdoing, improper conduct and misbehavior. Importantly, 
though, it was error to find that as "peace officers" Grievants had no duty to 
report the incident but as "supervisors" they were obligated to report. 
Grievants1 peace officer status has been disregarded while their 
managerial/administrative status has been downgraded to that of supervisors. 
Finding No* 16 states that Anderson considered only two percent of his and 
Weaver's duties to consist of law enforcement responsibilities. (Per 
Anderson's remark, T. II p. 257.) The issue is not whether the Grievants 
served two percent, twenty percent or ninety percent in peace officer status. 
The salient fact is that they are and were required to be certified peace 
officers in order to be Regional Managers. Both Grievants acknowledged such. 
The question is whether the complained-of off-duty misconduct is sufficiently 
serious or material and whether it is related to their peace officer status. 
A nexus exists between Grievants' off-duty misconduct as peace officers and 
public managers and the Utah standard of "advancing the good of the public 
interest" (Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-18-(D). Even the hearing officer 
found their non-reporting to be nonfeasance as supervisors. This tribunal, 
however, believes that the magnitude of nonfeasance is significantly greater 
than that determined at Step 5 because of their peace officer status, the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing, and the connection of the wrongdoing with the 
employees' duties and the employer's business. While we do not find that any 
disciplinary action will be upheld merely because an employee is designated as 
a "peace officer", we hold that Anderson, and to a lesser extent Weaver and 
the other peace officers, had a duty to report a violation of the wildlife law 
for the reasons stated above. 
Anderson and Weaver acted improperly not only as peace officers, but also 
as hunters. If Anderson killed the bear because he believed his life was in 
danger, that would surely mitigate any charge of pre-meditated, deliberate, or 
wanton slaying. But even the status of his State position aside, Anderson had 
a responsibility to report his taking of a black bear out of season to 
conservation officers. It was his responsibility to come forward to explain 
that he had not intended to kill the bear pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
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Section 23-20-3 and to report the incident, as would be expected of any hunter. 
III. 
SUMMARY OF FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Anderson's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to provide just cause 
for termination. After shooting the bear, he deliberately failed to report 
the incident, even though several of the hunters suggested that he should 
report the incident to authorities (T. I p. 164, 170, 171; II, pp. 192, 193, 
194; Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement, pp. 2-3). His participation in moving the bear 
gave rise to the appearance of attempting to conceal the carcass; he removed 
several bear claws, which gave rise to the allegations of souvenir-taking and 
mutilation; he set a tarnished example for his fellow hunters who were also 
peace officers, and to the citizens in the hunting party for improper conduct 
by a State employee; he failed to disclose the matter upon returning to duty 
which violated the spirit and intent of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. 
Even more deplorable was the fact that although neither Anderson nor Weaver 
disclosed the bear-killing incident, the hunting party ultimately left that 
decision solely to Anderson while the hunters reached an agreement to remain 
silent. Finding No. 9.j., states that "Neither Grievant took any action to 
influence other members of the hunting party not to report the incident; there 
was no conspiring to 'cover-up1 the killng of the bear. Management Exhibits 
1,2, and 3. Testimony of Anderson, Weaver, Blaine Luke, and Rodney 
Hunsaker." Substantial evidence in the record, however, adequately shows that 
such a factual finding is not correct. There was a clearly stated and 
mutually accepted understanding among the members of the hunting party to keep 
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silent anent the bear incident. Indeed Anderson did keep silent until the 
investigation in January 1986 brought the episode to light. Anderson's 
wrongful actions coupled with his nonfeasance in not reporting as a peace 
officer and manager are contrary to the statutory criterion of advancing the 
good of the public interest. (See Utah Code Annotated, Section 67-19-18(1).) 
The evidence in the record supports the following Conclusions and Factual 
Findings: 
1. It is illegal to take parts of protected wildlife, such as bear parts 
(Section 23-30-4). Anderson acknowledged removing some of the bear's 
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claws. Weaver did not remove bear parts. Both were present as other 
hunters removed claws and ear parts. 
The Regional Managers were "on-duty" in a substantial sense as peace 
officers when they were on the hunt, since they retained formal peace 
officer responsibilities even when "off-duty." The legal significance of 
those responsibilities is only in part measurable by the proportion of 
time they occupied in their Regional Managers1 total workload. 
Neither Anderson nor Weaver disclosed or reported the bear-killing 
incident on his own initiative. Rather the hunting party left it up to 
Anderson to report the matter. He chose not to disclose the incident to 
authorities. 
Grievants1 failure to report was job-related, in a dual way: A) It 
contradicted the duty of the Regional Managers to fulfill certain 
responsibilities which applied even when those managers were formally 
"off-duty"; and B), it contradicted the duty of the Regional Managers to 
fulfill certain responsibilities they had when they returned to formal 
"on-duty" status. 
A conscious decision was made, both on the mountain and subsequently in 
practice, not to report the bear shooting. The decision initially was 
Anderson's, but Weaver sustained him in that choice. 
The supposition that the Regional Managers1 failure to report after they 
had returned to formal "on-duty" status was merely inadvertent, is not a 
credible premise. The hunting party viewed the matter seriously. The 
potential implications of the incident had great significance, confirmed 
by later outcomes. The number of people who were in the hunting party, 
and who therefore knew about the shooting, was sizeable. The people most 
centrally involved were well aware of the affirmative legal duty to 
report. In such a context, "forgetting" would be extremely difficult to 
do, and is certainly inexcusable as a defense. 
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The members of the hunting party clearly were influenced by the Regional 
Managers to avoid disclosing the shooting, even if no direct pressure was 
applied and even if no formal agreement was concluded within the hunting 
group. The hunters knew Anderson's wishes. Influence was inherent in the 
circumstances, from a triple perspective. First, the informal code 
practiced among hunting companions is one of relations based upon 
friendship. Second, given the employment connection for those members of 
the hunting group who worked for the Division of Parks and Recreation, 
they could understandably have been concerned about their future careers. 
And third, people at a high level, such as the subject regional 
administrators, can reasonably be expected to maintain a sufficient 
measure of awareness of legal requirements applicable to themselves, and 
be extra sensitive to the trusteeship aspects of their public service, and 
to the public relations needs of their employing governmental agency. 
The Regional Managers' failure to report was damaging to the agency, in 
several respects: (A) That failure undermined the responsibility of 
these administrators to set a good example to all other employees of the 
agency. The symbolic significance of administrative misbehavior is very 
great, because it affects the tone of expectations about levels of 
behavior by others in the agency, and affects the degree of commitment and 
dedication that employees offer to the Division. (B) That failure sent 
important signals to the general public about the degree to which public 
administrators themselves abide by the law and are held accountable under 
the law. Behaviors of the sort involved here can subtly but 
far-reachingly undermine levels of public trust and confidence in the 
agency, and the degree of willingness of the citizenry to cooperate with 
public agency programs and to abide by the law themselves. 
The opportunity of the Division to discipline its employees in this case 
was not foreclosed by the time required for another agency (i.e., Wildlife 
Resource Division) to proceed carefully to investigate. The time lags 
(understandable and defensible in the context) should not be interpreted 
to mean that the matter was not considered important to the Division, 
contrary to Conclusion No. 5. (Cf. T. II, 109-110.) 
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10. When Mr. Miller testified about his own loss of trust and confidence in 
his two Regional Managers, that testimony was not hearsay as stated in 
Finding No. 14. 
11. In Conclusion of Law No. 5 the hearing officer stated the following seven 
premises. 
Management's failure to take prompt action upon 
receipt of information concerning the bear 
incident leads to the conclusion that the trust 
and confidence of supervision was not eroded to 
the point that eventual termination was 
justified. Indeed, the Grievants were allowed to 
continue their normal duties for six weeks 
following detailed disclosure of the incident to 
Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller had preliminary 
information available to him for four and 
one-half months before he took action to 
terminate the Grievants. He did nothing to 
expedite the investigation and did not suspend 
the Grievants during any portion of the 
investigation. The lack of expeditious handling 
of the investigation by the Wildlife Division 
also serves to indicate that the matter was not 
considered to be a very important matter to that 
Division, either. Finally, Mr. Miller's 
statements to the Grievants upon their discussing 
the matter with him further indicates that the 
issues involved were not regarded to be serious 
enough to merit the ultimate penalty of 
discharge. During the period of the 
investigation, including the time following the 
point when all details were made known, there is 
no direct evidence in the record to indicate that 
the Grievants were not able to perform their jobs 
adequately or that the morale of the other 
employees in the Division was adversely affected. 
The Board finds that the just-quoted conclusion contains several errors of 
fact together with some inaccurate inferences, specifically: 
A. The Division director did take prompt action upon receipt of the DWR 
investigative report issued on February 14. Following detailed disclosure 
of the incident through the DWR report, only three weeks elapsed between 
issuance of the report and the imposition of penalties, not six weeks. 
Thus, within three weeks punitive action was imposed by Miller. And 
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during that three week period, Miller was further actively engaged in 
review and consultation. 
B. It would have been inappropriate to have punished Grievants solely on 
the basis of "preliminary information available." The Grievants1 off-duty 
misconduct had to be verified by an extensive investigation. That 
investigation was entirely in the hands of the DWR law enforcement 
investigators until Miller received a report in mid-February. 
C. As Miller had no control over the investigation being performed by 
another independent agency, he can not be faulted for what the hearing 
officer considers to be a somewhat slow-paced investigation. Suspension 
is a disciplinary action. It would have been presumptuous for Miller to 
have suspended any of the seven employees until the facts were at hand. 
Miller's Division should not be faulted for not expediting a 
geographically-widespread investigation (scattered over several counties) 
involving thirteen hunters which was not his responsibility. 
D. No evidence was elicited to show that DWR did not consider the 
investigation to be a "very important matter." 
E. Miller's alleged statements to the Grievants, if they were made, came 
in January well before all of the factual information was placed in his 
hands through the DWR report. At that time Miller had as yet taken no 
action, nor bound himself to any future specific course of action. In 
fact, Miller stated that he didn't really want to speak with the Grievants 
about the incident until the factual investigation was completed. 
Considered in the aggregate, Conclusion No. 5, contains several erroneous 
conclusions and draws some incorrect inferences. 
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IV. 
ANALYSIS OF PENALTIES 
The following set of facts greatly influenced the Board's prescribing 
appropriate penalties to Anderson and Weaver, based upon a careful 
consideration of the just cause standard: 
It was Anderson who shot at the bear and killed it (Findings of Fact, 
9.d.). Thus it was his action, appropriate or not, which initiated the 
incident. The shooting triggered the unfortunate series of events which 
concluded with a failure to report. Again, the threshold action which led to 
such consequences was Anderson's, not Weaver's; thus the former had a greater 
duty to report. 
The hearing officer found that the hunting party discussed the problem of 
what to do given the fact that the bear had been killed. He determined that 
"the issue was left to Anderson . . . ." Thus Anderson carries extra 
responsibility for the failure of hunting party members to report the 
incident. Since it was Anderson who could have been in some legal difficulty 
when the incident was reported, and whose career could suffer, his decision 
not to report naturally put his hunting colleagues in a difficult position 
regarding their relationship to him in the circumstances. In effect, his 
decision created for them an ethical dilemma. In order for them to fulfill 
their own respective duties to report the bear shooting, they would have to go 
against Anderson's wishes, while also carrying the burden of placing Anderson 
at substantial risk as a result of their reporting. 
Anderson's failure to report was evidently not the result of 
misinterpretation of legal requirements, nor a well-intentioned attempt to 
fulfill some worthy agency objective in the face of a possible legal 
obstacle. This is not to imply that having such motives would be regarded as 
excusing the neglect of a positive legal reporting duty. But they at least 
are not based on individual self-interest to the same degree as Anderson's 
motives apparently were here. 
The hearing officer found that "Anderson removed claws from the bear but 
did not take them from the mountain." No comparable finding was made about 
Weaver. 
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In conclusion, and certainly not to excuse Weaver's misconduct, the 
magnitude of Anderson's culpability is vastly greater than the degree accorded 
to Weaver. It is reasonable as well as justifiable that their respective 
penalties individually manifest that difference based upon their degree of 
culpability. Anderson's dismissal satisfies the just cause standards set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P. 
2d 1129 (Utah 1985), which requires that culpability, knowledge and control 
must be present. Anderson's dismissal by the agency is reinstated pursuant to 
his notice of dismissal under date of March 20, 1986 by the Department's 
executive director, Dee C. Hansen (Mgt. Exh. 7 ) . 
The Board orders that Weaver be assessed a penalty of six calendar weeks 
without pay effective March 21, 1986, following which he shall be reinstated 
to a Regional Manager II position (whether the Central Region, or another) 
with all backpay and benefits which he would have earned had he been employed 
subsequent to the suspension, including the one-time State employees' bonus of 
one percent, albeit minus any earned income from other employment or from 
unemployment payments by the Employment Security Department. 
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V. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Step 5 decision is hereby vacated. Robert 0. Anderson's dismissal is 
reinstated pursuant to the above-stated date. The agency is ordered to 
reinstate D. Dennis Weaver subject to the foregoing conditions. 
D A T E D this \ ^ day of Feburary, 1987. 
WE CONCUR: 
Bruce T. Jones 
Mary Graham-Payne 
Dalmas H. Nelson 
Jose L. T r u j i l l o 
An i ta B. Bradford, d issents . 
BRUCE T. jai^ES^Chairman 
Utah PersonnelKeview Board 
\ZAJi--yf. 
ROBERT N. WHITE, SPHR 
Admini. * ra tor 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
APPEAL 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days 
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County. 
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. Section 
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended. 
OQ. 
BRADFORD, Board Member: (Dissenting) 
I dissent from the majority opinion which vacates the hearing officer's 
penalty of suspension and reinstates the Division's termination of Anderson. 
There is no doubt that Anderson exhibited "bad judgment" by not reporting his 
shooting of the bear, even though the bear killing per se appears to have been 
unintentional. Therefore, failure to properly report the shooting incident 
constitutes nonfeasance but only of a degree short of — but not warranting — 
dismissal. 
I agree with the hearing officer in that even if nonfeasance is proven, 
that fact or condition does not unalterably lead to a conclusion which 
necessarily demands termination in the instant case. Consideration has to be 
given to the various degrees or shadings of nonfeasance in each case. The 
statutory provision at Utah Code Annotated Section 67-19-18(1) supports this 
position. The Code provides for recognition of at least two penalties, 
demotion or dismissal, even if nonfeasance is established. Proven nonfeasance 
does not automatically warrant dismissal. Such job-related factors as length 
of service, performance record, absence of prior disciplinary incidents, 
severity of the infraction, disparity of treatment between similarly situated 
employees, etc. may justify either greater or lesser penalties. 
Furthermore, I am unconvinced by the Division's argument that Director 
Jerry Miller's decision does not "shock one's sense of fairness." (Brief, p. 
17). To the contrary, indeed, my conscience is "shocked" by the excessive 
penalty of dismissal given the facts, circumstances and conclusions in this 
case as set forth by the hearing officer. The hearing officer's decision 
regarding Anderson's and Weaver's suspensions and reinstatements was 
appropriate, although I would favor longer suspensions for both Grievants 
(even up to six months' duration); or, in the alternative, demotion also would 
have been appropriate. 
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F O O T N O T E S 
The Step 5 (evidentiary level) hearing was not transcribed until 
after the Division's appeal of the Hearing Officer's determination 
was taken to Step 6. Thus, the trier of facts did not have it 
available for his decision-making purposes. 
The Hearing Officer re-worded this issue/question as follows: "Was 
dismissal an appropriate disciplinary action in their cases? If not, 
what remedy or remedies are appropriate?11 
The hearing officer accepted Grievants' testimony as to motivation 
unreservedly in the matter of moving the bear without an intent at 
concealment. (Example: Anderson stated that moving the bear did not 
take it out of view. T. II, p. 292) The evidence, however, does not 
so clearly support Grievants1 claim but allows for a contrary 
inference to be drawn. Kean Luke testified that the bear was "moved 
about fifteen yards into the cover." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview, p. 4); 
Robert G. Anderson (citizen) stated that Grievant Anderson and three 
others "walked over to the bear and dragged it into the trees." 
(Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview, p. 4); Ray Keith knew that the bear had been 
"moved 10 feet to the trees." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview p. 6) Others 
alluded more directly to a concealment: Wayne Johnson, a citizen, 
understood moving of the bear to be a cover-up. (Mgt. Exh. 3, 
Interview p. 6); Hunsaker, who assisted in moving the carcass, 
stated at the hearing: "TVe probably drug it 60 yards, over to a 
pinetree." (T.I, p. 165.) Why? "To drag it away from the road." 
(T. I, p. 165) Previously during the investigative interview 
Hunsaker reported that the bear was "pulled about 100 yards over to a 
lone pine tree to conceal the animal." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement p. 
3). Lucchesi stated: "Some one said they ought to move the bear out 
of sight. And several went down by the bear and moved it into or 
behind small brush or trees." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement p. 2) 
Anderson, Weaver, and Ray Keith described the carcass being moved 
only 10-15 feet; whereas Kean Luke, Hunsaker, and Lucchesi reported a 
much greater distance. Several witnesses specifically referred to 
concealing or covering-up the carcass. Admittedly, the bear's 
remains were not buried, nor thrown in a ditch or culvert and then 
covered, nor even covered over with a cairn. Yet some of the hunters 
distinctly expressed the view that the carcass was being more 
carefully concealed. The evidence suggests that the Grievants' did 
intend concealment. When all of the evidence is considered, not 
merely Grievants' statements, then it is clear that Finding of Fact 
No. 9.g. is incorrect to some degree. 
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FOOTNOTES CONTINUED: 
4. Anderson and Weaver were each responsible for administering a 
sizeable work force. Weaver's managerial span of control included 44 
permanent staff and 49 part-time positions. (T. I, p. 210) He 
directly supervised ten staff. (Jt. Exh. 1) Anderson had managerial 
responsibility for 51 permanent staff and 52 part-time positions. 
(T.I, p. 210) He, too, supervised directly about 10-12 people. In 
addition to serving as members of the Division's "management team," 
Grievants assisted in both policy development and the overall 
direction of the agency. (T. I, p. 211) 
5. Anderson's current position and status, and to a lesser extent 
Weaver's, were obviously a factor considered by several of the other 
hunters who were also Division employees. Lucchesi stated that he 
didn't disclose the incident because he believed that he had better 
not say anything against a high up official with the Division. (Mgt. 
Exh. 3, Interview p. 13) Hunsaker stated that both Anderson and 
Weaver had "quite a high position with the division and you know, I 
mean sure, it counts." (T. I, pp. 69-70). He realized that Anderson 
could become his supervisor again. (Ibid.) 
According to Blaine Luke, " I had thoughts of what and who Bob 
was within the division . . . ." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement, p. 2) Said 
Luke: "If I told on Bob, I would be on his 'bad list"1 (T. I. p. 
139) Luke stated that he respected Anderson and Weaver because of 
their positions. (T. I, pp. 136, 146, 153). Luke considered that 
Anderson would probably be in the running for the new directorship of 
operations and park development (ibid., 139), and thus might yet 
become his future superior. 
All of the foregoing statements demonstrate rather conclusively 
how Grievants' positions as public managers influenced the 
lower-ranking Division employees on the hunt not to "make waves" 
against their superiors regarding the bear incident. 
6. See Attorney General Opinion Request No. 85-17 — Status of Natural 
Resources Peace Officers. 
7. Even Hunsaker, who was not a peace officer, reflected on Anderson's 
and Weaver's sworn officer status: "There were five law officers 
willing to look the other way and I went along with the group." 
(Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview p. 5) Blaine Luke, on the other hand, didn't 
consider his law enforcement role: "My peace officer status didn't 
31 
enter into my thoughts." (T.I, p. 170) For such neglect, he was 
later disciplined. Grievants, however, by the nature of their 
managerial positions can reasonably be held to greater accountability 
for their peace officer status and responsibilities than the other 
five Division employees. 
8. The term "nexus" is not listed in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. The 
New College Edition of The American Heritage Dictionary (1980) 
defines nexus as "... a means of connection between things." Peter 
B. Broida, author of A Guide to Merit Systems Protection Board Law & 
Practice 1979 - 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Dewey Publications, Inc., 
1985), devotes one-half of chapter 7 ("Nexus and Mitigation") to the 
legal concept of nexus as applied to employment cases at bar. 
Some practioners hold that nexus as a principle is applicable 
only in off-duty misconduct cases; others hold that it must be 
considered as an essential element in all disciplinary 
determinations. To quote Broida: "Although there are cases that 
made it appear that nexus determinations are only essential in 
off-duty misconduct cases, the nexus formulation in fact applies to 
all misconduct: there must be a connection between any misconduct, 
and disciplinary action, and service efficiency." p. 282. 
Anderson's counsel stated in his Memorandum of Law, p. 3, that 
the federal civil service standard commonly known as the "efficiency 
of the service" criterion is equivalent to Utah's standard "to 
advance the good of the public interest". (Utah Code Ann. Section 
67-19-18(1) and DPM Rule ll.a.). In general, we agree. 
In the federal or MSPB process, a governmental agency must make 
two separate determinations before removing an employee on grounds of 
off-duty misconduct. First, it must be shown that the alleged 
offender actually committed the conduct complained of; and second, 
that removal based upon the stated misconduct will promote the 
efficiency of the the service. Sherman v. Alexander, 684 F. 2d 464. 
The requirement that removal or termination based upon the specified 
off-duty misconduct will promote the efficiency of the service is 
known as the "nexus requirement." Wild v. United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, 692 F. 2d 1129. Also see Abrams v. 
United States Dept. of the Navy, 714 F. 2d. 1219 (1983) in which the 
question is raised as to whether a public employee may sufficiently 
rebut a presumption of a nexus between egregious off-duty misconduct 
and the efficiency of the service by showing that his off-duty 
misconduct will not impede the agency's achievement of its goals 
directly or indirectly through its other employees while preserving 
the agency's exercise of discretion in making personnel management 
decisions. (Ibid., p. 1220.) Federal courts have further limited 
the nexus concept by requiring that the nature of the complained of 
off-duty misconduct must be limited to actions which at least 
rationally could be considered likely to discredit the employee(s) or 
the governmental agency. Major v. Hampton, 413 F. Supp. 66. 
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9. Contrary to the hearing officer's finding that there was "no 
conspiracy to 'cover-up1 the killing of the bear," the record is 
replete with such statements: Robert G. Anderson: A discussion 
resulted in everyone saying to keep quiet on the incident (Mgt. Exh. 
3, Report pp. 4, 14). Ray Keith stated that there was "an agreement 
by the group to keep the killing of the bear quiet." (Mgt. Exh. 3, 
Report, p. 6). Blaine Luke: There was considerable discussion among 
the hunters as to what should be done with the bear, and a decision 
was made to do nothing (Mgt. Exh. 3, Report p. 12). Rod Hunsaker: 
At first it was decided [in "a discussion involving everyone"] to 
contact a conservation officer. Then it was decided to just keep 
quiet about the incident (ibid, p. 15). Blaine Luke: A decision was 
made to do nothing (ibid, p. 12). [Admittedly this witness lost his 
recall at the hearing, T.I. pp. 134-35, 148]. 
More importantly, Hunsaker testified as follows: 
A: . . . . [W]e had all taken the stand of that [sic] if Bob 
[Anderson] doesn't want to turn it in, then you know, because he was 
scared if he didn't want to turn it in, then fine. We won't turn it 
in. We can't make him turn it in . . . I mean that was not a 
conspiracy, it was just a passing deal, you know, hey guys, let's 
lock our lips, a little bit. I can't remember who said it, because I 
can't remember enough to incriminate somebody you know. 
Q: So there were agreements made not to tell anyone anything? 
A: Yeah, but just between the entire group, I guess. (T. I, pp. 
167-68) 
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M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing PERSONNEL REVIEW 
BOARD'S STEP 6 DECISION has been sent to the following: D. Dennis Weaver, 
Grievant, at P. 0. Box 97, Midway, Utah 84049; to his attorney, John T. 
Caine, of Richards, Caine & Allen, 2568 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401; 
and Robert 0. Anderson, Grievant, 807 East William Way, Murray, Utah 84107; 
to his legal counsel L. Zane Gill at Gill & Wade, Valley Tower Building, Suite 
900, 50 West 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and UPEA Employee 
Relations Representative Casey Romijn; and from the Department of Natural 
Resources: Dee C. Hansen, Executive Director; Jerry Miller, Director, 
Division of Parks and Recreation; Margo Silvester, Personnel Manager; J. 
Stephen Mikita, Assistant Attorney General; Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Tax 
& Business Regulation Division, Office of the Attorney General; and to Laura 
Robinson, Court Reporter for Alpha Court Reporters. 
D A T E D this jtj ^ a y of February, 1987. 
Penny G. Wright 
Secretary 
Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days 
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County. 
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. Section 
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended. 
ADDENDUM L 
Career Service Review Board decision Paul Urry v. Central Services 
Division, 2 PRB 17, issued February 7, 1986. 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Appeal of: 
PAUL URRY, 
Appellant, 
v. 
CENTRAL SERVICES DIVISION, 
Respondent. 
D E C I S I O N 
A N D O R D E R 
The above-entitled matter came before the Personnel Review Board as an 
appeal hearing, pursuant to notice, on January 9, 1986, at 9:25 A.M. in Room 
5100 of the State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah. Board 
members present were: Peter Fillmore, Chairman; Anita C. Bradford; Dalmas H. 
Nelson; and Mary Graham-Payne. Absent and excused was Jose L. Trujillo. 
Paul Urry ("the Appellant") was present and represented by Gregory J. 
Sanders, Attorney at Law. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman, 
Chief, Tax and Business Regulation Division, and Special Agent, Sharon K. 
Esplin, both of the Utah Attorney General's Office, represented the Central 
Services Division. Also present: Eugene H. Findlay, Executive Director of 
the Department of Administrative Services and Robert Draper, Deputy Director 
of the Central Services Division; ana Mrs. Paul Urry, Appellant's spouse. 
A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before the 
Board, which, to date, has not been transcribed. However, the court 
reporter's record from the evidentiary level hearing at Step 5 had been 
previously transcribed into two volumes. That transcript was made available 
to the parties' counsel and used as a basis for their briefs. 
The Board, having previously received copies of both parties' briefs 
together with Hearing Officer H. Wright Volker's Step 5 Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision ("Decision"), and having reviewed and 
considered these documents, then heard oral arguments on the matter. 
Following oral argument the Board took the matter under advisement and after 
deliberating in an executive session decided to individually review the 
transcript and exhibits in greater detail. The executive session continued on 
January 22, 1986. Being duly apprised in the facts and premises of the case, 
the Board now makes and issues the following conclusions and decision. 
BACKGROUND: 
The present appeal has its origin in Appellants dismissal from the Motor 
Pool, a component of the Division of Central Services, which is an 
organizational unit of the Department of Administrative Services 
("Department"), State of Utah. Mr. Urry was formally notified by an "Intent 
to Terminate" letter dated June 19, 1985, from Eugene H. Findlay, Executive 
Director of the above-mentioned Department, that dismissal was to be effective 
June 27, 1985 unless appealed. An appeal to Mr. Findlay was timely submitted 
with a subsequent administrative review occurring on June 27. Grievant's 
opportunity to respond to allegations resulted in an affirmance of the earlier 
termination decision albeit the effective dismissal date was changed to June 
27, 1985. 
Thereafter an appeal was perfected to the Personnel Review Board for a 
Step 5 hearing pursuant both the State Employees1 Grievance and Appeals 
Procedure (i.e., the Board's promulgated rules) and to Sections 67-19-20 
through 25 of the Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. The evidentiary Step 5 
hearing took place on September 10 and 11, 1985. Hearing Officer Volker's 
Decision was issued on October 9, 1985 followed by a Notice of Amendment dated 
October 15, 1985. The Hearing Officer sustained management's dismissal of 
Appellant from the Department's Motor Pool. From that Step 5 Decision 
Appellant advanced the matter to this Board which has proper appellate 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the above-cited provisions of the State 
Personnel Management Act. 
ISSUES: 
The two issues presented to the Hearing Officer for his adjudication were: 
1. Was the Grievant, Paul Urry, dismissed for just cause? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
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The Step 5 determination by Hearing Officer Volker concluded that: 'The 
State has proved by substantial evidence that Grievant was terminated from his 
employment with the State of Utah for just cause and the action of the State 
is sustained." (Decision p. 18.) 
Appellant's brief presents two issues for the Boara's consideration. 
First, he claims that error occurred where the Hearing Officer concluded that 
the sending of Motor Pool repair work to Walter Jones May (or "Jonesy") 
constituted the obtaining of a special privilege which violated Section 
67-16-4(3) of the State code. Second, Appellant further asserts that the 
Hearing Officer erred in concluding that dismissal be sustained given the 
circumstances of the case; hence Mr. Urry avers that the penalty of 
termination was too severe and therefore not appropriate under the facts of 
this case. 
Appellant bears the burdens of proof and persuasion that reversible error 
occurred in the evidentiary determination. The standard of review applicable 
to the Board's jurisdiction consists of determining whether the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Step 5 
decision is warranted by the facts. State Employees' Grievance and Appeals 
Procedure, 1983 ed., ("Board Rules", See Section 19.8). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Appellant's dismissal from his nine years with the State's Motor Pool was 
initiated with a Letter of Intent to Terminate, dated June 19, issued by 
Executive Director Eugene H. Findlay. That document stated the charges and 
reasons for Mr. Urry's dismissal in the following paragraph: 
That which is the basis for the action taken 
against you consists of incidents that have 
occurred over the past eighteen months but which 
have only come to light recently. They include 
the preparation and/or use of phony bids for 
repair of state vehicles which resulted in the 
giving of most, if not all repair business, to 
one firm at a time and where you received meals 
and other gratuities from them. Your involvement 
was direct with knowledge that such was going 
on. In my opinion, this is a violation of the 
State's Procurement Code and of the 
anti-competitive provisions of the Anti-Trust 
Act. You further received a paint job for a 
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vehicle owned by you from this same business for 
less than full value and engaged in trading a VCR 
recorder with this business or its employee for a 
value greater than its actual worth. You also 
were treated to frequent meals by an employee of 
this business during the time the gratuities and 
phony bids were being prepared and state money 
was being used to pay for repairs to state 
vehicles under the control of the Motor Pool. 
(Jt. Exh. #1) 
After making his Findings of Fact, the Hearing Officer concluded that some 
of the above-stated charges had been proven while others had not been 
adequately substantiated. Specifically, the Step 5 Decision determined that 
Appellant had, indeed, violated a long-standing Motor Pool policy by knowingly 
obtaining false bids from Jonesy together with legitimate bids submitted by 
the latter on repair offers made at Freed Chrysler-Plymouth and Streator 
Chevrolet; that in obtaining these second or false bids Appellant committed 
malfeasance and/or misfeasance; that Appellant violated Section 67-16-4(3) of 
the Public Officers1 and Employees' Ethics Act ("Ethics Act") when he failed 
to obtain valid competitive second bids on each repair job. (Decision, 
Conclusions 9, 11, 13, 18.) The accusations that Appellant had violated 
provisions of the Utah Procurement Code, the State's Antitrust Act, and 
Section 67-16-5(2) of the just-cited Ethics Act were dismissed by the Hearing 
Officer as being either erroneous or unsubstantiated. 
Both before and during the period of time that Appellant obtained bogus 
bids from Jonesy the Motor Pool had a policy that required at least two 
competitive bids on auto body repair work. The basis of that two bid 
requirement was set forth in a written directive to the then Motor Pool 
manager, Keith Floyd, from the Purchasing Division director under date of 
March 9, 1983. (Mgt. Exh. #8). That document states in pertinent part: 
As we discussed in my office the other day, this 
letter will authorize you to make purchases for 
repair parts only from $500.00 to $2,000.00 by 
obtaining telephone quotations. No less than two 
(2) businesses shall be solicited for these 
quotations. (Emphasis in original.) 
When a change in Purchasing Division directors occurred during 1983, the 
successor reiterated the just-cited two bid procedure in a memo dated December 
1, 1983, which states in part: 
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Our records indicate that Doug Christiansen (see 
attached letter aated March 9, 1983) delegated 
purchase approval to the Motor Pool. Assuming 
the circumstances which led to that delegation 
still exist, I affirm that relationship. 
Specifically the Motor Pool is authorized to: 
* * # 
(3) Procure repair parts only between $500 and 
$2,000 by obtaining at least two bids (may be 
telephone bids) and attaching documentation to 
the warrant request. 
* * * 
The just-described two bid policy was in effect until the State changed 
the bidding procedure on auto body repair work by contracting with Bloom and 
Associates, Inc., an insurance adjusting firm^ in March, 1985. The Hearing 
Officer made a finding that the Motor Pool "had an unwritten or verbal rule, 
or policy, requiring two competitive bids for repair of damaged automobiles." 
(Decision, Conclusion No. 15.) That finding is accurate with regard to Mr. 
Floyd not disseminating any written rule on bidding procedures to either Urry, 
Allen Orwin (Appellant's subordinate) or others. Yet it would be a 
misstatement to conclude that no written policy or directive existed between 
the Purchasing Division and the Motor Pool manager, inasmuch as two directives 
were issued to Mr. Floyd in 1983, both specifically pertaining to repair work 
requiring two bids. 
Thus during the period of time when the Motor Pool was required to obtain 
two or more competitive auto repair bids, a written policy was applicable.* 
Was Mr. Urry aware of that two bid policy while performing his duties under 
Mr. Floyd, the Motor Pool manager? Although he did not post the competitive 
two bid policy, Mr. Floyd testified that he required a second bid (T.I, 34, 
72), that he preferred written bids to verbal ones (T.I, 73), that he told 
Appellant to get two bids and that Urry always obtained two bids (T.I, 38). 
Allen Orwin testified that both Floyd and Urry told him to always obtain two 
bids ("Yes, we always got two bids." T. I, 91). Orwin understood that even 
though the two bid policy was unwritten, that it was both required and to be 
complied with. (Ibid.) 
^Problems relating to implementing the two bid policy will be reviewed 
under the "Discussion" heading hereinafter. 
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Importantly, Mr. Urry testified on cross-examination that he knew that he 
was to obtain two bids on auto repair work and that he had been told by his 
supervisor (Floyd) at different times to obtain two bids: 
Q Isn't it true that Keith Floyd told you on 
occasions that you needed to get two bids? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there any question in your mind for accident 
repair work that you needed to get two bids? 
A No, what I was told [was] that we needed two bids. 
Q And that had always been what you had been told? 
A Right. 
Q That had never been changea? 
A No. 
(T. II, 70) 
Indeed, Appellant's presentation at Step 5 was an acknowledgment that he 
knew about the two bid policy and he admitted to the phony bid ploy. (T.I, 
10; II, 102, 103). 
The testimony of Orwin, Floyd and Urry showed that Motor Pool employees 
who were responsible for gathering auto body repair bids had a sufficient 
knowledge of the policy either in its original written format (Floyd) or as a 
worksite practice or a verbalized rule (Urry and Orwin). 
Importantly, the record clearly demonstrates that Appellant intentionally 
violated and/or disregarded complying with the competitive aspect of the two 
bid policy by manipulating the bidding system when he sent the State auto 
repair jobs to his friend Jonesy. In concert, Jonesy and Appellant 
collaborated in the submission of forged bids together with valid bids on at 
least 42 Motor Pool repair orders over more than a year. 
James Jed Anderson, formerly a service writer and now a service manager at 
Freeds, testified that he saw Jonesy fill out bids on Freeds' estimate forms. 
Jonesy then asked Anderson to write down the same repair work although on 
another shop's form in front of Mr. Urry. Anderson said that he wrote 
spurious bids between three and fifteen times. (T.I, 120, 119) 
Stan Roberts, an estimator and manager at Rick Warner Body Shop, stated 
that he had never met Mr. Urry and had not provided body shop repair estimates 
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to the Motor Pool during the 1984-1985 period of time- Roberts stated that 
the Rick Warner estimates attached to State warrant requests (Mgt. Exh. #13) 
were written on obsolete forms and that the handwriting was neither his nor 
his colleague's (i.e., Clark Muir). (T. I., 146). He did not authorize 
anyone else to bid on his forms (T. I., 150). Thus the bids in Mgr. Exh. #13 
were forged, according to Roberts. 
Gene McNaughton was a manager at Woodco Enterprises during the 1984-85 
period under question. McNaughton identified several Woodco bids that he and 
his colleague "Woody" had filled out. (T. I., 132-34). However, McNaughton 
also identified Woodco bid forms that neither he nor Woody had completed. 
These latter bids had been processed by the Motor Pool as bona fide bids (Mgt. 
Exh. # 11, 12); although they were not, according to McNaughton. 
Keith Roberts, an assistant body shop manager at Streator Chevrolet from 
fall of 1984 into January, 1985, acknowledged providing Appellant with "quite 
a few" bids that were not on Streator forms. That is, these were so-called 
"courtesy" bids written by Roberts on business forms other than Streator1s. 
Roberts identified some of these courtesy bids in Mgt. Exh. #12 that he had 
completed for Urry (T. I., 183-85). 
Urry's co-worker, Allen Orwin, testified that he had witnessed Jonesy 
writing bids on someone else's letterheads on several occasions. Orwin 
observed Woodco forms being used by Jonesy. These same forms would then be 
given to Urry or Orwin. (T. I., 81-82). Finally, Appellant himself candidly 
acknowledged obtaining fake or "courtesy" bids from Jonesy. (T. II, 57, 68, 
76) 
Appellant has steadfastly maintained that he was aware of the two bid rule 
and acknowledged that he always obtained two bids. Was it his understanding 
that phony or courtesy bids were acceptable within the context of the two bid 
policy? Keith Floyd stated in his March 13, 1985 memo (Mgt. Exh. 7) to the 
Finance Division Director that: "In the past, our division [i.e., Motor Pool] 
has obtained two competitive bids per accident and had the vehicle repaired at 
the vendor whose bid was lowest." (Emphasis added.) Floyd, thus, specified 
that it had been a standing Motor Pool practice that each of the two bids be 
competitive or bona fide per repair. Assistant division director Robert 
Draper corroborated Floyd's testimony. (T.I. 29-30). 
The evidence in the record is more than sufficient to show that Appellant 
committed malfeasance ("Intentional wrong; deliberate violation of law or 
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standard; mismanagement of responsibilities." DPM Rules) and misfeasance 
("Performance of a lawful action in an . . . improper manner." DPM Rules). 
Turning to the Ethics Act, Appellant contends that he did not violate 
Section 67-16-4(3) of the State Code. The Hearing Officer concluded 
otherwise. (Decision, Conclusion No. 13, p. 9). Section 67-16-4(3) prohibits 
a public employee or officer from using one's official position to secure 
"special privileges" either for self or others. Hearing Officer Volker found 
that Mr. Urry had breached the just-cited provision when he used his official 
position to take State automobiles to his friend Jonesy, first at Freeds then 
later at Streators, while knowingly accepting second — and false — bids that 
were higher than bids officially offered by Jonesy at either business. 
(Decision, pp. 9, 13) 
Although the term "special privileges" is defined neither within the 
Ethics Act nor in Utah case law, the term appears sufficiently plain and 
understandable. The purpose of the Ethics Act is to "set forth standards of 
conduct" for public officers and employees to serve as a guide for situations 
where actual or even potential conflicts of interest may arise between one's 
public duties (i.e., Mr. Urry the Motor Pool employee) and one's private 
interests (i.e., Mr. Urry the private citizen). 
Specifically, did Mr. Urry attempt to use his official position to secure 
special privileges for his friend Jonesy? Appellant told why he took the 
Motor Pool's auto repair business to Jonesy at Freeds, then later to Jonesy at 
Streators: 
Q Why did you take the business there? 
A Because I liked him. [Jonesy] 
Q - Just your friend? 
A Right. 
Q Did you have any intent to benefit Freeds? 
A No. 
Q Is it a fair statement to say that you were 
sending the business where your friend was? 
A Yes. 
Q Now Jonesy quit Freeds and moved to Streator's, 
is that correct? 
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A That's correct* 
Q What happened to the business? 
A It followed. 
Q It followed your friend, didnft it? 
A Right. 
Appellant avers that the term "or others" refers only to other public 
employees and thus excludes Jonesy. In our view, "or others11 includes the 
entire citizenry of the State, including Walter May, a.k.a. Jonesy. It is 
clear that the Legislature intended to insulate public officers and employees 
against granting special privilege to those within government service as well 
as to those without. 
Appellant suggests that the only harm to the State was that of a rule 
violation which itself was not clearly established in the work place. (Brief, 
p. 13) Yet the "special privileges" standard was breached in the following: 
when Jonesy received his Freeds' two per cent and his Streators' 
two-and-one-half per cent commissions on body shop work performed by his 
respective employers (the Division asserts that more than $30,000 was paid out 
to Jonesy1s employers during the complained of period and hence Jonesy 
received his commissions thereon); when two — and only two — body shops 
received the bulk, perhaps even all of the State's repair business, of the 
Motor Pool's body shop jobs to the detriment of those firms not invited to 
submit bids; when State funds were being narrowly channeled to Jonesy's 
employers in contravention of the Purchasing Division's intent to ensure 
competitive solicitation in matters involving body shop service fees between 
$500 - $2,000; and when the State's prescribed competitive bidding procedure 
was being circumvented by the Jonesy-Urry friendship. Appellant's wrongful 
actions constituted a serious willful violation of Motor Pool policy. 
Appellant's malfeasance, misfeasance and violation of Section 67-16-4(3) of 
the Ethics Act warrant his dismissal. (See Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended 
Section 67-16-12.) 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The Board sustains the Hearing Officer's findings and conclusions 
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showing that Appellant was dismissed for just cause. Management's decision is 
not viewed as arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or based upon any 
mistake(s) of fact. Hence, in this appeal it is not the Board's intent or 
province to substitute its judgment for that of management's. Concededly, 
management might have imposed a different, even a less severe, penalty. Even 
among Board members, imposition of penalties might vary. Only if there is 
found to be a situation where the facts do not warrant such a penalty or that 
a serious abuse of discretion has occurred, should management's penalty be set 
aside. 
DISCUSSION: 
Board Rule 19.8.2 sets forth a standard of review which authorizes the 
Board to determine whether a Step 5 decision is warranted by the facts and 
circumstances of a case. The facts and circumstances of the Urry appeal 
warrant the following discussion: 
1. Timing. It appears entirely coincidental that this entire business of 
the Motor Pool's accepting and processing of spurious bids came to light at 
all. For at the approximate time (perhaps during the same month) that Orwin 
sparked a "whistleblower" investigation, the Motor Pool implemented the Bloom 
and Associates, Inc. firm's procedure of utilizing a single adjuster for 
damage claims and discontinued the two bid policy. Yet rather incredibly the 
State (whether at the Department or Division level) failed to discern any 
"glitches" in the phony bid process which had lasted over a year. It is 
reasonable to conclude that closer monitoring or periodic auditing would have 
detected the pre-selection pattern given the very few firms' bid sheets that 
were being processed with the warrant requests. 
2. The Two Bid Policy. Throughout the Step 5 hearing there was frequent 
reference to "the two bid policy" of the Motor Pool. Yet in retrospect the 
requirement that these be competitive bids was not sufficiently stressed by 
the Motor Pool manager to Urry or Orwin, nor was that aspect emphasized or 
even mentioned in the March 9 and December 1, 1983 memos. (Mgt. Exh. 8, 6). 
Presumably Mr. Floyd, himself, was inadequately trained in the Procurement 
Regulations to understand and to demand competitive bids from his staff. The 
bidding system used by the Motor Pool was lax, intolerably so. The Motor 
Pool's bidding system lacked specificity: it contained numerous exceptions, 
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it permitted telephone solicitation bids without setting any basic 
requirements, it failed to stress the need for authentic competitive bids and 
it failed to provide adequate instructions and/or training to staff, thus 
supporting Appellant's counsel's claim that insufficient training was provided 
(not that much training is necessary in order to secure two legitimate bids). 
3. Industry Practice. One of Appellant's arguments in his own defense 
was that "courtesy" bids are a commonplace feature of the insurance/auto 
repair industry. Indeed, one Division witness so testified. (Keith Roberts, 
T.I, 184, 191-2). Despite an industry-wide practice, however, the State, 
through its officers and employees, may reasonably expect that bids are to be 
valid and competitive where private entrepreneurs are invited, pursuant to 
rules and official policies, to submit bids. Often large sums of State funds 
are involved in governmental purchases and the public rightfully expects its 
tax dollars to be carefully and properly spent and spent pursuant to the 
State's rules and policies. 
4. Application Failures. The circle of culpability extended beyond Mr. 
Urry: Orwin testified that Floyd as well as Urry told him to "Go down and get 
some bids from Jones." (T.I, 92, 78, 107); the bids from Urry and Orwin 
always went to Floyd (T.I, 92); since Floyd received all bids he should have 
realized that Urry was not properly soliciting competitive bids, but he seems 
to not have questioned Urry's numerous bids received from Jonesy; rather Floyd 
condoned the Motor Pool's defective bidding system, by directing his staff to 
solicit bids from Jonesy even though Freeds and Streators had each received a 
long run on the State's repair business directly concomitant to Jonesy's 
employment. To some extent Urry was following Floyd's instructions by taking 
the Motor Pool business to Jonesy; although Mr. Urry must be held accountable 
for improper conduct in actually obtaining spurious bids. 
In sum, the Motor Pool bidding system was slack to the point of being 
critically defective; and it functioned with inadequate supervision over the 
solicitation process resulting in a system which deteriorated into a mere 
formality rather than serving as an earnest process. Hence, while Mr. Urry's 
dismissal is based upon the principle of just cause and no severe abuse of 
discretion occurred, we further conclude that Urry's actions were part of an 
overall defective bidding system, a faulty system encompassing more than just 
Appellant himself. 
Mr. Urry had been a satisfactory State employee for many years prior to 
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the events giving rise to this case. No doubt he has learned from this 
experience and presumably would not engage in such conduct in the future. 
Therefore, in full consideration of all the facts and circumstances anent the 
faulty bidding system, the Board directs Mr. Urry's placement upon the State's 
reappointment register to a position for which he qualifies but one in other 
than the Motor Pool. (Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Section 67-19-25(6).) 
All provisions of the Personnel Management Rules and Regulations (1985 ed.) 
shall apply to Mr. Urry's placement upon the State's reappointment register as 
in the case of any other employee placed upon said register. The period of 
time between dismissal and any placement into a future State position shall be 
treated as an administrative leave without pay, with no seniority, back pay or 
benefits accruing during the interim. Upon registering at the office of 
Personnel Management, Mr. Urry may have his name placed on the State's 
reappointment register, if he so desires. 
io 
DECISION: 
The Hearing Officer's decision sustaining Appellant's dismissal at Step 5 
is affirmed, except that Appellant shall be placed upon the State's 
reappointment register as noted above, provided that Mr. Urry applies to the 
Division of Personnel Management within ten working days following receipt of 
this decision. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
D A T E D this / — day February, 1986. 
Peter Fillmore, Chairman 
Personnel Review Board 
~\Z_Mi~~>i. 
Robert N. White, SPHR 
Administrator &. Executive Secretary 
Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days from 
issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County. On 
appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amenaed, 
Section 67-19-25(6). 
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M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing DECISION has been 
mailed to the following: Paul Urry, Appellant, at 9955 South 730 East, Sandy, 
Utah 84070; to his attorney, Gregory J. Sanders of Kipp & Christian, 600 
Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2765; 
to Stephen G. Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, legal counsel for the 
Department of Administrative Services; and to the following from the 
Department of Administrative Services: Gene Findlay, Executive Director; 
Scott Lawrence, Director of Central Services; Robert Draper, Deputy Director, 
Central Services; Alan Ostler, Manager of Motor Pool; Brian Harris, Director, 
Division of Personnel Management and to the Utah Personnel Review Board: 
Peter Fillmore, Chairman; Anita C. Bradford; Dalmas H. Nelson, Mary 
Graham-Payne, and Jose L. Trujillo. 
D A T E D this / ij~L day of February 1986, 
Penny G. Wright 
Secretary 
Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days 
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County-
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive- Utah Code Ann- Section 
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended. 
ADDENDUM M 
Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-21(D)(3) (1994), as cited by Petitioner Moon 
has the same language as Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(4) (1997), 
Addendum G to this Brief which was in effect at the time of the hearing. 
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M. Reconsideration. 
1. Section 63-46b-13, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, governs reconsideration requests 
to the same hearing officer at step 5. 
2. The written request must contain specific reasons why a reconsideration is warranted with 
respect to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the evidentiary/step 5 decision. 
The same hearing officer shall decide the propriety of a reconsideration. A request for 
reconsideration is filed with the administrator. An appeal to the board for a 
reconsideration must be filed with the administrator. Any appeal to the board from a 
hearing officer's reconsideration must be filed within ten working days upon receipt of the 
reconsideration or within ten working days after expiration of the time for receipt of the 
reconsideration. 
R137-1-21. The Board and the Appellate Procedure. 
A. Transcript Production. The party appealing the hearing officer's decision to the board at the 
appellate/step 6 level shall order production of the evidentiary/step 5 proceeding's transcript 
from the court reporter. The appellant shall share an equal payment with the CSRB Office to 
the court reporting firm. 
1. Transcript production cost-sharing applies only to the appellant and to the CSRB Office. 
The former receives the transcript original; the latter receives a transcript copy. 
2. The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office about obtaining a transcript copy, or may 
directly purchase a copy from the court reporting firm. 
B. Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board is based upon the evidentiary record previously 
established by the hearing officer. No additional or new evidence is permitted unless compelled 
by the board. 
1. The appellant in a step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of the step 5 hearing. 
After receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 30 calendar days to file an original and 
six copies of a brief with the administrator. Additionally, the respondent must be provided 
with a copy of the appellant's brief. 
2. Upon receipt of a copy of the appellant's brief, the respondent then has 30 calendar days 
to file an original and six copies of a reply brief with the administrator. 
3. Briefs are distributed to board members upon receipt from both parties. 
4. All briefs shall be hand delivered, sent by the U.S. Postal Service postage prepaid, or sent 
through the state's Central Mailing. 
5. Briefs shall be date-stamped upon receipt in the CSRB Office. 
6. The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or waived only for good cause as 
determined by the administrator. 
C. Rules of Procedure. The following rules are applicable to appeal hearings before the board: 
1. Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party or upon its own motion, the board 
may dismiss any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the appeal is clearly 
moot, without merit, not properly filed, or not within the scope of the board's authority. 
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2. Notice. Written notice of the date, time, place, and issues for hearing by the board shall 
be given to the aggrieved employee, to the employee's counsel or representative, to the 
agency, and to the agency's counsel or representative, at least five days before the date set 
for the hearing. 
3. Compelling Evidence. The board may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals. 
4. Oral Argument/Time Limitation. As a general rule, the board restricts the oral argument 
to 30 minutes, or less, per party. The board may grant additional time as it deems 
appropriate. 
5. Oral Argument Set Aside. If the board determines that oral argument is unnecessary, the 
parties shall be so notified, but they may be expected to appear before the board at the 
date, time, and place set to answer any questions raised by the board members. 
6. Argument or Memoranda. Oral argument or written memoranda may be required of the 
parties at the board's discretion. 
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of review shall be based upon the 
following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence standard. 
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not 
reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board 
may, in its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual 
findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing 
officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB 
hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to 
the correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 
decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing officer, 
including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational 
based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
E. Appeal Hearing Record. The proceeding before the board shall be reported by a certified court 
reporter, or in exceptional circumstances by a recording machine. 
F. Appellate Review. Upon a party's application for review of the hearing officer's evidentiary 
decision, the board's decision shall be based upon a review of the record, including briefs and 
oral arguments presented at step 6, and no further evidentiary hearing will be held unless 
otherwise ordered by the board. 
G. Remand. Until the board's decision is final, the board may remand the case to the original 
hearing officer to take additional evidence, as appropriate. 
H. Appellate Decisions. The board's decisions shall be issued pursuant to the following rules: 
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